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SCIENTIFIC VIRTUES: AN INTRODUCTION TO DIACHRONIC REALISM
CHAPTER I 
REALISM 
Introduction
Imagine that human-like beings inhabit a world similar to earth 
except that it is enclosed by a gigantic cube consisting of sheets of 
translucent cloth-like material.^ Outside of this cube flocks of geese 
fly across the top from north to south and back again but only their 
shadows, projected on the translucent cloth, are visible to the inhabi­
tants of this world. Furthermore, a system of mirrors is set up outside
the translucent cube in such a way that these shadows are also cast upon
2
one of the vertical walls of the cube, for example, the northern wall. 
Finally, it is physically impossible for inhabitants of this world to 
penetrate the translucent sheets so that they cannot (in principle, if 
you like) see the geese directly, hear their squawkings, collect their 
feathers, etc. Anything the inhabitants conjecture about the shadows is 
therefore forever limited to evidence that can be gathered from within 
the cube.
Assuming that human-like creatures, given enough time, will
1
almost certainly attempt to take stock of their environment in a more 
or less systematic way, various cosmologies will be developed that will 
somehow try to incorporate the visible shadows into a consistent 'cube- 
picture'. Perhaps the most primitive cosmologies will see at first in 
the irregular shadowy display the caprice of the gods, or the haphazard­
ness of the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. Others may inter­
pret them as entities governed by laws and consisting of materials 
totally different from any known on this other world. Doubtless, over 
time it will be noted that there are correlations between the upper and 
the northern shadows and, perhaps, if the inhabitants develop telescopes, 
more of the detail of the shadows will be discerned. At this point, some 
of the more primitive capricious cosmologies are likely to lose (though 
perhaps not without a struggle) whatever credibility they might have once 
had, at least for the more informed members of the population. Still, 
there will be a wide range of acceptable cosmologies, any of which can 
continue to save the phenomena.
Among the more sophisticated inhabitants this underdetermination 
of current theories by the available evidence will lead to an important 
methodological debate. Some will maintain that the differences between 
rival cosmologies are merely conventional or pragmatic, that as long as 
the phenomena are equally saved there are no further facts of the matter 
to which one can appeal. Any system that mathematically accounts for 
the data will be as good as any other. Choices of which system to use 
will be based on questions of convenience, personal or social taste, or, 
in short, sociological and psychological considerations together with, 
perhaps, a more or less objective standard of computational ease. It
may even be argued that this is all that a'science’ of the shadows is 
or should be, and a cubical Ptolemy may pick and choose at will from 
among the various mathematically adequate systems without feeling that 
he (or she) has violated any physical principles.
Others will not be satisfied with this sort of account of 
science and will attempt to provide explanations as to the nature of the 
shadows, what causes their movements, and so forth. Crystalline cubes, 
invisible strings, and various other theoretical models will be advanced 
as the ’true’ or ’real’ account of the observed phenomena. This group 
will likely criticize the other for surrendering the quest for truth for 
purely formal, descriptive correlations. In turn they will be labeled 
as ’armchair metaphysicians’, criticized for their inability to move be­
yond visual or imaginable aids in their account of the phenomena.
Trying to decide at this point which group was more rational or 
more scientific would be to jump into the traditional debates between 
scientific realists and various forms of anti-realism. This would be to 
take a stand on what science is and should be, and which of the above 
approaches is more representative and conducive of whatever these are 
taken to be. It would also be to assume that these issues can be decided 
once and for all, for all theories. Roughly, a decision could be made to 
support the first group and claim that if descriptive and predictive suc­
cess and relative ease of computation does not decide between alternative 
accounts, there is no rational choice between them. Or it could be claimed 
with the second group that predictive and descriptive success should be 
(somehow) correlated with questions concerning the truth of the accounts.
Is there an objective way to choose between these two views?
At the stage we left our cubical science, I think the more ra­
tional view would be to side with the anti-realist approach. All that 
the available evidence supports is that there is a correlation between 
the two visible sets of shadows. Whether there are two distinct realms, 
crystalline cubes, invisible strings, 'epicubes', or whatever, is, at 
present, totally underdetermined by the available evidence. Arguing for 
one theory over another when this is the case seems to be less rational 
than remaining neutral as to the truth of the accounts and stressing 
their relative usefulness, computational ease, etc.
Rather than leaving the story at this point, however, it may be 
instructive to provide more and varied information for the cubical sci­
entists. If, for example, there are also geese within the cube, similari­
ties between their observed behavior and the behavior of the shadows may 
eventually be noticed. Scientific developments in other fields also may 
begin to separate the competing theories into more and less plausible 
alternatives. Advances in optics, for example, might enable the scientists 
to determine that the observed phenomena are shadows, rather than 
aethereal substances. Subsequently, theories that had not utilized en­
tities beyond the cube, or worse, had argued against them, would be in 
serious trouble.
At this point, one would expect a great deal of new interest and 
research concerning what the external entities are like. There would also 
be more impetus to link information provided by separate fields when this 
is available, so that advances in each one may throw light on problems 
within the others. If, for example, certain types of biological regulari­
ties become established concerning cubical geese, the observed similarities
between them and the shadows can be increased or decreased. The scien­
tists begin to expect more and more effects to be predictable from the 
various remaining theories. Each one becomes committed to more and more 
as other regularities are established or refuted. It does not seem im­
plausible that enough convergence between and among various theories and 
the available evidence could lead to the acceptance of the theory that 
the visible shadows are caused by the very situation described at the 
beginning of the above parable.
Perhaps enough had been learned about biological entities, and 
birds in particular, that it began to look very probable that the shadows 
were caused by a particular kind of entity. Similarly, the shape of and 
the correlation between the shadows might eventually point to the 
existence of mirrors, and so forth. While the vagueness of this fanciful 
development of cubical science undoubtedly stacks the deck, I hope that 
it at least shows the plausibility of the view that a realist position 
might become more rational as evidence accumulates for and against 
various theories. At a certain conceivable level of development (de­
tailed commitments being borne out, a great deal of convergence among 
theories in different fields, etc.) the level of confidence in the truth 
of a particular theory can rationally increase.
If this is so, it appears that one should not interpret realist/ 
anti-realist debates as atemporal or as global, but rather as being about
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particular theories at particular stages in their development. Further­
more, the relative rationality of each position can change as the ratio 
between the evidence for a theory and the empirical and conceptual 
problems within this theory fluctuates.^ The purpose of this disser­
tation is not only to argue that this diachronic approach to realist/ 
anti-realist debates is superior to the traditional synchronically in­
terpreted dichotomy, but also to argue that using such an approach can 
support a particular form of scientific realism, at least for some theories, 
at particular stages of their development. This will also involve, of 
course, an elucidation of what this form of realism amounts to, what kind 
(as well as what amount) of evidence can support it, and enough historical 
data to help make the resulting position plausible. The remainder of 
this work will be devoted to providing such an elucidation and defense.
Some Types of Scientific Realism 
There are, of course, many different versions of scientific 
realism, as there are many different versions of anti-realism. One of 
the more traditional controversies, beginning with debates between Plato 
and Aristotle, concerns the referential status of abstract terms such 
as properties and relational terms. In medieval parlance part of this 
debate focused on the problem of the existence of universals. As such, 
it finds part of its current formulation in the widespread debates con­
cerning the reality of numbers, or whether 'physical magnitude' terms 
such as 'length' are best understood as functions which map objects into 
real numbers, or as properties of these objects (or, in Kyburg's happy 
phrase, the distinction between 'length' being a property of an object or 
"the result of doing something to the object").^ Also relevant, of course, 
are some of the recent debates concerning whether or not to quantify over 
(or be ontologically committed to) classes or sets, physical properties, 
modalities (such as necessity) and so forth.^ Despite their long philo­
sophical history and their importance for philosophy of science (parti­
cularly as some of the above mentioned issues relate to the problems of 
measurement and the reference of physical magnitude terms), however, these 
debates are not the ones that most often occur among realist and anti­
realist philosophers and historians, nor are they the ones that are usually 
found in historical cases of disagreement among scientists.
Similarly, though scientific realist claims are sometimes formu­
lated in terms of whether statements containing theoretical terms have 
truth values (as opposed to, for example, being mere 'inference tickets', 
or being reducible to non-theoretical, observational statements),^ this 
is also not the usual focus in historical cases of realist/anti-realist 
debates. It has long been maintained that the 'meanings' of theoretical
8
statements are not reducible to the meanings of observational statements. 
Furthermore, important current anti-realist positions, such as that of Bas 
C. Van Fraassen (discussed at length in chapter three of this work), are 
no longer committed to a strict observational/theoretical distinction, nor 
to the view that the empirical meaningfulness of theoretical claims is 
totally contained in the observational consequences of e theory. In fact, 
much of the motivation behind recent realist positions is the utter 
failure of early positivist 'reductionist' programs to succeed in showing 
that theoretical statements do not have independent meaning and scientific
9
(especially explanatory) importance.
Finally, while the claim that scientific theories (or the con­
junction of statements within a scientific theory) have truth values may 
once have been considered important, it has never been the main focus of 
actual realist/anti-realist debates in science. Rather, the focal point 
of historical cases of disagreement has been over whether there was suf-
fiaient evidence available at the time to justify postulating 'gravity', 
or 'atoms', or 'electrons', or 'phlogiston', i.e., whether scientists 
working in the relevant field could be warranted in believing in such 
theoretical entities. Consequently, whether theories or their component 
parts have truth values (whether we can discover them or not) misses this 
important epistemological component of whether the evidence warrants as­
signing them the value 'true' or 'approximately true'. Similarly, I 
will argue in chapter two that the recent interest in formulating theories 
of reference for theoretical terms is, while a necessary ingredient for 
realist positions, also beside the point as far as this central epis- 
temic component is concerned. Briefly, even if a theory of reference 
succeeds in accounting for how theoretical terms can be referential, 
whether particular ones are cannot be decided without considering the 
evidential support for these terms available at a particular time for a 
particular theory.
Much more relevant and widespread (given the tendency to adopt 
holistic interpretations of scientific theories in the aftermath of po­
sitivist observational-reductionist frenzy)is what I will call a 
pragmatic approach to realism. In such an approach one often finds the 
realist claim that some theoretical terms have the same existential status 
and support as medium-sized physical objects linked with the view that 
both 'molecules' and 'chairs' are postulated to make sense of our total 
experience. W.V.O. Quine, perhaps the most familiar adherent to such a 
view, expresses this claim as follows.
Considered relative to our surface irritations, which exhaust our 
clues to an external world, the molecules and their extraordinary 
ilk are thus much on a par with the most ordinary physical objects.
The positing of those extraordinary things is just a vivid analogue 
of the positing or acknowledging of ordinary things.H
What places both ordinary objects and theoretical entities 'on a par' is
the desideratum that our overall theory (the set of all our beliefs from
the 'sitability' of chairs to the complementarity of electrons) remain
as consistent and as simple as possible, while being able to successfully
guide our behavior in the sense of enabling us to make accurate predic-
12tions concerning future experience. Unlike the realist positions dis­
cussed above, this view does emphasize the relation between theoretical 
(and ordinary) objects and the evidence which is used to support belief 
in them. Also, unlike these other forms of realism, the pragmatic ap­
proach (or something like it) recently has become quite widespread in 
philosophy of science, and does (or may) have direct relevance for inter­
preting historical cases of realist/anti-realist debates. For all of 
these reasons, I will consider it in some detail before I proceed to 
develop the type of scientific realism that I will be defending in this 
work.
First of all, the pragmatic approach does represent a type of
scientific realism, both in the sense that it emphasizes the evidential
support for postulated entities, and because it does not interpret the
'existence' of theoretical entities differently from that of ordinary 
13physical objects. Still, there is something substantially indetermi­
nate about pragmatic realism in that it places too much emphasis on 
epistemological concerns. Quine often claims that when predictions fail 
what we are to change in our total system of beliefs to correct the re­
sulting tension is largely underdetermined. He often uses an analogy 
(which he attributes to Neurath) of attempting to repair a leaking boat 
while at sea.
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Our boat stays afloat because at each alteration we keep the bulk 
of it intact as a going concern. Our words continue to make passable 
sense because of continuity of change of theory: we warp usage gradu­
ally enough to avoid rupture.
What we change to bring recalcitrant experiences into our system depends 
on what would do the least overall damage to our existing system. This 
depends, of course, on all of our beliefs, as well as upon all of the 
varied interconnections between them (or at least upon all of some sub­
set of our belief system, since finding that some swans are black need 
not create tension within axiomatic set theory or quantum mechanics).
This is why Quine's position can be classified as holistic, and why such 
a position cannot adequately assess what precisely to blame when predic­
tions go awry, nor what precisely to praise when they are successful. 
Since scientists have almost always behaved as if they could single out 
particular parts of a theory to modify or abandon when predictions fail, 
holistic interpretations of scientific theories cannot represent how sci­
entists interpret scientific practice.
The situation is worse for pragmatic realism. Quine has re­
peatedly argued that our ontological commitments (often put in terms of 
what we should be willing to quantify over) should be based on our best 
physical theories, and that new commitments should be considered in 
terms of whether they add to the scope and accuracy of existing theory.
As an epistemic guideline, this represents sound advice. On the other 
hand, from Quine's pragmatic-holistic perspective, this claim also takes 
on ontological trappings, concerning not only what we have warrant to 
believe there is, but also concerning what there is. It is one thing to 
insist that our only basis for believing or disbelieving in theoretical 
claims involves their relation to available evidence, and quite another
11
to claim that this evidential support is all there is to claims of exis­
tence or truth. To decide on the existence of, for example, electrons 
because of the ability of the physical theories that postulate them to 
organize our experience and make predictions about our future experience 
is a different matter from claiming that this is what existence claims 
amount to (or that this is all we can legitimately mean when we say that 
statements involving electrons are true).
Embracing the latter is to slip into one or another form of 
verificationism, which has already been battered and bruised sufficiently 
to eliminate the necessity of attacking it again in this work. Quine's 
position is, of course, more subtle than some earlier forms of verifi­
cationism, and was in fact formulated partially in response to early po­
sitivist accounts. Still, interpreting notions of 'truth' or 'existence' 
in terms of some system of beliefs (or according to 'our best physical 
theories') again amounts to identifying evidential and ontological con­
cerns (even though this identification may be less direct in pragmatic 
realism than in earlier forms of verificationism). How we connect 
theoretical claims to 'physical reality' is a difficult and as yet un­
answered (to everyone's satisfaction at least) question. Still, it is 
this connection that is operative in our most widespread notions of 
'truth' and 'existence'. Consequently, reducing physical reality to well 
supported observational and theoretical claims abandons the usual notion 
of objective truth rather than elucidating it. The evidence I will pro­
vide if questioned about my ontological commitments is simply not what 
these commitments commit me ^  (i.e., that there i^ a connection between 
my statements and something (perhaps vaguely) referred to as 'physical
12
reality').
Recently claims about the connection between our statements and 
a theory-independent external reality have been widely attacked as 'meta­
physical' by a number of philosophers (some of them realists) who are 
interested in philosophy of science. Primarily, these attacks have been 
based on an interpretation of Tarski's definition of 'truth' for 
formalized languages. It is claimed that it is a consequence of Tarski's 
approach that truth (even a 'correspondence' theory of truth) is to be 
formulated within a theory, and that the connection between terms (or 
statements) and 'things' is to be understood internally in terms of the 
formal notion of 'satisfaction'. Hilary Putnam has popularizes this ap­
proach in his presidential address to the Eastern meeting of the Ameri­
can Philosophical Association in 1 9 7 6 . While Putnam's approach is in 
many respects different from Quine's, and Putnam would undoubtedly resist 
the label of 'pragmatic realism', I will try to show that the position 
he outlined in "Realism and Reason" is committed to the same muddling 
of epistemological and ontological concerns outlined above, Putnam con­
siders his realism to be many sided, and supported in different ways by
18a number of his works. Still, his Tarskian attacks on what he calls 
'metaphysical realism' (MR) can be initially separated from other aspects 
of his overall realist position. Consequently, I will here focus pri­
marily on "Realism and Reason", and consider his general epistemic account 
of realism in chapter four, and his theory of the reference of theoretical 
terms in chapter two.
Putnam formulates the essential ingredients of MR as follows.
The most important consequence of metaphysical realism is that truth 
is supposed to be radically non-epistemic— we might be 'brains in
13
a vat’ and so the theory that is ’ideal’ from the point of view of 
operational utility, inner beauty and elegance, ’plausibility’, sim­
plicity, ’conservatism’, etc., might be false. ’Verified’ (in any 
operational sense) does not imply ’true’, on the metaphysical realist 
picture, even in the ideal limit.19
This certainly depicts the notion that ’truth’ and ’existence’ depend in 
a crucial way on some connection between statements and an independent 
physical reality that I opted for above. Putnam claims that this view is 
not simply wrong or naive, but incoherent. This commits him to something 
stronger than holding that empirical evidence does not support MR, or 
that the ’connection’ between words and independent reality that it is 
based on is not sufficiently articulated. Claims that a position is ’in­
coherent’, like claims that a statement is ’meaningless’, imply that 
there is either some out and out contradiction within the position, or 
at least that it systematically misuses central terms (in this case, 
’truth’, ’existence’, or ’connection’). Thus, though Putnam explicitly 
rejects a verificationist theory of meaning, it is precisely over meanings 
that he disagrees with MR positions. I have already maintained that what 
most of us mean when we claim that, for example, electrons carry a single 
negative unit charge of electricity, is that there is a correspondence 
between what we say and the way electrons ’really’ behave (independently 
of our best theory concerning them, which may be false). I think that
this is the common informed view of ’truth’, ’existence’, and the like,
so that the burden of proof is almost certainly on Putnam. How, then,
does he try to justify his claim that MR is ’incoherent’?
He begins his attack on MR by appealing to an imaginary ideal 
theory that he characterizes as follows.
Let Tj^  be an ideal theory, by our lights. Lifting restrictions on
14
our actual all-too-finlte powers, we can imagine T. to have every 
property except objective truth— which is left open— that we like. 
E.g., can be imagined complete, consistent, to predict correctly 
all observational sentences (as far as we can tell), to meet whatever 
'operational constraints' there are (if these are 'fuzzy', let 
seem clearly to meet them), to be 'beautiful', 'simple', 'plausible', 
etc. The supposition under consideration is that T. might be all 
of this and still be (in reality) false.20
It is this claim of MR that Putnam argues is incoherent, for reasons I 
will soon provide. At this point, however, it will be worthwhile to 
elucidate what might be incoherent about such a claim, and how this 
shows that Putnam also muddles epistemological and ontological con­
siderations. Before his formal objections are articulated, we can become 
intuitively clearer concerning what his motivations are for claiming that 
MR positions are incoherent by trying to formulate some incoherence 
claims that might be generated from the above quote.
First, it might be argued that, given such an ideal theory, we 
should surely believe in its truth (if we are willing to believe in any­
thing) . This would amount to a claim that this model of an ideal theory 
completely satisfies all we could possibly mean by evidence warranting 
belief in a theory. Hence, if MR claims that there is something more or 
different involved in justifying theoretical claims, it would be 'incoher­
ent' because of some misuse of the term 'justification' (or 'warrant', or 
'evidence'), I agree. In fact, a large part of chapter three will be 
devoted to arguing that when a theory achieves a certain level of 'vir­
tues' (to be elucidated later— roughly corresponding to some of the 
'operational constraints' that Putnam lists), the most appropriate epis­
temic attitude towards it (or the conjunction of its theoretical claims) 
would be belief in its truth. Still, MR certainly need not be committed 
to this type of incoherence, and I know of no actual MR positions that
15
would deny that, as far as justification Is concerned, the Ideal theory 
postulated by Putnam could serve as an exemplar.
’Justification*, however. Is an epistemic concept, concerned 
with our right to claim to know or believe certain statements. As such, 
whether or not such epistemic attitudes can be said to be justified does 
not. In Itself, say anything about whether such warranted beliefs are 
true. I think, for example, that Aristotle was justified, given the evi­
dence available to him, in believing (or even claiming to know) that 
the earth Is stationary at the center of our solar system. Still, of 
course, he was wrong, and later evidence began to accumulate against his 
belief so that we can be said to justifiably believe (or know. If you 
like) that the earth Is not stationary at the center of our solar system. 
Granted, this example does not approach the evidence converging on 
Putnam's Ideal theory (though I will later argue that cases like that of 
Aristotle ^  pose problems for Putnam’s position). Nevertheless, even In 
the Ideal case, the theory could be wrong. I would argue that this would 
approach the miraculous (for reasons to be given In chapter three) and 
that we could have no explanation of how a theory could be so Incredibly 
confirmed and yet be false. Still, If truth Is Indeed linked with the 
notion of some connection between statements and an Independent reality. 
It Is not Impossible that a theory that Is ’super confirmed’ could be 
false. We would have no reason to believe that It was false, and no way 
of ever finding out that It was false (assuming that no new evidence In­
dicates otherwise), but, alas, we and our theories do not have the final 
say In such matters.
Second (and this Is what Putnam clearly Intends), It might be
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argued that the incoherence within MR is precisely this notion that there 
is something more to 'truth' than what is contained in super-confirmed 
statements. This would be to deny that our notion of 'truth' entails 
any commitment to a connection with some independent reality (i.e., to 
deny that 'truth' is a non-epistemic notion). I think, as I've said, 
that this is just false. Even if articulating what this connection is be­
tween words and things is difficult (or even impossible), it is not in­
coherent (though it may be naive or unjustified) to postulate such a 
connection. Denying that truth is non-epistemic is, I think, precisely
to argue that completely confirmed statements are what we mean by 'truth',
21i.e., to adopt a form of verificationism. This does not, in itself, 
show that verificationist claims are wrong, but it does show that MR is 
only incoherent ^  we treat 'meaning' (at least of terms such as 'truth' 
and 'existence') in a verificationist manner. Incoherence from-the-per- 
spective-of-verificationism is not incoherence per se. A theory of 
meaning has slipped into the argument, and, in fact, one that some eighty 
years of philosophical argumentation give us good reasons to reject. In­
tuitively, then, I think that Putnam's claims for the incoherence of MR 
are suspect. Now we need to consider the arguments he actually gave for 
this claim to ensure that important questions haven't been begged or ig­
nored.
Putnam's actual argument for the incoherence of MR positions is, 
as I've said, closely linked to model-theoretic considerations tied to 
Tarski's definition of 'truth' for formalized languages. The following 
is the main passage in which these model-theoretic considerations are 
supposed to show that theory-independent notions of truth are incoherent.
17
I assume that THE WORLD has (or can be broken Into) infinitely many 
pieces. I also assume T- says there are Infinitely many things (so 
in this respect T- i^ 'objectively right' about THE WORLD). Now T- 
is consistent (by hypothesis) and has (only) infinite models. So 
by the completeness theorem (in its model-theoretic form), T^  ^has a 
model of every infinite cardinality. Pick a model M of the same 
cardinality as THE WORLD. Map the individuals of M one-to-one into 
pieces of THE WORLD, and use the mapping to define relations of M 
directly in THE WORLD. The result is a satisfaction relation SAT—  
a 'correspondence' between terms of L and the sets of pieces of THE 
WORLD— such that the theory T^ comes out true— true of THE WORLD—  
provided we just Interpret 'true' as TRUE(SAT). So what becomes of 
the claim that even the ideal theory T^ might really be false?
This is a nice piece of argumentation, based on a widely accepted formal
23treatment of truth, and on a well-defined notion of 'satisfaction'.
Whether it is compelling as opposed to being sophisticated legerdemain 
remains to be seen.
First, there are some minor problems involved in Putnam's ac­
count if it is to be related to a (even ideal) physical theory. While 
it may be the case that physical theories will someday be capable of for­
mulation within some artificial language, it is at least controversial 
whether such a program will ever be carried out. If it is not carried 
out, it is not clear that Tarski's theory can be applied to such a theory. 
Tarski consistently maintained that his definition of truth was not meant 
to apply to natural (or any nonformal) languages, both because of the 
relative vagueness of nonformal languages, and because of certain persis­
tent paradoxes (notably that of the 'liar') if such languages are used.^^ 
As I said, this is probably a minor problem, both because some ideal 
scientific theory may be adequately formalized someday, and (more impor­
tantly) because there have been attempts to extend Tarski's treatment
25to nonformal languages. Also, even if the above problem can be ignored, 
it is not clear that 'incoherence' results from a MR position given Put-
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nam's above account because, as I've claimed, 'incoherence' seems to be a
claim about meanings, and Tarski's 'Convention T' is only meant to pro-
26duce extensionally equivalent statements. Even if (and this is also
controversial, as we'll see) the mapping of M into THE WORLD produces
TRUE(SAT) statements that are extensionally equivalent to MR true-of-an-
external-reality statements, it is still not incoherent to claim that
something is missing in M concerning our ordinary notion of 'true'. This
point too may be a minor one, but an extension of it is not.
Second, G.H, Merrill has argued that an extension of this last
minor point shows that Putnam's construal of TRUE(SAT) does not render
27MR positions incoherent. The crux of Putnam's claim is that the one-
to-one mapping of M into THE WORLD renders the MR 'true' and 'TRUE(SAT)
in M' equivalent. What then is 'left over' in the MR concept of truth?
Merrill argues that Putnam's argument against MR is a non sequitur in
that it only applies to a MR position that is committed to the claim that
THE WORLD consists of a set of objects (and hence the mapping of M into
28
THE WORLD would be complete). As Merrill points out, it is dubious
whether any MR position would accept such a construal.
Are there any realists who maintain just this position? This is du­
bious, for realists typically hold that not only are there objective­
ly existing entities (both observable and unobservable) in the world, 
but also that these entities bear to one another certain objactual 
relations. And according to this latter view the world must be re­
presented not simply as a set, but as a set together with a class 
of relations among the members of that s e t . 29
The remainder of Merrill's article consists in constructing a model in­
volving what he calls a 'structured domain' (including the relations be­
tween the objects) and showing that, given such a model, MR claims do not 
come out incoherent on a Tarskian construal (though, for Merrill, MR
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daims are still false). This shows, if it is successful, that Putnam's 
arguments do not formally justify his desired results. Briefly, if Mer­
rill is right, Putnam has attacked a straw man.
Finally, there are also less formal problems with Putnam's
30claim that MR is incoherent besides the ones I've already presented.
First, a formal consideration renders Putnam's argument much too strong
for his purposes. Though Putnam's claim is that it is incoherent to
maintain that the ideal theory T^ can be 'super-justified' and yet be
false, such a claim can similarly be applied to non-ideal theories that
31are (or once were) rationally acceptable. The moral of this is that, for 
example, Aristotle's belief that the earth was stationary at the center 
of our solar system (or Newton’s theory, or phlogiston theory, etc.) will 
come out TRUE(SAT) for much the same reasons that the model M of T^ does, 
which would turn Putnam's account into a version of relativism. Or, if 
one chooses to restructure TRUE(SAT) so that only 'ideal' theories would 
qualify (for example, one might argue that no non-ideal theory is really 
rationally acceptable, or some such), then "there is scarce any differ­
ence between Putnam's unmetaphysical realist and the garden-variety 
sceptic.
Second, and more generally, all of Putnam's arguments for the
truth (as opposed to the justification of believes-true claims) of T^^
with M as a model are of the 'what else?' variety. "What else could be
required for the truth of the ideal theory than that there be an inter-
33pretation which makes it true in the actual world?" Not operational
34constraints, for they can be assumed to be met in T^. Furthermore, 
according to Putnam, it would be illegitimate to claim that it is not
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enough for the truth of a theory that one of its models can be mapped
into THE WORLD, but that it must also be an 'intended* interpretation.
How do such 'intentions' link words with things in a manner that is dif-
35
ferent from the mapping of M into THE WORLD? Causal theories of re­
ference, intended to replace the vague 'intention' talk with real 
causal relations between words and objects (consisting, perhaps, of phy­
sical, social, and psychological circumstances) will not help, according 
to Putnam, since these theories are still unarticulated concerning what 
reference is. In short, for Putnam, such theories label the already
mysterious relation formulated by MR positions, but do nothing to de- 
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mystify it. This amounts to a kind of circularity, that "in order to
say anything which is informative about what fixes reference, the re-
37ference of some of our words and phrases must already be fixed." And,
if such a circularity is vicious, it would seem to undermine MR claims.
There are at least two things wrong with this. First, there
is no reason to think that the above circularity is vicious unless causal
theories of reference are understood as definitions of 'reference.'
Rather, they should be viewed as "natural explanations" of aspects of 
38reference, and, as such, the circularity is no more vicious than the 
familiar belief-reference circularity in radical translation (roughly, 
we need to know what the native believes to fix the reference of her ut­
terances, and we need to know what the references of her utterances are 
to figure out what she believes). Second, and more importantly, causal 
and other accounts of reference, since they are at least partially con­
cerned with explaining the success of linguistic communities by linking 
these communities' linguistic practices to their (independent) physical
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environment, are not analyses of the term 'refers*. As I claimed earlier, 
arguing that the connection between words and things postulated by MR is 
unarticulated is not the same as arguing that this postulation is inco­
herent. Again, MR positions may be false or naive (but, if so, a differ­
ent type of argument must be leveled against them), but that is a dif­
ferent matter from their being incoherent. Given my earlier remarks 
against Putnam's 'what else?' strategy, plus the arguments of Merrill and 
Glymour, it seems that the alleged incoherence of MR positions is a non 
sequitur, both formally and intuitively.
Realism and Explanation 
One may wonder why so much space has been devoted to criti­
cizing Putnam's attack on MR, First, such a move has become widely ac­
cepted, and much effort has been expended recently trying to avoid the 
39'pitfalls' of MR. Second, and more importantly, a large part of the 
overall realist position I am going to defend depends on some sort of 
MR being acceptable. The basic formulation of diachronic realism will 
be presented in the next section of this chapter. This basic formulation 
will look like several familiar versions of scientific realism, with the 
addition of a few qualifications and addenda. It shares with most real­
ist positions the basic intuition that scientific realism offers the best 
(if not the only) explanation of the overall success of science. It will 
be seen in chapter four, however, that this intuition faces serious dif­
ficulties if it is accepted at face value. Briefly, it has recently been 
argued that 'successful' theories need not be true, and that theories 
that can be said to have successfully referred and to have been at least
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'approximately true' were not always the most successful theories avail­
able at any given time. Consequently, the notions of 'truthlikeness', 'be­
nign chauvinism', and 'being on the right track' will later be introduced 
as addenda to diachronic realism to help counter this objection. The 
crux of the matter is that these notions, as well as the success of the 
general intuition that realism explains scientific success, depend on 
some sort of MR interpretation of 'true', and, hence, the necessity of 
attempting to refute Putnam's objections to MR in the proceeding section. 
At present it will suffice to introduce part of my general strategy, and 
to consider a different objection to realism as explanation, reserving 
my main line of argumentation until chapter four.
One of the notions I will further elucidate is that of 'benign 
chauvinism'. Part of this concept (the 'chauvinism' part) consists sim­
ply in asserting the truism that we must judge the truth or falsity of 
theories or theoretical claims, the reference or non-reference of theore­
tical terms, and the 'success' of past theories in terms of the evi­
dence now available to ^  (as is often noted, what else besides our 
criteria and our evidence can we use?). Hence, Aristotle, for example, 
was right to believe that the earth was stationary at the center of our 
solar system given his evidence, but nevertheless, given our information, 
this belief was wrong. Such a claim depends on there being a separation 
between epistemological (Aristotle was justified in believing x) and on­
tological (Aristotle was nevertheless wrong) concerns. Furthermore, the 
'benign' part of this chauvinism consists partially in the ability to 
claim that Aristotle and other past theorists were justified in making 
their claims, in spite of the fact that they were wrong. I agree with
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Glymour that a simple extension of Putnam's argument concerning the truth 
of the ideal theory would render such past successful theories (or ra­
tionally acceptable theories) 'true' as well. The resulting relativism 
would render either 'chauvinism' bankrupt (Aristotle's claim was true, 
given Aristotle's 'conceptual scheme')at the expense of a (or so I've 
maintained) philosophically respectable notion of truth, or the 'benign' 
part bankrupt (possibly in the form of 'incommensurability' arguments 
such as "væ can't understand, or accept, or appreciate any part of Aris­
totle's theory, since we are invariably locked in our own different per­
spective"— so that Aristotle's claims were not even rational, by our 
lights)at the expense of historical charity and intelligibility. 'Truth­
likeness' and 'being on the right track' also depend in crucial ways on 
the theory-independence of truth, and the resulting epistemological/onto­
logical distinction. This brief introduction to 'benign chauvinism' 
should suffice for the moment to show why I belabored my critique of 
Putnam's 'unmetaphysical realism'.
While most of my arguments in defense of realism as explanation 
will be presented later, there is an independent, general type of defense 
of this notion that can be presented now. The belief that realist po­
sitions explain scientific success has become a cornerstone of virtually 
all recent realist positions, including Putnam's. The basic intuition 
is that the best way to account for the success of, for example, atomic 
theory (consisting, in part, of its crucial role in a number of dif­
ferent sciences, its predictive and explanatory power, its developing 
more than one way to measure or detect subatomic particles, etc.) is by 
assuming that there are atoms (or something very much like atoms).
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The alternative seems to be to swallow the existence of more or less in­
credible coincidences in the form of "while there aren't atoms or any­
thing like them, our overall experience is such that the world operates 
^  there were", or some such. Roughly, it does not seem likely that 
the postulation of imaginary or arbitrary entities would enable us to 
achieve the very impressive convergence of evidence for a successful 
theory that many current scientific theories (and some past theories as 
well) enjoy. How else are we to account for this level of success 
(barring Berkeley's God, or Descartes' possibly too clever evil genius)?
In response many anti-realists (and some, notably pragmatic,
realists) have claimed that the increasing success of scientific theories
40can be explained in some sort of evolutionary manner. Most of these 
accounts, however, remain at best explanatory sketches, as if the details 
of the evolutionary account were familiar enough to render attempts to 
elucidate it unnecessary. The most articulated evolutionary account that 
I know of (though it is primarily concerned with explaining the evolution 
of ideas, while other evolutionary accounts concern themselves with cul­
tural survival elements) is provided by Pierre Duhem in The Aim and Struc­
ture of Physical Theory.Consequently, I will briefly consider Duhem's 
formulation in order to determine whether evolutionary accounts actu­
ally provide a rival explanation for the success of science.
As is well known, Duhem's general position regarding the cogni­
tive status of theories and theoretical statements is that they are not 
assumptions concerning the 'real' nature of material things, but rather 
that they "have as their sole aim the economical condensation and clas­
sification of experimental laws."^^ This means that the theorist enjoys
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considerable freedom in the formulation of her theories, constrained only 
by the experimental laws that she is attempting to condense and classify, 
and by "the opinions of men" (past theories, the prevailing methodologi­
cal and theoretical framework, etc.). Still, a successful and impres­
sive theory such as Newton's theory of universal gravitation does not 
spring forth as "the sudden product of a creation" (which would seem mi­
raculous) but is rather "the slow and progressive result of an evolution" 
(which seems at least less m i r a c u l o u s ) D u h e m  then proceeds to out­
line the earlier attempts to deal with the physical problem of 'weight',
from Aristotle through theories of astrologers and physicians to the sys-
44terns of Galileo and Newton. What results is a plausible view that we 
can understand the complexity and high level of success of Newton's 
theory as a result of a slow evolution roughly spanning two thousand 
years of attempts to condense and classify experimental and experiential 
regularities. Given this slow evolution of theoretical systems, con­
verging finally in Newton's theory of universal gravitation, the otherwise 
implausible view that Newton 'chanced' upon this theory that just 'hap­
pened' to work can be somewhat mollified.
From Duhem's perspective, all of the aspects of Newton's theory 
were available for him to synthesize, and all of these aspects were for­
mulated by previous, less successful, attempts to condense and classify 
experimental laws that can be seen as representing nearer and nearer 
'misses' (not, of course, a la realism, as near misses towards the 'true' 
account, but rather as near misses towards a more empirically adequate 
account). ^  it can be conceded that Aristotle's system was hardly a 
miraculous scientific achievement, but was rather a more or less common-
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sense theory concerning the then relatively straightforward experiential 
’facts', then showing that Newton's system developed gradually (a piece 
at a time) from Aristotle's and other relatively simple systems removes 
the 'miraculous coincidence' aspect of universal gravitation without pos­
tulating its 'truth'. In short, Newton's theory was as successful as it 
was because it represented the gradual synthesis of previously less 
successful theories. One need not, therefore, be committed to theories 
approaching the truth in order to account for their increasing success.
Such a view seems quite plausible, and I have no doubt that 
something like the above account may well explain the formation of suc­
cessful theories. Still, I maintain, their success has not thereby been 
explained. Indeed, the fact that Einstein could formulate the special 
theory of relativity may presuppose that earlier non-relativistic 
theories at least helped to pose the problems that Einstein addressed. 
Still, why should any of them have worked as well as they did, if they 
were not at least partially 'right'? Some evolutionary theories (such as 
Van Fraassen's) would claim that such theories need only be 'right' about 
the experimental laws that they condense and classify (or even, for Van 
Fraassen, ' e x p l a i n ' ) F o r  some theories (such as phlogiston theory),
I will argue later that their ability to organize otherwise unrelated 
data all that can be claimed to be 'right' about them. I do not find 
this plausible, however, for all theories, especially ones that enjoy a 
particularly high convergence of different types of evidence (which 
phlogiston theory, concentric sphere astronomical theories, etc., do 
not). How does the postulation of, for example, 'electrons' account for 
so much experimental data, and in such a relatively simple and determi­
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nate manner, unless there are electrons (or something very much like 
them)? For a realist this is accounted for by accepting electrons as 
real entities, some of whose properties we have discovered. For an anti­
realist, I maintain, it does not appear that this level of success can 
be explained at all.
Briefly, an evolutionary anti-realist must claim that success 
is to be expected given the (evolutionary) necessity that many of our 
low-level generalizations must be right in order for us to survive
(examples: I will fall if I step off of a cliff, bears and armed robbers
are dangerous, etc.), and the fact that theories are postulated to aid
us in such experiential expectations. From this (if it is correct) it
only follows that our overall belief system must be at least largely suc- 
sessful on the pain of our extinction as a species. If one adds to this 
Duhem's account of the piecemeal evolution of theoretical systems, there 
may be some sense in which even complicated abstract theoretical systems 
would also have to be successful (on the pain of their extinction as 
fruitful coordinating and classifying systems). Still what makes them 
successful is not included in such an account, while for the realist 
what makes them successful is their approximation to the truth. I 
therefore maintain that the best explanation for the success of scienti­
fic theories is that the theories themselves (or the conjunction of 
their theoretical claims) are largely right, and not just concerning 
the experimental regularities that they classify and predict. In any 
event, an account of how false or neutral theories could enjoy such an 
impressive convergence of evidence is not yet provided by evolutionary 
anti-realists. Consequently, it seems that the realist account of this
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success is still the only one available. Further elaboration and de­
fense of this brief sketch will, again, be provided in chapter four, 
when some detailed anti-realist arguments against this claim are consi­
dered.
Diachronic Realism
The previous two sections have provided some information con­
cerning what diachronic realism is not, as well as a few hints as to 
what it is. In partial summary, one can claim that diachronic realism 
addresses the relation between evidence and theoretical claims in the 
sense that certain levels of evidential confirmation warrant belief in 
some theoretical claims. Furthermore, diachronic realism is not commit­
ted to the view that all debates between realists and anti-realists 
should be decided in favor of realism. Briefly, since the evidential 
support for a theory can change, so does whether or not we are warranted 
in believing the claims of a particular theory in light of this evi­
dential support. Finally, diachronic realism is committed to some form 
of what has been termed 'metaphysical realism', and thus is committed 
to a distinction between: (1) epistemological concerns such as whether, 
given the available evidence, it would be rational to believe the claims 
of a particular theory; and (2) ontological concerns such as whether or 
not the theory ^  (evidence and theory-independently) true. I will 
briefly elaborate this notion of diachronic realism in order to separate 
it from some otherwise similar realist formulations.
As I claimed earlier, the usual focus in historical cases of 
realist/anti-realist debates in science is whether there is sufficient 
converging evidence at a particular time to warrant belief in particu­
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lar theoretical claims. As such diachronic realism is immediately separ­
ated from the kind of scientific realism concerned with the general 
existence or non-existence of abstract entities, or with the kind of sci­
entific realism that claims that scientific theoretical claims merely 
have truth values.Still, there are many realist positions that share 
this epistemic component with diachronic realism, and are, therefore, 
in this respect similar to it. Many of these formulations are based on 
a claim made some time ago by Wilfrid Sellars. "As I see it, to have 
good reason for holding a theory is ipso facto to have good reason for 
holding that the entities postulated by the theory e x i s t . S i m i l a r  
formulations of scientific realism can be found in the works of Richard 
Boyd,^® Clark G l y m o u r , a n d  (as the position he is attacking) Bas C.
Van Fraassen.Diachronic realism differs from this formulation chiefly 
in two respects. First, such a formulation is too strong in that it 
does not seem true that having good reasons for holding (or accepting) 
a theory are necessarily good reasons for believing it (or believing in 
the entities it postulates). After all, we should hold or accept the 
best theory currently available that can account for the largest number 
of data within the relevant field. At one time, Franklin's theory of 
static electricity held this honor within the (then fledgling) field of 
electrical physics. Still, as will be shown in chapter four, there were 
enough problems with this theory at the time to render out and out belief 
in it (and the 'electrical fluid' it postulated) to be, at best, reckless. 
In a different context, while 'possible world' semantics may well be the 
best current approach for accounting for some of our informed intuitions 
regarding modal logic, I, at least, balk at accepting the existence of
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'possible worlds' (particularly if this 'existence' is understood in the 
same manner as the 'existence' of tables, molecules, and electrons).
Still, if a theory is indeed the best theory available, we should accept 
it, use it, and try to elaborate it. Consequently, reasons for holding 
a theory are not always strong enough to warrant belief in it.
Second, Seller's formulation of scientific realism does not ex­
plicitly countenance the possibility that a theory might at one time 
enjoy sufficient supportive evidence to warrant belief, and at other 
times not enjoy this status. Almost all traditional formulations of 
realist and anti-realist positions share such an ahistorical bias.^^ As 
I've already claimed, diachronic realism, on the other hand, explicitly 
recognizes the need to consider the evidence available for particular 
theories at particular stages of their development in assessing whether 
or not this evidence is sufficient to warrant belief. This sympathy for 
historical change in the theory-evidence relation strikes me as obviously 
necessary for any view that links warranted belief to the available 
evidence for a theory. Still, most realist formulations have not expli­
citly adopted this perspective and, as we shall see in chapters three 
and four, many anti-realist arguments are formulated precisely because 
of this ommission.
Finally, though I will explain and justify this notion in chap­
ter three, I will deal with the evidence available for a theory at a 
particular time in terms of the level of theoretical virtues a given the­
ory has. Roughly, these virtues correspond to what have sometimes been 
called 'criteria for theory choice’, or, in Putnam's terminology, 'oper­
ational constraints'. For example, instead of merely considering as evi­
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dence for a theory the number of correct predictions it makes, I will 
also include among scientific virtues constraints on how these predic­
tions can be made. The number and type of commitments a theory has, as 
well as the number of previously diverse fields it manages to unify, and 
whether it can accomplish this in a relatively simple manner, also enter 
into the level of virtues a theory can be said to have at a given time.
At present, I only intend to introduce the terminology of 'scientific 
virtues' so that I can proceed to present my version of diachronic 
realism.
Given the above considerations, diachronic realism can be for­
mulated as follows:
When a particular theory can be shown to have achieved a certain le­
vel of scientific virtues, we can rationally believe in the truth 
of its theoretical claims and in the existence of the theoretical 
entities it postulates at the time this level of virtues is achieved.
This formulation is, again, meant to satisfy the considerations just dis­
cussed, as well as to be committed to a version of what Putnam calls 
'metaphysical realism'. It will be argued later that this formulation of 
scientific realism is both historically and conceptually adequate. This 
adequacy, however, is contingent upon three additional concepts. I will 
briefly introduce these concepts in this section, together with an out­
line of the reasons the additions are necessary, and provide an overview 
to the strategy of the remaining chapters.
One of the three additional concepts is benign chauvinism, which 
has already been introduced, together with an outline of why it is im­
portant for an epistemic approach to scientific realism. The other two 
concepts are necessary to defend the intuition that realism offers the 
best explanation for the success of science, in view of the historical
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fact that not all successful theories were true, nor were all true (or 
'approximately true') theories successful at all stages of their develop­
ment. Roughly, if levels of success are differentiated and explained by 
a theory's being 'right' about something, it must be possible to sepa­
rate theories in terms of how much they were right about. Sometimes 
theories whose central theoretical terms did not refer (and were thereby 
neither true nor approximately true) were nevertheless 'successful', 
given the level of evidence then available. Phlogiston theory, again, 
offers a well-known example of a theory that could account for a variety 
of chemical phenomena even though there is (and was— benign chauvinism) 
no such thing as phlogiston. In such cases, all the theory was right 
about was that this variety of data was, in fact, connected. Hence, 
even though its 'success' i^ best explained by its having been right 
about something, there is no reason to believe in the existence of its 
postulated entities.
This case differs from some other cases of non-referential 
theories that achieved a higher level of virtues than phlogiston theory 
(for example, Franklin's theory of static electricity). Since I want 
to argue that Franklin's theory achieved a higher level of virtues and 
thereby warrants more belief than phlogiston theory, and still maintain 
that Franklin’s theory was neither true nor approximately true, I 
would seem to face a dilemma concerning just how to separate these two 
non-referential theories. I cannot separate them in terms of the amount 
of empirical data they covered for two reasons. First, this would 
amount to accepting van Fraassen's proposal that this is all that theo­
ries can be said to be 'right' about (an unhappy move if diachronic
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realism is to retain its 'realism'). Second, if I wish to separate 
these theories in terms of different levels of warranted belief in the 
theoretical components of these theories, then I certainly cannot re­
strict this belief to the empirical data alone. Roughly, since neither 
phlogiston theory nor Franklin's electrical theory were successfully 
referential, and yet there is a difference in the level of virtues in 
the two cases, and since diachronic realism is committed to this dif­
ferent level of virtues being explained in terms of Franklin's theory 
being right about more than phlogiston theory was, different notions 
besides 'true' and 'approximately true' are necessary to account for 
the difference in the two cases. Consequently, I intend for the notion 
of truthlikeness to cover the fact that a successful theory is right 
about something, either experimental regularities or at least partial 
theoretical correctness. As such, 'truthlikeness' (like 'true') must 
be interpreted as evidence and theory-independent, and our justification 
for positing different levels of truthlikeness must be in terms of 
different levels of scientific virtues. In short, our reasons for be­
lieving in the relative truthlikeness of a particular theory are based 
on evidential considerations, and could be wrong.
Furthermore, since phlogiston theory and Franklin's theory can­
not be separated in terms of their truth or approximate truth (since, 
again, neither successfully referred), and yet Franklin's theory was 
more theoretically correct than phlogiston theory, there must be a way 
of articulating partial theoretical success without resorting to notions 
of 'true' or 'approximately true'. If realism is to provide an expla­
nation of the increased 'success' of Franklin's theory, this articulation
34
must also include some ontological grounds for the difference in episte­
mic attitudes. To have been partially theoretically correct without 
its central theoretical terms referring, there must have been something 
about at least the theoretical approach of Franklin’s theory that was 
’right’, as opposed to the explicit theoretical claims Franklin made.
I maintain that Franklin’s theoretical approach was on the right track 
(as opposed to the theoretical approach of phlogiston theory), and hence 
was partially theoretically correct, because it was a direct forerunner 
to a later successful theory, or was closely related to such a theory, 
or was mistated, but with relatively minor amendments could be recon­
structed by such a theory, which (from our perspective) referentially 
successful, and hence true or approximately true. ’Being on the right 
track’ is supposed to enable diachronic realism to differentiate be­
tween levels of truthlikeness in different theories (justified, again, 
by their different levels of virtues) in terms of a non-referential 
theory’s being pulled up by its theoretical bootstraps by a true or ap­
proximately true theory.
While ^  fact all the examples I will subsequently provide to 
elucidate ’being on the right track’ are justified by later theories 
which they directly led to, or with which they share important theoreti­
cal aspects, I do not intend to imply that it is because the referenti­
ally successful theories were later that they were more successful, and 
could consequently render the earlier theories more truthlike. It could 
turn out, for example, that Newton was right, and then I would want to 
argue that it is because relativity theory shares important theoretical 
aspects with universal gravitation that ^  is as successful as it is.
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There are two important reasons for this non-evolutionary addendum to
’being on the right track’. First, I believe that scientific progress
is a fact, but I do not wish to base my epistemological or ontological
commitments on this fact (i.e., I think that scientific progress is a
contingent fact). Consequently, it is quite compatible with diachronic
realism that some earlier theories may turn out to be closer to the
52truth than some of their successors. Diachronic realism is thereby 
committed to some scientific theories having achieved sufficient eviden­
tial success to warrant belief in these theories, but these theories are 
not necessarily current theories. Second, if ’being on the right track’ 
is interpreted in terms of earlier successful theories leading to and 
being ontologically supported by later more successful theories (with 
’earlier’ and ’later’ being the operative terms), it becomes too easy 
to historically demonstrate it. Duhem’s position, it should be remem­
bered, also shows that Newton’s theory, for example, was a direct suc­
cessor of earlier, less successful theories. On this interpretation 
the ontological notion of truthlikeness can too easily slide into the 
historical truism that later scientists have the advantage of being 
able to formulate their theories on the background established by ear­
lier efforts. Consequently, to maintain its epistemic-ontological role, 
I intend for ’being on the right track’ to remain aloof from evolution­
ary considerations.
Now that diachronic realism has been introduced, it remains 
for me to elaborate and defend it in the course of this dissertation. 
Chapter two concerns the relationship between diachronic realism and re­
cently formulated theories of reference for theoretical terms. In this
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chapter I counter some anti-realist objections— chiefly, 'incommensura­
bility' arguments based on the alleged meaning-reference shift of theo­
retical terms when theories change, and I further insist that the epis­
temic component of diachronic realism is a necessary condition for 
addressing realist/anti-realist debates; that is, a successful theory 
of reference for theoretical terms is not enough for a realist position. 
Chapter three is devoted to elaborating this epistemic component by 
clarifying the theoretical virtues introduced in this section, and 1 
defend this approach against the most important conceptual anti-realist 
arguments. Chapter four addresses the most important historical anti­
realist arguments, as well as elaborates the notions of 'benign chauvi­
nism', 'truthlikeness', and 'being on the right track', and I use these 
notions to interpret two important historical examples in some detail. 
These chapters should provide a suitable elaboration and defense of 
diachronic realism as briefly presented in this chapter.
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In this sense especially 'truthlikeness' and 'being on the 
right track' differ from the otherwise similar notion of 'verisimilitude' 
as discussed by Newton-Smith, which is also essentially a device for 
blocking the 'pessimistic induction' that since some past 'successful' 
theories were false, we have little reason to believe that present 
successful theories are true. See, The Rationality of Science, espe­
cially chapter 8.
CHAPTER II
REFERENCE AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM
Reference Change and Incommensurability
In the middle of the 18th century, experiments conducted with
the newly invented Leyden Jar led to the 'one-fluid' theory of (static)
electricity. For some historians, this theory marks the beginning of
the study of electricity as a legitimate part of natural philosophy.^
Certainly most philosophers and historians have traditionally considered
the rapid progress made during the next 50 years on the basis of this
theory as establishing a new branch of science that has progressed more
or less continuously to the present day. In fact, many of the phenomena
that Franklin and his followers attempted to explain with this theory are
still described in more or less the same terms in current introductory 
2
science texts. Still, references to 'imponderable fluids' are not to 
be found in these current texts, while they can be considered to be cen­
tral to the older theories. It thereby becomes important to try to
3
analyze in what sense contemporary theories are 'about the same thing'. 
Progress seems to commit one to some sense of continuity, while, of 
course, allowing for more refined experimental and theoretical perspec­
tives. Both proponents, and recently, opponents of cumulative scientific
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progress are therefore interested in notions of 'sameness' of meaning 
and reference with regard to theoretical terms and statements.
Perhaps the best known attempt to undermine cumulative progress
4
in science is found in the work of Thomas Kuhn. His attacks on the 
traditional notion of cumulative progress are broad and varied. Each 
succeeding chapter provides an interpretation of historical examples 
that, if accurate, increasingly undermine a number of classical empiri­
cist claims concerning progress in science. Gradually, the methods, 
data, and underlying assumptions of succeeding theories are claimed to 
be incommensurable, and, ultimately, it is argued that there are no 
straightforward bridges across the theoretical divide. Still, much of 
the evidence he introduces depends at least implicitly on the narrower 
topics of meaning and reference. While arguing against the alleged 
derivability of older theories from the framework of newer, more compre­
hensive systems, for example, he makes the following claims concerning 
the specific cases of Newtonian Mechanics and Special Relativity.
The physical reference of these Einsteinian concepts ['space', 
'time', and 'mass'] are by no means identical with those of the 
Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. (Newtonian mass is 
conserved; Einsteinian mass is convertible with energy. Only at 
low relative velocities may the two be measured in the same way, 
and even then they must not be conceived to be the same. )5
From the non-identity of the respective concepts, Kuhn argues that the
alleged derivations, even at low relative velocities, are bankrupt,
i.e., claims about Newtonian 'mass' are not, and cannot be, derivable
from the different theoretical framework of Einstein's theory.
What is it exactly that Kuhn thinks is changed in this example? 
The first sentence in the quoted passage clearly states that it is the 
shift in 'physical reference' that constitutes the problem. He then
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immediately goes on to justify this claim by citing examples of differ­
ent statements believed to be true of 'mass' in the two theories. Spe­
cifically, Kuhn lists two differences that may very well not be legiti­
mately handled in the same way. First, he says, Newtonian 'mass' is 
conserved while Einsteinian 'mass' is convertible with energy at high 
velocities with respect to the speed of light. This might, without too 
much oversimplification, be analyzed as a difference in the properties 
of 'mass', or at least as a difference in the way the variable 'mass' 
will behave mathematically with appropriate changes in reference frames 
and the other variables involved. The second claim is that either the 
measuring operations for determining the value of 'mass' are not the 
same in the two theories, or that the results obtained via measuring in 
the two theories will not always correspond. If statements believed to 
be true about a concept comprise at least part of what is often called 
the meaning  ^of that concept, and if Kuhn accepts the (quasi) Fregean 
claim that meaning determines reference, then it is possible to under­
stand his insistence that the term 'mass' underwent a change in "phy­
sical reference"— i.e., Newton and Einstein are not talking about the 
same thing. After all, the only reasons Kuhn provides for the alleged 
reference shift of 'mass' in Newton's and Einstein's theories is that 
the two theories provide different theoretical accounts of 'mass'.
While Kuhn is concerned with much broader topics, the above 
seems to be a fair representation of his implicit views concerning the 
meaning and reference of theoretical terms. Before these views are ex­
panded and criticized, I will try to flush out what such views might 
have to do with cumulative scientific progress, and why this topic is
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important for the purposes of this dissertation. First, it seems clear 
that if ’mass', for example, is a central term in both Newton's and 
Einstein's theories, and if its 'physical reference' is in fact differ­
ent, then the two theories are in an important sense not 'about the same 
thing'. While it may be true that the very notion of the 'physical ref­
erence' of concepts like 'mass' is problematical, these problems can 
be resolved, and the reference can be shown to have changed, cross- 
theoretical statements using it would necessarily be about different 
things and thus at cross-purposes. Hence, Kuhn's arguments against de­
rivability would appear to hold. A logical analogy could be made con­
cerning a predicate that was given two different extensions. Surely 
logical validity would not result if the predicates with different ex­
tensions were used interchangeably in a proof. Further, it seems clear 
that 'theories' about the two different predicates (or even using the 
two different predicates) would not be likely to interconnect, at least 
not in the simple way that pro-cumulative theorists imagine.
It is something like this simplified case that Kuhn seems to be 
mustering against the notion of cumulative progress in science. Com­
bined with arguments concerning the theory-ladenness of experimental re­
sults, and the non-translatability of methodological perspectives, ref­
erence change seems to eliminate all reasonable candidates for different 
theories having the same subject matter. Simply put, if scientists 
within different traditions are not talking about the same things, how 
can later theories be said to increase our understanding of the topics 
covered by their predecessors? If we do not increase our knowledge 
about (at least some) of the same topics, what is left of the claim that
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successive theories often represent cumulative progress?
Of course, problems with scientific progress transcend the 
realist/anti-realist debates with which I am primarily concerned. An 
anti-realist can certainly be just as concerned with preserving progress 
as a realist.^ While it may not neatly divide into realist/anti-realist 
considerations, however, scientific progress is a desideratum of the 
realist view I'm defending. As will be shown later, some notion of 
progress is central to the notion of 'being on the right track'. Fur­
thermore, much of the literature concerning scientific progress ap­
proaches the topic from the perspective of a more explicit treatment of 
meaning and reference than is found in Kuhn. Theories of reference in 
particular have recently engendered a great deal of new interest in sci­
entific realism. Also because I want to offer an alternative approach 
to realism, this chapter will consider the topics of the meaning and 
reference of scientific terms and statements in some detail.
Kuhn, as was argued above, seems committed to a view that 
meaning change engenders reference change. At least, if this is not his 
view it is not clear that he has given even implicit arguments in favor 
of the alleged reference change in the Newtonian/Einsteinian example. 
Furthermore, he is not the only anti-realist who has at least implicitly 
adopted such a view. Perhaps second in influence only to Kuhn as an 
opponent of cumulative scientific progress is Paul Feyerabend, who seems 
to argue in much the same way.
In classical, prerelativistic physics, the concept of mass 
(and, for that matter, the concept of length and the concept of 
time duration)'was absolute in the sense that the mass of a system 
was not influenced (except, perhaps, causally) by its motion in the 
coordinate system chosen. Within relativity, however, mass has
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become a relational concept whose specification is incomplete with­
out indication of the coordinate system to which the spatiotemporal 
descriptions are all to be referred. Of course, the values obtained 
on measurement of the classical mass and of the relativistic mass 
will agree in the domain 'D', in which the classical concepts were 
first found to be useful. This does not mean that what is measured 
is the same in both cases; what is measured in the classical case 
is an intrinsic property of the system under consideration; what is 
measured in the case of relativity is a relation between the system 
and certain characteristics of 'D'. It is also impossible to define 
the exact classical concepts in relativistic terms as to relate them 
with the help of an empirical generalization. . . .  It is therefore 
again necessary to abandon completely the classical conceptual 
scheme once the theory of relativity has been introduced.®
That it is the change in the meanings of scientific terms that he be­
lieves engenders "abandoning completely the classical conceptual scheme" 
is made more explicit in Feyerabend's account. He argues that the point
of the above passage is to show that:
The postulate of meaning invariance is incompatible with actual 
scientific practice. . . .  in most cases it is impossible to relate 
successive scientific theories in such a manner that the key terms 
they provide for the description of a domain 'D', where they overlap 
and are empirically adequate, either possess the same meanings or 
can at least be connected by experimental generalizations.^
Both Kuhn and Feyerabend, then, base part of their attacks on cumulative
scientific progress on considerations of meaning and reference. They
also (at least implicitly) seem committed to the view that changes in
the meaning of scientific terms (in the rough sense described earlier)
constitute changes in the reference (if any) of these terms. It is now
time to investigate these claims in more detail.
First, there is an inherent vagueness in the claim that meaning 
determines reference, especially since explicit accounts of meaning and 
reference are not to be found in either of the cited authors. Does any 
change in statements-held-true concerning a theoretical concept consti­
tute a meaning change, and, hence, a shift in reference? Does the status
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of the stateraent-held-true within the two theories determine whether or 
not the reference of the concept has changed? Does the notion of 'mean­
ing' encompass the notion of 'reference', or are they distinct concepts? 
Since neither Kuhn nor Feyerabend address such issues, it will be neces­
sary to reconstruct their positions in such a way that their probable 
position concerning these questions can be ascertained. This task will 
be aided somewhat by the fact that their implicit view of the meaning 
and reference of theoretical terms is likely to be borrowed from the 
views they are criticizing. Since both authors are concerned primarily 
with refuting empiricist notions of cumulative progress, derivability 
of the older theory from the perspective of the newer, etc., we can hope 
to get clearer on what type of meaning determines reference by analyzing 
such topics within the 20th-century empiricist tradition.
Classical Empiricist Accounts of Reference 
The earliest versions of 20th-century empiricism were, of 
course, the various forms of logical positivism advocated by the Vienna 
Circle and philosophers and scientists influenced by this group. While 
many disagreements arose concerning a sense-data foundation or a physi- 
calist foundation for empirical knowledge, this school was virtually 
unanimous concerning the 'verifiability' theory of meaning. Simply put, 
this theory of meaning was an attempt to separate cognitively signifi­
cant (testable) statements from metaphysical flights of fancy.
We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given 
person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition 
which it purports to express— that is— if he knows what observa­
tions would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the prop­
osition as being true, or reject it as being false.
The verifiability criterion, construed as it is above or in any of its
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many formulations, was not generally accepted as a theory of (semantic) 
meaning. Still, many remained sympathetic to it construed as at least 
a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of empirical statements, 
at least in science. So construed, it could be interpreted as a proviso 
that a statement must be verifiable (in principle at least) in order to 
be acceptable as a part of empirical science (i.e., meaningful scientific 
statements must be testable). This insistence on empirically significant 
scientific statements was at least as important a motivation for logical 
empiricists as any explicit interest in (semantic) meaning or reference. 
It will be worthwhile to keep this aspect of their enterprise in mind as 
we attempt to uncover their position on meaning and reference.
An important influence on the empiricists, published a year 
before Carnap's paradigmatic Logical Structure of the World, was P. W. 
Bridgman's The Logic of Modern Physics, i n  which Bridgman developed 
his notion of 'operational definitions'. One of the main motivations 
for this work was the 'revolutions' caused in modern physics by 
Einstein's theories and by recent work in the quantum domain. Bridgman 
thought that the real basis of Einstein's conceptual revolution was his 
critical attitude towards scientific concepts, particularly towards the 
relation between theoretical concepts and means of testing them (briefly 
discussed in the preceding paragraph).
It was a great shock to discover that classical concepts, ac­
cepted unquestioningly, were inadequate to meet the actual situa­
tion, and the shock of this discovery has resulted in a critical 
attitude toward our whole conceptual structure which must at least 
in part be permanent. Reflection on the situation after the event 
shows that it should not have needed the new experimental facts 
which led to relativity to convince us of the inadequacy of our 
previous concepts, but that a sufficiently shrewd analysis should 
have prepared us for at least the possibility of what Einstein 
did.12
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This 'shrewd analysis' would have revealed that the change in attitude
that Einstein initiated would not have been necessary if the concepts
of empirical science had not been established in such a way that new
13experience would show them to be metaphysical fetters, and if "our 
present experience did not exact hostages of the f u t u r e . T h e  main 
aspect of classical physics that led to such an impass was the tendency 
to define physical concepts in terms of their properties.^^ Under such 
circumstances, even if a definition of a concept should be wholly ade­
quate with respect to all current experience, there is no guarantee that 
it will remain so as this experience is expanded as a result of new ex­
periments. If, however, these concepts had been defined in terms of 
physical operations used to measure or detect these concepts, such con­
ceptual fetters would never have r e s u l t e d . I f  new physical operations 
would be adopted in the future, a new concept should be introduced cor­
responding to them.^^ If there are no unambiguous operations presently 
available for a proposed physical concept, that concept should be con­
sidered empirically meaningless. In either case, we would not have 
found ourselves stymied with classical concepts inadequate for dealing 
with the new experimental data.
Given that the main motivation for operational definitions was 
not a concern to clarify (semantic) meaning, what sort of view of meaning 
and reference of theoretical terms can be found in Bridgman's work? The 
meaning of theoretical terms is explicitly determined by a unique set of 
operations used to detect or measure that term. To return to the exam­
ple used by Kuhn, Einsteinian 'mass' will correspond to Newtonian 'mass' 
if and only if this concept is measured in the same way by the two
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theories, and this measurement technique achieves the same or suffi­
ciently similar results. In chemistry, the mass of a substance is often 
measured by weighing samples of it before and after some chemical change. 
It is on such a basis that the law of the conservation of mass was first 
formulated (rather, from Bridgman's point of view this is how it should 
have been formulated, historically; Lavoisier probably assumed it). 
Neither Newton nor Einstein, however, has anything to say about this 
scientific treatment of the concept 'mass'. Both are rather concerned 
(in the case used by Kuhn at least) with the mass of bodies in motion, 
or their inertial mass. If mass is conceived in classical physics as a 
property of bodies, and some correlation between mass measured by 
weighing and the amount of force necessary to accelerate it a certain 
amount has been established, perhaps the operations used to determine 
mass in chemistry might also be used to determine the mass of a body be­
fore it is moved (if it is also thought to be conserved). There is no
hope, however, of carrying out such operations concerning the sub-atomic
18particles that provided the experimental tests for Einstein's theory. 
Consequently, if this operational definition of mass is used, the two 
theories should strictly use different terms according to Bridgman 
('mass' cannot mean the same thing).
This, however, is not how Bridgman or Kuhn interpret the con­
cept 'mass' in the two theories. Rather, Bridgman treats 'mass' as 
determined by the other quantities in Newton's second law, or Einstein's
Lorentzian transformation of this in the case of the kinetic energy of a
19slowly accelerated electron.
We are eventually able to give to each rigid material body a 
numerical tag characteristic of the body, such that the product of
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this number and the acceleration it receives under the action of 
any given force applied to it by a spring balance is numerically 
equal to the force, . .
If 'mass' is operationally defined by the equations of the Newtonian 
and Einsteinian theories, however, it is, again, not the same concept 
in the two theories, since these equations are not the same. Conse­
quently, on any of the above readings of 'mass', it is not the same con­
cept in Newton and Einstein, and, hence, Newton and Einstein aren't 
really contradicting one another.
This conclusion, which seems to follow from Bridgman's opera­
tional treatment of theoretical concepts, is precisely the view attri­
buted to Kuhn and Feyerabend earlier. Bridgman, of course, does not de­
velop the consequences that the avowedly meaning-change theorists do, 
and this is probably due to his different motivations for developing his 
view. (He was, after all, trying to found an empiricist philosophy of 
science, while Kuhn and Feyerabend were arguing against such an enter­
prise.) It would seem, however, that if operational definitions provide 
the 'meaning' of theoretical constructs, and if change in the operations 
for measuring or detecting a concept entails changes in these concepts, 
Bridgman's position, if spelled out, is implicitly advocating a meaning- 
change view as well. Does the physical reference of a concept change if 
the meaning changes as it did in Kuhn? This is even harder to establish 
in the case of Bridgman. He, too, fails to specifically address the 
notions of meaning and reference that we've come to accept as terms of 
art (at least since Kripke). Worse, in another context, he makes claims 
about the cumulative progress of atomic theory leading to the 'physical 
reality' of atoms that seems very strange given his earlier strict
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operationalist perspective.
The atom was invented to explain constant combining weights in 
chemistry. For a long time there was no other experimental evidence 
of its existence, and it remained a pure invention, without physical 
reality, useful in discussing a certain group of phenomena. It is 
one of the most fascinating things in physics to trace the accumula­
tion of independent new physical information all pointing to the 
atom, until now we are as convinced of its physical reality as of 
our hands and feet.21
How could we achieve independent new physical information concerning the 
atom if a unique set of operations must define it as he argued earlier? 
How could evidence accumulate at all if new operations entail new con­
cepts, and new concepts entail new theoretical entities?
Such arguments in Bridgman are indeed puzzling, and seem to be 
contradictory. Perhaps he was simply inconsistent, but, again, a more 
charitable construal may be available if we remember once again his main 
motivation for developing his position. He was primarily concerned with 
articulating how theoretical scientific concepts could be assured of 
having empirical content. Given this emphasis, he would not be overly 
careful about implicit consequences his view might have concerning (se­
mantic) meaning and reference. If we've trying to sort this problem out, 
we can only be puzzled by his above treatment of 'atom'. Just when it 
appeared that he held a strict meaning-change view, we find him claiming 
a physical reality for the theoretical concept 'atom', based on the very 
cumulative progress within atomic theory that a meaning-change view 
would often deny. It is little wonder that an explicit treatment of 
meaning and reference is not to be found in Kuhn and Feyerabend, since 
the position that they are attacking also failed to articulate an unam­
biguous view concerning these topics. Hence, though the incommensura­
bility arguments found in Kuhn and Feyerabend seem much too strong, and
56
even naive, to current theorists interested in semantics, they are 
fairly representative of the level of semantic sophistication achieved 
by some of their main opponents.
Perhaps the situation is clearer in some of the other empiri­
cists. It would seem that if any of these philosophers of science were 
also concerned with strictly semantic issues, that philosopher would be 
Rudolf Carnap. Does he present a view of the meaning and reference of 
theoretical terms that would be more accessible to more recent philos­
ophers? First, it might be useful to elucidate Carnap's position with 
respect to Bridgman's. Operational definitions in Bridgman's sense can 
be construed as a special case of explicit definitions. The logical 
form of explicit definitions, according to Carnap, is the following:
' (x) (Tx = (OgX ->■ O^x))', where 'T' stands for the theoretical construct 
being defined, 'Og' stands for a certain set of test conditions or
22
operations, and '0^ ' stands for a positive outcome of these tests.
Given this formulation, the theoretical term 'T' is defined in terms of 
certain experimental tests and outcomes, rather than in terms of 'T's' 
properties (hence, being close to Bridgman's position outlined earlier). 
If we also stipulate that every time we establish new test conditions, 
the definition of 'T' changes, the above formulation amounts to the same 
thing as Bridgman's treatment of explicit definitions. Since the impli­
cations of operational definitions for the meaning and reference of 
theoretical terms has already been discussed, we can illustrate Carnap's 
position by considering his criticisms of this form.
Carnap's criticism of the explicit definition approach for the 
introduction of theoretical terms begins with a discussion concerning
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their adequacy for handling dispositional concepts in science. Con­
sider, for example, the following model for the logical form of expli­
cit definitions. Let 'T' stand for the dispositional concept 'soluble 
in water', 'Og' for the test condition of placing a substance in water, 
and '0^ ' for the positive test result that the substance dissolves 
within a certain amount of time. Given the usual interpretations of the 
logical connectives in ' (x) (Tx = (O^x -»■ O^x))', 'T' will properly apply 
to any substance not placed in water, since a sentence of the form 
'({i El);’ is true when both '())' and ’i);' have the same truth value and 
'()) ->• ip’ is true whenever '<))' is false. Hence, any substance not placed 
in water would render 'Ogx' false, and therefore 'OgX ->■ O^x' true, and 
consequently 'Tx' true (i.e., this substance would be 'soluble'). It is 
for this reason that Carnap rejects explicit definitions at this point
in his career, and introduces another approach for the introduction of
23theoretical terms, that of 'reduction sentences'.
Instead of explicitly defining a theoretical term, Carnap in­
troduces it into the language of science by a pair of sentences which 
determine cases where the term applies to an experimental result and 
where it doesn't. If 'Q^ ' and 'Q^ ' represent experimental conditions 
(test situations), and 'Qg' and 'Q^ ' represent positive results of these 
test conditions, and 'Q^ ' represents the ascription of the theoretical 
concept, then '(x)(Q^x (QgX -> Qgx))' and ' (x) (Q^x -»■ (Q^x ->■ - Q^x))' 
logically depict a case where the theoretical term applies and a case 
where it does not, and are called 'reduction pairs' for the introduction 
of that theoretical c o n c e p t . I n  the special case where 'Q^ ' coincides 
with 'Q^', and 'Q^ ' with 'Q2'» the reduction pair can be reduced to a
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single 'bilateral reduction sentence' of the form '(x)(Q^x (Q^x =
25
Qgx))'. Sets of reduction pairs or bilateral reduction sentences do 
not explicitly define the theoretical construct, but rather give it a 
'meaning' only in cases where the test conditions are fulfilled. For 
example, an object that is never placed in water (using our earlier 
example) is not under the extension of the theoretical construct, and 
should not be considered as having or not having the theoretical prop­
erty (or as belonging or not belonging to the class that it represents, 
etc.). Carnap believes that such an approach is better suited to handle 
disposition terms than explicit definitions, since it is not subject to 
the unhappy consequence that the theoretical term will apply to all ob­
jects that are not placed under the test conditions.
It is only after the problems of disposition terms have been 
discussed that Carnap mentions implications of the reduction sentence 
approach that may be more important for the meaning-change views we've 
been considering. First, he states that reduction sentences allow for 
a theoretical concept to be measured (or operationally defined) in more 
than one way, in contrast to Bridgman's strict formulation considered 
earlier.
If a property or physical magnitude can be determined by dif­
ferent methods then we may state one reduction pair or one bilat­
eral reduction sentence for each method. The intensity of an elec­
tric current can be measured for instance by measuring the heat 
produced in the conductor, or the deviation of a magnetic needle, 
or the quantity of silver separated out of a solution, or the quan­
tity of hydrogen separated out of water, etc. We may state a set 
of bilateral reduction sentences, one corresponding to each of 
these methods.27
Second, he believes that such an approach is advantageous for scientific 
progress, in that new experimental progress need not disrupt past
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theoretical commitments, or, again, in Bridgman's terms, "our present 
experience need not exact hostages of the future." Specifically, since 
reduction sentences only confer meaning on theoretical terms when test 
conditions are fulfilled, there is always a 'region of indeterminate­
ness' or a 'third class' besides those of falling under the extension 
of a concept or not falling under it; i.e., the cases in which the test 
conditions are not met.
The scientist wishes neither to determine all the cases of the 
third class positively, nor all of them negatively; he wishes to 
leave these questions open until the results of further investiga­
tions suggest the statement of a new reduction pair; thereby some 
of the cases so far undetermined become determined positively and 
some negatively. If we now were to state a definition, we should 
have to revoke it at such a new stage of the development of science, 
and to state a new definition, incompatible with the first one. If, 
on the other hand, we were now to state a reduction pair, we should 
merely have to add one or more reduction pairs at the new stage; and 
these pairs will be compatible with the first one. In this latter 
case we do not correct the determinations laid down in the previous 
stage but simply supplement them.28
This is, in a sense, precisely the motivation that we found earlier in
Bridgman, i.e., to avoid drastic conceptual revision every time new
experimental conditions are applied to existing theoretical concepts.
Carnap's approach also seems to avoid the meaning change consequences
that were shown to be implicit in Bridgman's account. Does his view at
this stage really offer an alternative to meaning-change views?
Many philosophers of science interpret Carnap's approach in
29
this way. In a recent paper, however, Jane English has argued per­
suasively that this is not the case, and that Carnap's position con­
cerning the meaning of theoretical terms in his 1936-37 paper (as well
as later formulations) itself represents an implicit meaning-change 
30view. To support this position, English considers a simple case of
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theory change, formalized in a manner compatible with Carnap's reduc­
tion sentence approach. Assume that theory 'A' consists solely of one 
bilateral reduction sentence, partially defining a theoretical concept 
'T^ ' in terms of test conditions '0^ ' and observational results of these 
tests 'Og', so that the theory can be formally represented by the logi­
cal statement '(x)(0^x (T^x = OgX))'. If 'a' is an object that has 
successfully undergone the experimental tests, it would then be a com­
mitment of theory 'A' that this object has the theoretical property 
31
'T^ ' (i.e., 'T^a'). Assume also that theory 'B' shares this bilateral 
reduction sentence with theory 'A', but that further research has re­
duced the region of indeterminacy of the term 'T^ ' by ruling out certain 
objects that satisfy this reduction sentence, but also satisfy a new 
test condition that is meant to depict other properties, now incompatible 
with 'T^ ' (i.e., a new reduction sentence is added to theory 'B':
'(x)(OgX (O^x -»• - T^x))'). If the object 'a' that satisfied the orig­
inal bilateral reduction sentence also satisfies this second reduction
32
sentence, theory 'B' would be committed to the statement T^a'.
Would these two theories contradict one another? If not, English has 
constructed an example of theoretical term introduction via chains of 
reduction sentences that leads to a meaning-change view.
First, it should be noted that the two theories do not contra­
dict one another observationally. The observational consequences of 
theory 'B' are not incompatible with the observational consequences of 
theory 'A', since the only way they could contradict one another would 
be as a result of test condition 'Cy', which is not even contained in 
theory 'A'. It does seem, however, that the two theories contradict one
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another theoretically, since a commitment of theory 'A' concerning ob­
ject 'a' is 'T^a', which seems formally incompatible with the commitment 
T^a' of theory 'B'. One theory seems to be committed to the same ob­
ject having a property that the other theory denies to it. On closer 
inspection, however, this does not have to be the case. Theory 'B's' 
commitment to ' ~ T^a’ is based on the assumption '(x)((OgX • O^x) - T^) ', 
which is, again, not even covered by theory 'A'. The two theories would 
contradict one another theoretically only if ' - T^a • T^a' is impossible, 
but, for theory 'A', ' ~ T^a', being based on different test conditions, 
is within the region of indeterminateness for 'T^'. Consequently, it 
could be given the value false within 'A', or, more in line with 
Carnap's intentions, be simply indeterminate within 'A'. In neither 
case does 'T^a • - T^a' represent a straightforward contradiction between
the two theories (for the same reason that the two theories do not con-
33tradict one another observationally). It seems, then, that meaning- 
change examples can be generated via chains of reduction sentences.
To show that the above example is not only a formal considera­
tion, consider a future state of biology, hoped for by many contemporary 
essentialists regarding natural kind terms. Perhaps the best operational 
treatment of 'species' currently available to biological taxonomists in­
volves the interbreeding of two groups of animals that produces fertile 
offspring. This, of course, could easily be symbolized precisely as was 
theory 'A' above, with 'T^ ' representing the theoretical concept 'belongs 
to the same species x'. Assume, however, that some future stage of biol­
ogy succeeds in determining that microstructures of the animals belonging 
to species 'T^ ' can be theoretically used in organizing data, making
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predictions, etc., precisely analogously to the role that microstruc­
tures now play in physics. At that point, assuming that there will be 
test conditions determining when this microstructure is present or ab­
sent, a new definition utilizing these tests may play a role precisely 
like the additional reduction sentence in theory 'B' above. It is then 
possible that a pair of animals that could interbreed and produce fer­
tile offspring may both not have this underlying microstructure. Ac­
cording to theory 'A', of course, these animals would be members of the 
same species, while according to theory 'B' they would not. Again, 
however, the two theories would not contradict one another, since the 
test conditions that lead to the negative assertion in theory 'B' are 
not available in theory 'A’. Any change of classification that resulted 
in tightening the conditions of class membership, if the claim is par­
tially defined in terms of reduction sentences, could lead to such a 
result. That is, since the two theories use different test conditions 
for establishing class membership, the classes are different, and at­
tributing incompatible properties to different classes does not involve 
a contradiction.
English concludes that any sets of reduction sentences that do 
not contradict one another observationally do not contradict theoreti­
cally on Carnap's view.^^ His earlier example of the intensity of an 
electric current was a fortunate one in that the addition of new reduc­
tion sentences did not further restrict the extension of 'T^', but 
rather, extended it. In cases like the above, however, the theories are 
not 'talking about the same thing'. Perhaps this result is due to the 
still very strong operational-observational basis of Carnap's views in
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1936-37. He certainly liberalized his conditions with the passage of 
35time. English argues, however, that as his views liberalized, they
became more contextualist (holistic) and, subsequently even more open
36to meaning-change interpretations.
As was the case with Bridgman, however, the precise relation 
between the procedures for establishing the empirical significance of 
theoretical terms and the implicit meaning-change views these procedures 
might entail is never explicitly drawn by Carnap. In fact, the problem 
we've been investigating in this chapter was probably not explicitly 
addressed until the work of Kuhn, which was avowedly anti-empiricist. 
Even there, as we've seen, the treatment of semantic notions of meaning 
and reference is implicit at best, so that it remains difficult to de­
termine precisely what changes when the meanings of theoretical terms 
undergo revisions. This is, I think, largely due to the fact that
'meaning' and 'reference' were not taken as terms of art until post-
Kripkean philosophy, at least by philosophers of science (Frege, Searle, 
and Strawson, for example, did not have much influence on philosophy of
science). Neither Frege's nor Carnap's extensive use of 'reference' and
'sense', 'intension' and 'extension', etc., have the tight applicability 
to our problem that one might wish. To give one example to solidify 
this point, Carnap, in a relatively late article, offers the following 
view of increasing intensions! precision in science that is both strik­
ingly similar, and yet worlds apart from corresponding treatments of 
necessity, scientific progress, and the relation between theoretical 
terms and their corresponding properties found in, for example, Kripke 
and Putnam. .
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In the oldest book on chemistry, . . . there were a great num­
ber of statements describing the properties of a given substance, 
say water or sulphuric acid, including its reactions with other 
substances. There was no clear indication as to which of these 
numerous properties were to be taken as essential or definatory for 
the substance. Therefore, at least on the basis of the book above, 
we cannot determine which of the statements made in the book were 
analytic and which synthetic for its author. . . . But in chemistry 
there was an early development from the state described to states 
of greater and greater intensional precision. On the basis of the 
theory of chemical elements, slowly with increasing explicitness 
certain properties were selected as essential. . . . For the ele­
mentary substances, first certain experimental properties were more 
and more clearly selected as definatory, for example, the atomic 
weight, later the position in Mendeleyev's system. Still later, 
with a differentiation of the various isotopes, the nuclear compo­
sition was regarded as definatory, say characterized by the number 
of protons (atomic number) and the number of neutrons.^'
As in Kripke, we find in this quotation a belief that science progresses 
by replacing accidental properties with necessary properties of a sub­
stance. Unlike Kripke, this necessity is interpreted in terms of defi­
nitions of the terms and analyticity. Corresponding near-misses are 
also found in earlier empiricist work on designation, meaning, exten­
sion, etc. Not surprisingly, it is difficult to extract clear commit­
ments on these issues in writers like Kuhn, who were arguing against the 
empiricist position. Consequently, it is not clear, as we discussed 
earlier, what changes for Kuhn with a change of theory, nor how much 
meaning change is necessary for a complete breakdown of communication 
between competing theories.
While I have possibly belabored the lack of clear concepts of 
meaning and reference within classical empiricism, it is important to 
realize that these concepts have only recently played crucial roles in 
philosophy of science. Consequently, Kuhn and Feyerabend were not being 
foolish or unfair when they took their incommensurability arguments to 
be telling against contemporary views of scientific progress. Further­
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more, to adequately assess the importance of their incommensurability 
arguments, one must determine how their implicit interpretations of 
meaning and reference fare when they are unpacked in terms of more re­
cent, clearer semantic accounts. It will therefore be necessary to 
discuss how theories of reference in particular have been formulated 
recently, and to use these new formulations to address scientific exam­
ples. Only then can it be decided whether there is reason for a real­
ist (or any philosopher of science who is committed to scientific prog­
ress) to be worried by incommensurability claims.
Current Theories of Reference Applied 
to Scientific Examples 
Without too much oversimplification, I think there are three 
major approaches to meaning and reference expressible in current termi­
nology: the strict descriptivist view (SD), the cluster view (CD), and
the causal view (CT). For certain kinds of terms (theoretical concepts 
being an example), some combination of these may be the most appropriate 
approach. Still, it will be useful to treat each one separately (as an 
'ideal type') at the beginning of our analysis, and discuss possible 
complications for certain kinds of terms later.
The strict descriptivist (SD) view of reference holds that the 
reference of a term is determined by the meaning of that term in the
sense that "the meaning of a word is a set of characters that are neces-
38sary and sufficient for it to apply," or, "concepts or meanings asso­
ciated with general terms and names determine the set of things to which
39they apply or refer." The term 'mass', for example, refers to whatever 
satisfies the set of concepts or meanings associated with it in a given
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theory (examples, m = f/a, mass ® weight, m = etc.). If different
c
theories associate different concepts with this term, they are neces­
sarily referring to different entities or sets of entities. As in a 
strict reading of Bridgman's concept of operational definitions, if any 
of the concepts associated with a theoretical term change, a new term 
should (strictly) be introduced. That is, the set of concepts asso­
ciated with a theoretical term define that term, and determine its ex­
tension (if any) via necessary and sufficient conditions for class mem­
bership. An (SD) view of reference is distinguished by this insistence 
that if any of the concepts or meanings associated with a theoretical 
term change, there is a corresponding change of reference. According 
to this view, then, Einsteinian and Newtonian 'mass' must have different 
references, since the two theories certainly associate (some) different 
meanings to the term (for example, the mass of an object is invariant 
for Newton, but not for Einstein). Similarly, Lavoisier's 'Oxygen' 
cannot pick out the same gas as Priestley's 'de-phlogisticated air',
since part of the meaning of Priestley's air involves "being capable of
40taking more phlogiston from nitrous air," a formulation which 
Lavoisier, of course, rejects along with phlogiston theory. For that 
matter, Lavoisier's 'oxygen' cannot pick out the same gas as our 'oxy­
gen', since this term was chosen by him on the view that oxygen is an 
'acidifying p r i n c i p l e ' I n  general, no term will retain its refer­
ence through a theoretical change unless the term is not at all af­
fected by the different theories (e.g., 'weight' and 'length' in clas-
42
sical, but not in relativistic theory changes).
The only position that we've seen that comes close to the (SD)'s
67
view concerning reference change on any meaning change is, again, 
Bridgman's. If the meaning of a theoretical concept is completely 
determined by the set of operations used to measure or detect it, and 
different operations should (strictly) introduce different concepts, 
then any change in meaning (so construed) would seem to lead to a ref­
erence change. Since Bridgman explicitly rejects the old property ap­
proach to the meaning of scientific terms, his position is limited to 
changes in measurement. That is, he would apparently reject treating 
the meaning of 'dephlogistigated air' as having to do with phlogiston 
as metaphysical, and would instead define it via the set of operations 
which detect or measure it. In that case it would seem that Priestley 
and Lavoisier could be referring to the same gas, regardless of their 
respective theories, provided that they used the same measuring proce­
dures for detecting it. In many cases, of course, they did use iden-
43tical or similar procedures.
On the other hand, there are many examples concerning similar 
seemingly basic and unproblematical concepts such as time, where 
Einstein's operations would differ from all previous treatments. Hence, 
some cases of meaning change according to Kuhn and Feyerabend might not 
be such cases according to Bridgman, and vice versa. Though Kuhn, for 
example, allows for cumulative progress within normal science, it is 
evident that there are cases of changes of measurement procedures within 
a given theory that, for Bridgman, would change the meaning and reference 
of the relevant concepts. Worse, Bridgman allows for a variety of evi­
dence to point to the existence of atoms, which does not fit well with 
his earlier claims if they are interpreted on a strict (SD) view.
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Carnap, too, at times seems to be committed to something like
an (SD) view. In Meaning and Necessity, for example, he argues that
44'extensions' can be reduced to 'intensions'. Again, however, the 
terms here used are connected to the notion of 'analyticity'. That is, 
the long quotation analyzed earlier concerning essential properties as 
definatory, is much like his treatment of extension and intension in 
Meaning and Necessity, and not much like the Kripkean analysis of mean­
ing and reference. In another late work, "Empiricism, Semantics, and 
Ontology," he makes a distinction between 'internal' and 'external' 
questions concerning the existence or reality of abstract entities,
'internal' and 'external' applying to the linguistic framework in which
45the abstract concepts occur. Such a relativity of questions to a 
particular linguistic framework might be construed as applying to the 
meaning and reference of terms being relative to different theories.
In fact, as was stated above, English interprets all of Carnap's later, 
contextualist, views as meaning change views. Still, it remains dan­
gerous to accept such an extrapolation, since, again, these were not 
the issues that he was primarily concerned with in this work. It was 
seen that on his earlier position of the introduction of theoretical 
terms via reduction sentences, he might be committed to a meaning change 
view in certain types of cases. One of my purposes in discussing re­
duction sentences at such length, however, is to show that this was not 
a commitment that he recognized. Remember, his example of the strength 
of an electric current was to illustrate the possibility of scientific 
progress on the reduction sentence approach, as opposed to an explicit 
definition account.
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Perhaps only Feyerabend (sometimes) straightforwardly accepts 
46a strict (SD) view. Even here, however, the emphasis is upon rejec­
ting empiricist positions, especially the claim that the observation 
language is immune from meaning change. Again, if we cannot pin down 
the empiricist position concerning the (semantic) meaning and reference 
of scientific terms in straightforward current terminology, we must be 
careful in so interpreting a position that is constructed to refute 
empiricist claims. It is quite possible, in other words, that no one 
would want to support a strict (SD) view, if such a position was spelled 
out as it is in Kripke or Putnam. Still, such a view is often inter­
preted as being a position against which the causal theory of reference 
(CT) b e g i n s . A s  such, it constitutes an important view concerning 
the meaning and reference of scientific terms, regardless of the diffi­
culties in finding anyone who unambiguously accepts it. Clearly, if 
this view is accepted, scientific progress in any normal sense becomes 
all but impossible. Even Kuhn's modest claims for progress within 'nor­
mal science' are problematical if any change in the meaning of a term 
(however construed) constitutes a change of reference. In short, if 
this is the way we decide to handle the meaning and reference of theo­
retical terms in science, Kuhn's and Feyerabend's objections to cumula­
tive scientific progress follow with a vengeance. So much of a ven­
geance, in fact, that it is not clear that they would accept a strict 
interpretation of this view.^^ Given this, and the implausibility of 
interpreting just any change of meaning of a theoretical term entailing 
a change of reference, the (SD) interpretation of meaning and reference 
need not seriously distress anyone who believes in scientific progress.
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First someone would have to unambiguously propose it and second, it 
does not do justice to semantics or to actual scientific practice.
The cluster theory of reference (CD) agrees with the (SD) view 
in the sense that the reference of a term is fixed by the concepts or 
meanings associated with it, but allows for earlier concepts not asso­
ciated with the meaning or definition of the term to change without a 
corresponding shift in reference. That is, on a (CD) account, only 
some statements believed true of a theoretical term are really asso­
ciated with its meaning (only 'core' concepts provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions for class membership). Some disjunction of (pos­
sibly weighted) concepts and meanings must remain intact for the refer­
ence of the term to be maintained, but not all of them. In the case of 
proper names, John R. Searle supports a (CD) view by claiming that 
'Aristotle' refers to a certain man even if some of the identifying 
descriptions associated with him are false, as long as some of these
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descriptions remain true (the 'core' concepts). If this treatment is 
extended as it was with the (SD) view to include general terms as well 
as proper names, it is a candidate for a way to interpret the meaning 
and reference of theoretical terms in science. On a (CD) view, 
Priestley and Lavoisier may or may not have been referring to the same 
gas within their respective theories. The ambiguity is due to the fact 
that they agreed concerning some of the meanings associated with the 
gas, and disagreed concerning others. They agreed that the gas could 
be isolated (more or less) in a number of ways, and that it supported 
combustion and respiration better than atmospheric air, etc. On the 
other hand, they disagreed concerning whether or not it was given off
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or added to a metal during the process of calcination (oxidation), 
whether or not it was an air usually bereft of phlogiston, etc.
Whether or not they were referring to the same gas depends, of course, 
on how one chooses to weight these and other relevant aspects of their 
meaning. If it is decided that the connection with the experiments 
that isolated the gas are core concepts, or the presence of a number of 
similar qualitative properties, then the reference could be the same.
If, on the other hand, it is decided that phlogiston is a crucial ele­
ment in the meaning of 'de-phlogisticated air', (i.e., that it is one 
of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a substance to de- 
phlogisticated air), then the reference would be different in the two 
theories. Similarly, if it is decided that the property of being an 
'acidifying principle' is a core concept in Lavoisier's theory of oxy­
gen, then he could not be referring to our oxygen.
How are such decisions made? The question of the respective 
weight to be placed on various meanings assigned to a term is at least 
partially relative to one's philosophical perspective. Carnap, for 
example (in footnote #34 cited in the text) argues that chemistry under­
went a progression of 'intensional precision', in that after the 
theory(ies) of chemical elements, various properties were increasingly 
taken as being 'essential' to an element. 'Essential' is, again, taken 
as being connected with 'analyticity' for Carnap, understood as having 
to do with 'definatory' properties of an element. Consequently, prop­
erties such as 'having the atomic number 8' would now be taken as essen­
tial to oxygen, and earlier defining properties (e.g., atomic weight) 
would now be considered accidental (or, changeable without change of
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reference, e.g., isotopes). Of course, anyone who does not accept the 
notion of analyticity need not feel obliged to agree with this partic­
ular weighting of the properties. Worse, since neither Lavoisier nor 
Priestley had any knowledge of such properties, some would argue that 
Carnap's position does little to help us decide whether they were re­
ferring to the same gas. Of course, we can (and, I think should) make 
such a decision on the basis of present knowledge, but, as long as 
decisions are necessary for determining reference, no-one is compelled 
to accept such a view. Besides, such a decision may well constitute an 
arbitrary assumption as far as Kuhn is concerned. He would agree that 
later theories interpret their predecessors from their own subsequent 
perspectives, but this is, for him, to commit the terminal fallacy his­
torically. Because there is as yet no transhistorical sense of the 
essential properties associated with a term, it should not simply be 
legislated that such and such properties are to count as determining 
the 'same reference' for terms across the theoretical divide.
Still, a (CD) view offers many advantages over an (SD) view.
It is at least possible in many cases to account for sameness of refer­
ence across the theoretical divide from this perspective, even if some 
individual cases remain controversial. The weighting of associated 
meanings seems to be crucial to the success of the (CD) approach, how­
ever, and such weighting may well turn out to be relative to a given 
theory. Past decisions were due to the properties that contemporary 
theories associated with a given term, present decisions are due to our 
best theories, and future decisions will be based on future theories.
As long as such decisions remain relative to contemporary perspectives.
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whether or not a given term refers to the same entity can receive dif­
ferent a n s w e r s . O n  the other hand, at least conditions have been 
laid down according to the (CD) view which make it possible that refer­
ence can be preserved. Even this much makes Kuhn's 'arguments' against 
sameness of reference deficient. If one cannot assume that reference 
is preserved because of the relativity of essential properties to theo­
retical frameworks, neither can one assume that it is not, due to the 
same relativity. Hence, his assertion that the physical reference of 
'mass' is not the same in Newton and Einstein, because some of the 
properties associated with this term are different, is not well founded. 
He too must deal with the problem of the weighting of relevant proper­
ties, which he has so far failed to mention. Again, of course, such an 
explicit treatment of meaning and reference as found in the (CD) view 
was not articulated by Kuhn or the empiricists he was criticizing.
Still, from our perspective, if he cannot maintain some of his arguments 
under an (SD) view, he cannot maintain others under the (CD) view. A 
strict (SD) view, again, would commit Kuhn to claiming that any change 
in the properties associated with a theoretical term would result in 
that term's changing reference, and, consequently, it is not clear what 
would become of his concept of 'normal science'. On the other hand, a 
(CD) view simply does not allow one to assume that the physical reference 
of a theoretical term has changed because of a change in some of the 
properties associated with the term, which is Kuhn's only 'argument' for 
the change in reference of the term 'mass' in Newton and Einstein. The 
strict meaning-change view is thereby weakening as the notions of 
meaning and reference are clarified. Already, reference change can be
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shown to be different from meaning change, and not a simple consequence 
of meaning change.
The causal theory of reference (CT) is a relatively recent ad­
dition to the literature, and is usually attributed to the work of 
Kripke and Putnam. It differs from both the (SD) and the (CD) accounts 
in that it denies the necessity of any associated meanings being in­
volved in the reference of a proper name, or general terms for classes 
and kinds, or, at least, it drastically changes the role these meanings 
play in determining the reference of a term.^^ It was seen earlier that 
it is a necessary consequence of the (CD) view that an object or class 
must have at least some of the properties or meanings usually associated 
with it for someone to refer to it. In Searle's version, "any individ­
ual not having at least some of these properties could not be 
52Aristotle." Similarly, if a certain gas does not have any of the 
properties (or a properly weighted subset of properties) associated with 
it by Priestley or Lavoisier, they could not have been referring to that 
gas. Paradoxically, if some still undiscovered gas that they never even 
encountered does have these properties, they were referring to i^. If 
reference is determined by a set of properties associated with a term, 
then reference fails if these properties do not apply to any object, 
and is misplaced if they apply to some other, unknown, object. This 
seems to be a consequence of any view that claims these properties or 
meanings are anything like necessary and sufficient conditions for class 
membership.
According to Kripke, neither the (SD) nor the (CD) views ade­
quately depict actual cases of the reference of a term, at least for
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proper names and natural kind terms. As long as there is an object or
kind that is originally isolated via ostension and/or experimentation,
subsequent expressions utilizing the name that was used to designate
this object or kind refer to that object or that kind, regardless of
the properties originally or subsequently associated with it. For a
proper name, Kripke's version of the (CT) is presented as follows:
Someone, let's say a baby, is born; his parents call him by a 
certain name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people 
meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from 
link to link as if by a chain. A speaker who is at the far end of 
this chain, who has heard about, say Richard Feymann, in the market 
place or elsewhere, may be referring to Richard Feymann even though 
he can't remember from whom he first heard of Feymann or from whom 
he ever heard of Feymann. . . .  He doesn't know what a Feymann dia­
gram is, he doesn't know what the Feymann theory of pair production 
and annihilation is. Not only that: he'd have trouble distinguish­
ing between Gell-Mann and Feymann. So he doesn't have to know these 
things, but, instead, a chain of communication going back to Feymann 
himself has been established by virtue of his membership in a commu­
nity which passed the name on from link to link; . . .53
Once such a 'b a p t i s m t a k e s  place between a name and an object, a 
'causal chain' is formed between the actual object and the term(s) 
'linked' to it via chains of communication. The properties associated 
with the object, even essential properties that the object could not 
lack, are not needed to determine which object is being referred to.^^
This account of reference is, again, supposed to apply at least 
to proper names and natural kind terms such as 'tiger', 'water', and 
'gold'; in short, any name of a thing or class whose corresponding sub­
stance is accessible to ostensive definitions. The (CT) view is founded 
in direct disagreement with both the (SD) and (CD) views concerning how 
a reference is 'picked out'. Both the (CD) and (SD) views base success­
ful reference on what is known (or believed) about the object or class 
named. As described by Kripke:
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Whatever we know about them (the objects or classes) determines 
the referent of the name as the unique thing satisfying those prop­
erties. For example, if I use the name 'Napoleon', and someone asks 
'To whom are you referring?', I will answer something like,
'Napoleon was the emperor of the French in the early part of the 
19th century; he was eventually defeated at Waterloo', thus giving a 
uniquely identifying description to determine the referent of the 
name.
Against this, and the (CD) view, Kripke proposes the (CT) view depicted 
briefly above. Introducing the notion of a 'rigid designator', as a 
term which refers to the same object in all possible worlds,Kripke 
argues that neither all of the properties associated with the designated 
object, nor a properly weighted subset of them, determine anything like 
the 'meaning' of the designator. Referring to Searle's version of the 
(CD) view discussed in the last section, Kripke argues that the refer­
ence (designation) of 'Aristotle' is not affected by denying that he had 
the properties normally associated with him.
Most of the things commonly attributed to Aristotle are things 
that Aristotle might not have done at all. In a situation in which 
he didn't do them, we would describe that as a situation in which 
Aristotle didn't do them. . . . Not only is it true of^  the man 
Aristotle that he might not have gone into pegagogy (and hence, not 
have been the 'teacher of Alexander'); it is also true that we use 
the term 'Aristotle' in such a way that, in thinking of a counter- 
factual situation in which Aristotle didn't go into any of the 
fields and do any of the achievements we commonly attribute to him, 
still we would say that was a situation in which Aristotle did not 
do these things. 8^
Similarly, if 'gold' or 'water' rigidly designates certain classes of
objects, then theorists who are properly connected to these objects,
directly or via a causal chain, formulate their theories about those
objects, however different their respective theoretical accounts.
How would the (CT) view deal with the air isolated by 
Priestley and Lavoisier? Since the gas, once isolated, can be treated 
as a natural kind much like water or gold (i.e., it can be contained in
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a vessel, pointed to, experimented on, etc.), Priestley and Lavoisier 
have different theories about the same gas if they are both causally 
related to i±. Since Lavoisier basically repeated Priestley's experi­
ments (at least at the early stages), there can be little doubt that 
the gas he isolated was the same that had "astonished" Priestley. Even 
a (CD) view might come to this conclusion, depending, again, on how one 
chooses to weight the properties. A (CT) view, of course, has no prob­
lems with ascribing the same designation to 'de-phlogisticated air' and 
'oxygen', given the causal relation between the two theorists and a 
certain 'stuff.
Kuhn argues that it is quite impossible to clearly establish 
who discovered the gas, or when it was discovered. Part of his claim 
is based on the rather vague concept 'discover'. Are we to say that 
someone discovered 'x' if they do not realize what they discovered? Or 
should the credit for a discovery go only to someone who recognizes 
something approximating the real significance of what he discovered? 
These questions do not affect the reference of a term, at least accord­
ing to a (CT) view. Kuhn's implicit commitment to one of the other 
views is once again evident in the following passage.
Priestley's claim to the discovery of oxygen is based upon his 
priority in isolating a gas that was later recognized as a distinct 
species. But Priestley's sample was not pure, and, if holding im­
pure oxygen in one's hands is to discover it, that had been done by 
everyone who ever bottled atmospheric air. Besides, if Priestley 
was the discoverer, when was the discovery made? In 1774 he 
thought he had obtained nitrous oxide, a species he already knew; 
in 1775 he saw the gas as de-phlogisticated air, which is still not 
oxygen or even, for phlogistic chemists, a quite unexpected sort of 
gasTSS
Some of these claims involve what is meant by 'discover' (as opposed to 
reference), some, as we'll see, are nonsense, and the last implies that
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the isolated gas was not oxygen, precisely because Priestley thought it 
was de-phlogisticated air.
The problems with 'discover' do not concern us here. The non­
sensical part of the above quote is Kuhn's claim that anyone who bottled 
atmospheric air would have an equal claim with Priestley to having dis­
covered oxygen. If this is changed to having referred to what we call 
oxygen, no one who merely captured atmospheric air in a bottle was 
causally related to oxygen (any more than the discoverer of any medium 
sized physical object could be said to be referring to its molecules).
By mid-March of 1775, Priestley was quite aware that the gas he had iso­
lated was 'purer' than atmospheric air. After a nitrous air test, and 
after observing the behavior of a mouse placed in the isolated sample, 
he was fully satisfied that the sample "was much better than common 
air. Finally, why in the world would Kuhn argue that the isolated 
air, 'seen' as dephlogisticated air, was not oxygen, unless he thinks 
that statements-believed-true about a substance determine the reference 
of the term used to designate that substance? Clearly, he is advocating 
at least a (CD) view here, and such a position has already been shown to 
render his 'arguments' concerning physical reference worthless. In any 
event, it seems much more natural to hold that if Priestley and 
Lavoisier isolated the same gas, their respective statements concerning 
their experiments are statements about i±, which is unproblematical on 
the (CT) view.
In a recent article, Philip Kitcher uses what he calls (along 
with Donnellan) a 'historical explanation theory' of reference, which 
includes most of the salient features of a (CT) view, to argue against
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Kuhn's and Feyerabend's conceptual relativism, emphasizing the case of 
P r i e s t l e y . H e  is concerned in this article with developing a method­
ology, through the concept of reference, that would enable philosophers
and historians to determine "what Priestley was talking about, and how
62much of what he said is true." The problem that Kitcher sees as cen­
tral to Kuhn's and Feyerabend's positions is how to reconcile two appa­
rently inconsistent philosophical intuitions. On the one hand it seems 
that if there is no such thing as phlogiston, then there is no such
thing as 'de-phlogisticated air', and statements made by Priestley using
63this term would then fail to refer. On the other hand, "we are also 
tempted to suppose that Priestley and Cavendish used the terms 'de- 
phlogisticated air' and 'phlogisticated air' to refer, and that they 
made some true utterances using these t e r m s . T h e s e  latter would in­
clude the various statements of Priestley containing 'de-phlogisticated 
air' that described his experimental results, and agree with proposi­
tions that Lavoisier (and we for that matter) rightly ascribe to oxygen 
(e.g., de-phlogisticated air supports combustion better than atmospheric 
air). The resolution of these apparently contradictory intuitions ac­
cording to Kitcher is to "allow that different tokens of 'de-phlogisticated 
air' refer differently."^^
To accomplish this, an account of reference and translation is 
necessary which allows for different tokens of the same term to have 
different referential status. A 'historical explanatory theory' of ref­
erence can, according to Kitcher, provide such an account. The follow­
ing quotation should begin to clarify how it accomplishes this, and what 
some of the similarities and differences are that it has with the (CT)
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view outlined above.
The general theory of reference which I espoused above pro­
poses that the referent of a token is the entity which figures in 
an appropriate way in a historical explanation of the production 
of that token. An explanation of the production of a token will 
consist in a description of a sequence of events whose first mem­
ber is either an event in which the referent of the token is 
causally involved, or an event which involves the singling out, 
by description, of the referent of the token. . . . Priestley's 
early utterances of 'de-phlogisticated air' were initiated by an 
event in which Stahl specified phlogiston as the substance emit­
ted in combustion. After Priestley had isolated oxygen and mis- 
identified it, things changed. His later utterances could be 
initiated either by the events in which Stahl fixed the reference 
of 'phlogiston' or by events of quite a different sort, to wit, 
encounters with oxygen. Thus we can answer the question of how 
different tokens of a scientific term can refer to different en­
tities by supposing that the production of different tokens can 
be initiated by different events.&&
In other words, when Priestley uttered statements concerning 'de- 
phlogisticated air' that merely espoused Stahl's (fallacious) theory, 
these statements failed to refer. On the other hand, when he uttered 
statements concerning 'de-phlogisticated air' that were initiated by 
his own experiments with the new 'factitious air' (oxygen), they re­
ferred to that gas, and were right or wrong depending on what he claimed 
about it.
The influence of the (CT) view on Kitcher's account of how 
Priestley sometimes referred to oxygen, and said true things about it, 
should be clear. He was, in these instances, directly causally related 
to what we call oxygen. Other instances of the use of the term 'de- 
phlogisticated air' by Priestley, however, require a different refer­
ential account. There he was related via a causal chain to Stahl's use 
of 'phlogiston', and, since ^  failed to refer, so did Priestley's de­
rivative from it. This account of the reference of individual tokens 
thereby shares the (CT) view's machinery of direct causal relations to
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an object, and indirect relations through a causal chain to earlier 
'baptisms'. It is different from the (CT) view outlined above, however, 
in two respects. First, and less important (for now), this is the first 
treatment we've considered of an initial 'baptism' of a non-existent ob­
ject. Some philosophers argue that a (CT) view is still the correct 
theory of references for such cases, and others disagree. In any event, 
since it is at least more difficult to account for the isolation of or 
ostensive relation to a non-existent object, it will be correspondingly 
more difficult to elucidate a (CT) view in such cases. Second, and more 
important (for now), the necessity of considering the context of indi­
vidual tokens of a term illuminates an entirely different problem con­
cerning Kitcher's treatment of the historical explanatory theory of 
(semantic) reference.
In a work which is often taken as one of the precursors of the 
(CT) view, Keith Donnellan argued that definite descriptions have two 
different functions for determining the referent of a term, one 'attri­
butive' and one 'referential'.
A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an 
assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and- 
so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an 
assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his 
audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states 
something about that person or thing.
An example Donnellan uses to illustrate this difference is 'Smith's mur­
derer is insane'. On the one hand, due to the grisly nature of the 
crime, a police chief might use this description to refer to whoever 
committed this terrible deed. On the other hand, a juror after the 
trial of Shlomo, convicted of the crime, may say 'Smith's murderer is 
insane' to his wife, since he often observed Shlomo drooling and rolling
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his eyes during his trial, and thereby use the description 'Smith’s mur­
derer' to pick out Shlomo (even though, let's say, Shlomo was framed).
In the first case, for Donnellan, the description refers to whoever 
satisfies the description, in the second it picks out Shlomo, whether 
the description is satisfied by him or not. As with Kitcher's account, 
we must know something about the context of the utterance (or token) to 
tell which is the case (i.e., who it is that the term denotes). We 
could not, for example, decide whether the description, printed on a 
piece of paper, was used referentially or attributively. If reference 
is taken to be a semantic notion, can such relativity to individual 
contexts be tolerated?
Kripke argues, rightly I think, that such relativity is not 
appropriate for semantic treatments of reference.
In a given idiolect, the semantic referent of a designator 
(without indexicals) is given by a general intention of the speaker 
to refer to a certain object whenever the designator is used. The 
speaker's referent is given by a specific intention, on a given 
occasion, to refer to a certain object. If the speaker believes 
that the object he wants to talk about, on a given occasion, ful­
fills the conditions for being the semantic referent, then he be­
lieves that there is no clash between his general intentions and 
his specific intentions. My hypothesis is that Donnellan's 
referential-attributive distinction should be generalized in this 
light.68
This 'speaker's referent' belongs not to semantics, but to the field of 
linguistic studies generally called 'pragmatics'. Cases like 
Donnellan's referential use of descriptions, or any case of misdescrib­
ing that may be said to (via the principle of charity) still pick out a 
certain person or object, depend upon the relevant context for the ref­
erence to work. Semantically, on the other hand, the reference must 
fail in all cases of misnaming, since the truth of the uttered sentence
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should not depend on individual contexts. From this point of view 
Priestley may well have been talking about oxygen, since the (CT) view 
depends upon the causal relation between the act of naming and the ob­
ject named, which he seems to have fulfilled via his experiments.
Still, against Kitcher's position, none of his statements using 'de- 
phlogisticated air' were (semantically) true, since 'de-phlogisticated 
air' is semantically related to a non-existent entity, phlogiston.
That is, the possibility of making a charitable translation of a past 
statement into currently respectable parlance is not sufficient to ren­
der the original statement true. If I, for example, utter the state­
ment 'Bill seems to be an awfully jealous man' after having talked to 
Frank and (mistakenly) taken him to be Bill, witnesses may very well 
charitably construe my utterance as being (really) about Frank. Still, 
this does not render 'Bill seems to be an awfully jealous man' true. 
Semantically, the truth of statements needs to be established via the 
statement type, while, pragmatically, tokens can be gerrymandered via 
the principle of charitable translation. In other words, while Kitcher's 
account certainly succeeds in breaking down Kuhn's and Feyerabend's ob­
jections to different theories being about the same thing, it is not a 
theory of semantic reference. This does no damage to the notion of 
scientific progress made possible according to such a view, but it does 
necessitate a long overdue clarification of terminology.
In a recent, unpublished paper, Lawrence Poncinie uses a dis­
tinction between what a name denotes and what a speaker refers to^^ that 
strikes me as being important for unravelling the semant ic s/pragma tics 
muddle engendered by much of the current literature. If the difference
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between meaning and reference is now usually understood through the 
works of Kripke and Putnam, the notion of reference remains ambiguous.
It is not just a matter of how one can determine which object is picked 
out by a name or a description, but also a matter of how general the 
referential relation depicted by a statement is. If Priestley can be 
judged to have said true things about oxygen, this is only because of a 
charitable translation of phlogiston talk into oxygen talk, not because 
of the referential status of 'de-phlogisticated air' itself. It would 
probably greatly aid current discussions of meaning and reference change 
in science if such a distinction between semantic reference and denota­
tion was kept separate from speaker's reference and practical concerns 
over what a historical figure meant to say, or, given his or her termi­
nology, how best to translate the historical figure's statements into 
current terminology. For a historian, the latter enterprise may be all 
that really matters. For a philosopher, however, whose tools of the 
trade include notions like semantics and pragmatics, such a distinction 
seems to be crucial. Extreme meaning-change views are in jeopardy 
regardless of which treatment is followed, but questions in philosophy 
of language remain obscure unless some kind of demarcation is clearly 
and consistently adhered to.
If a (CT) view seems to be able to answer Kuhn's and Feyera­
bend 's claims about reference change of scientific concepts as long as 
the concepts behave like proper names or natural kind terms, what about 
strictly theoretical terms? Here it is a bit more difficult to deter­
mine how the causal theory can be of help, at least as it has been out­
lined so far in this chapter. Kripke provides very little detail
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concerning how such terms are handled by his theory of reference. When 
he discusses such concepts as 'electromagnetic waves', or 'streams of 
photons' he does so in the context of discussing such scientific iden­
tity statements as "light is a stream of photons, that water is HgO, 
that lightning is an electrical discharge, that gold is the element with 
the atomic number 79."^^ We are never told how 'photons' or 'atomic
numbers' are isolated and picked out in analogy to the objects denoted
71by proper names or natural kind terms. Instead, Kripke is concerned 
with ascertaining whether such identity statements, if true, are neces­
sary or contingent. He argues that they are necessary, even though they 
are empirically discovered, and this claim has produced a great deal of 
current interest in physical necessity and scientific realism. Still, 
whether or not current 'atomic theory' (if there is one such theory) is 
an improved successor of Dalton's, or even Bohr's, 'atomic theory', 
seems problematical if we don't have a referential (denotational) ac­
count of the theoretical concept of an atom. On the face of it, it does 
not appear that anything like an initial 'baptism' is possible in such 
cases, if there is no ostensible thing to name. Worse, can reference 
or denotation be as theory-independent in such cases as it appears to 
be on the (CT) view with proper names and natural kind terms? Do we 
have anything like 'photons' picked out except against a large back­
ground of theoretical commitments? If not, are not properties and 
meanings believed true of the class of photons necessary for referring 
to or denoting that class? In short, if a child is born, or a type of 
medium sized physical object is discovered, the 'baptism' machinery dis­
cussed by Kripke seems to be adequate to initiate the 'causal chain'
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necessary for the (CT) view. A theoretical entity, on the other hand, 
is usually introduced as a postulate, or as a possible explanation of 
certain experimental data subject to further verification. It is thus 
not clear how the baptism machinery functions in the case of a theoret­
ical postulate.
Putnam seems to consider the referential status of such terms. 
Initially, such terms are treated exactly like names or natural kinds 
on a (CT) view.
Bohr would have been referring to electrons when he used the 
word 'electron', notwithstanding the fact that some of his beliefs 
about electrons were mistaken, and we are referring to those same 
particles notwithstanding the fact that some of our beliefs— even 
beliefs included in our scientific 'definition' of the term 'elec­
tron'— may very likely turn out to be equally mistaken.
The question is, of course, how are we referring to the same thing in 
this case? Well, for Putnam, if I were standing next to Benjamin 
Franklin when he conducted one of his experiments on electrical phenom­
ena (e.g., his famous 'kite' experiment), I could be causally linked to 
the event (his experiment), and hence acquire the term 'electricity'.
It is clear that each of my later uses will be causally con­
nected to this introducing event, as long as those uses exemplify 
the ability I acquired in that introducing event. . . .  If I teach 
the word to someone else by telling him that the word 'electricity' 
is the name of a physical magnitude, and by telling him certain 
facts about it which do not constitute a causal description— for 
example, I might tell him that like charges repel and unlike 
charges attract, and that atoms consist of a nucleus with one kind 
of charge surrounded by satellite electrons with the opposite kind 
of charge— even if the facts I tell him do not constitute a defi­
nite description of any kind, let alone a causal description—  
still, the word's being in his vocabulary will be causally linked 
to its being in my vocabulary, and hence, ultimately to an intro­
ducing event.
The above, of course, is exactly parallel to the linking via a causal 
chain of later uses of a name to an initial 'baptism'. What, however.
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is picked out by the introducing event in this case if my 'facts about 
it' are not necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the 
class of electrical phenomena? For Putnam, there seem to be some sort 
of meanings associated with 'physical magnitude terms' like 'electricity' 
or 'mass', even if these do not comprise necessary and sufficient condi­
tions for class membership. There is, in other words, some 'minimal 
linguistic information'^^ associated with the terms, and, together with 
the causal connections in a community's use of the term, this minimal 
information enables one to ascribe the same referent to the term. The 
'minimal linguistic information' that Putnam thinks is necessary in­
volves causal descriptions "because physical magnitudes are normally 
discussed through their e f f e c t s . I n  other words, 'electricity' is 
picked out if, together with the right causal connection to an original 
'baptism' (or some such), it is viewed as the cause of certain experi­
mental effects, however the current theory may otherwise describe the 
nature of electricity ('flow' of electrons as opposed to an 'imponder­
able fluid', etc.). A similar account holds for other types of theo­
retical terms in science.
Still, problems remain for the (CT) view in such cases. For 
one thing, we still are not told what the introducing event introduces, 
except a use of the term under certain circumstances. Franklin con­
ducted an experiment, for example, and called the cause of the experi­
mental results 'electricity'. Still, the 'cause' was not isolated, nor 
is it in any normal sense ostensive. Also, if the causal chain links 
successive speakers to a use of a term, instead of an object, we get a 
causal account of the same use, but not necessarily of the same
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reference (this is related to, but not identical with the pragmatic/ 
semantic problem in Kitcher's account of Priestley). Kripke, at least, 
does not seem to want to be committed to this kind of causal account.
Nor does he seem to want to be committed to any minimal linguistic in­
formation being necessary for physical reference. One could be totally 
wrong about, for example, whether Aristotle is male, or a teacher, or 
a Greek, and still denote him for Kripke. If theoretical terms operate 
differently, it is not clear how they are different, or whether a causal
account is appropriate for them.
If we can be totally wrong about theoretical entities, yet 
still refer to them, the situation may well prove to be even worse for
a causal account. Consider an example Kripke uses in a different
context:
Neptune was hypothesized as the planet which caused such and 
such discrepancies in the orbit of certain other planets. If 
Leverrier indeed gave the name 'Neptune' to the planet before it 
was ever seen, then he fixed the reference of "Neptune" by means 
of the description just mentioned.
Kripke goes on to say that the statement "if such and such perturbations 
are caused by a planet, they are caused by Neptune" becomes, in this 
case of fixing a reference via a description, an apriori truth. Still, 
he argues, it is not a necessary truth, since various counterfactual 
situations would have changed the description (i.e., it was not a defi­
nition).^^ But what about the supposed planet 'Vulcan' that was sup­
posed to account for a similar deficiency in Newtonian planetary the- 
78ory? If the cause of the advance in the perihelion of Mercury had to 
be a planet, then 'Vulcan' failed to refer, but, then it seems that at 
least the minimal linguistic information that Vulcan is a planet is
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necessary for determining what, if anything, 'Vulcan' referred to. On 
the other hand, if 'Vulcan' stands indifferently for 'the cause of the 
perturbation of Mercury's orbit', then Leverrier might be taken to have 
been referring (unknowingly, of course) to some aspect of General Rela­
tivity! It does not seem that the (CT) view can have it both ways. 
Either some added information is needed for the reference of theoreti­
cal terms, or they are simply causally related to the results of expe­
riments (i.e., 'Vulcan' is whatever causes the advance in the perihelion 
of Mercury, etc.). If the first horn is accepted, then some amendments 
will need to be tacked on to the (CT) view when theoretical terms are 
involved (what kinds of minimal linguistic information?), and it will 
then have to be separated from a (CD) view by some other criteria than 
the 'baptism' machinery. If the second horn is accepted, the (CT) view 
will run into serious conflict with our intuitions. Just as the (SD) 
view seemed suspect partially because of its anamolous results (I not 
only am not talking about Aristotle if my descriptions do not fit him,
I ^  talking about whomever they ^  fit), the (CT) view would, on this 
reading, have past theorists talking about current (or even future) 
explanatory causal mechanisms. It seems that the first horn is much 
more acceptable, so what would be needed to make the (CT) view viable 
for all scientific terms?
Michael E. Levin has argued that questions about meaning
change and reference change must be kept separate, and, contra Kuhn and
Feyerabend, the untranslatability of a term does not lead to a differ-
79ence in physical reference. As an example, he uses the Greek term 
'atomoi' (otioyoi), and considers how they could be wrong about the very
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things later theorists called 'atoms'. He concludes that a (CT) view 
can account for the two terms, which are not, perhaps, intertranslat­
able, still referring to the same things. "According to the CTR (CT), 
the Greeks were using 'atomos' to refer to whatever explains the facts
that explain the observations that explain the Greek's coinage of 
80'atomos'." In other words, some of the same phenomena that led the 
Greeks to postulate aropoi, led modern theorists to postulate atoms, 
and, hence, the two terms can refer to the same thing. It is important 
to use 'refer to' here, instead of 'denote', because Levin's account 
creates the same problems for semantic denotation as did Kitcher's. 
Again, I would like to reserve the technical semantic concept 'denote' 
for cases involving sentence types, not contingent upon contextual in­
formation involving individual tokens. When causal chains are used to 
unpack uses of terras, they lose their claim to being a semantic tool. 
Worse, Levin's account does not explain how a (CT) view can account for 
what is picked out by 'aropoi' or 'atoms'. Since neither refers to (or 
denotes) ostensive entities, we are back to the problem outlined in the 
last paragraph.
Berent Enc has attempted to amend the (CT) view to deal with
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the problem of non-ostensive scientific terms. Enc claims, as I have
above, that the referential apparatus for 'gold' or 'cat' is not like
that for 'caloric' or 'magnetic field', precisely because the objects
82
named by the latter terms are not ostensive. Rather than accepting
the use of descriptions to fix a reference for whatever causes the ef­
fect X, Enc thinks that the referential apparatus for non-ostensive 
terms must include the 'kind-constituting properties' attributed to the
91
object, and the 'explanatory mechanism' developed in the relevant theory 
83
or theories. Non-ostensive terms, in other words, lack the indexical
element the (CT) view utilizes to determine the referent for proper
names and natural kind terms, and instead require some 'set of beliefs'
84to determine their reference (if any). To determine the referent for 
a non-ostensive term, we must know something about the kind of thing 
the theory postulates this referent to be, as well as how such a kind 
of thing could explain the effects for which it was introduced.
This, I think, is to restrict the conditions of the reference 
of theoretical terms too drastically, especially by adding the condition 
of the causal account of how the theoretical kind brings about its ef­
fects. Such a restriction would, for example, entail that Franklin's 
'positive' and 'negative' electricity would not be the same as ours, 
though we use the same terms, and, in many cases, simple experiments 
are explained in similar ways. It is, of course, arguable that his 
theoretical kinds are not the same as ours, but this should not follow 
from a given treatment of reference. Generally, it does not seem proper 
that a theory of reference determine our intuitions about sameness of 
reference, but should, rather, match these intuitions once they have 
been established. More importantly, theoretical terms are often intro­
duced (or, if pre-existent, incorporated into a new theory) without de­
tailed causal analyses of how they accomplish their effects (e.g., 
'gravity' in the Principia). This should not, in itself, render such 
terms non-referential, or even referentially vague. Still, some kind 
of theoretical associations do seem to be necessary for determining the 
reference of theoretical kinds. Enc's restrictions simply seem to be
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too strong.
From a different perspective, Hartry Field has argued that 
referential semantics, whether from a (CT) or some other perspective, 
are not sufficient for establishing the truth or falsity of statements 
within a theory. Some of the statements in Newton's theory, for exam­
ple, can be assigned truth values even though there is no unambiguous
85determination of what some of the theoretical terms denote. Differ­
ent current physics texts, for example, contain treatments of 'mass' 
that, depending on the way it is formulated, has or does not have the 
same value in all reference frames ('relativistic mass' = total 
energy/c^, 'proper mass' = nonkinetic e n e r g y / c ^ ) I f  current texts 
allow for different formulations of 'mass', which one, if either, can 
Newton be said to have denoted? Field argues that this question is 
undecidable, that pre-relativistic uses of 'mass' were 'referentially 
indeterminate'.
Before relativity theory was discovered . . . the word 'mass' 
was referentially indeterminate: it did not lack denotation, in
any straightforward sense; on the contrary, there are two physical 
quantities that each satisfy the normal criteria for being the de­
notation of the term.87
This is not to be construed as a failure on our part to determine which
of these pre-relativistic 'mass' is denoted, but rather, there is no
fact of the matter.
According to Newton, momentum can be determined as the product 
of mass and velocity, and this 'mass' has the same value with respect 
to different frames of reference. After relativity theory, both of 
these statements cannot be true. Either the conservation of momentum 
is violated if velocity is held constant, or the invariability of mass
93
88is violated if the conservation of momentum is maintained. If 'mass'
is taken as relativistic mass then momentum is conserved while mass no
89longer remains constant, and vice versa if 'proper mass' is used.
Hence, for Field, we know that the conjunction of the two claims con­
cerning 'mass' in Newton is false (i.e., has a determinate truth value), 
but, we know neither which conjunct is false, nor which current 'mass' 
Newton denoted. The principle of Charity for translation also won't 
help according to Field, since both types of 'mass' play about equally 
important roles in relativity theory (as did the two claims concerning 
'mass' in Newton's theory). Nor will factors such as 'simplicity' help
determine our translation, since different equations will be simpler,
90depending on which type of 'mass' is employed. Nor, is it compatible 
with the most reasonable assignment of truth values to Newton's state­
ments to assume that Newton wasn't denoting anything with his use of 
'mass'. It seems true, for example, that it takes more force to move a
body with more mass, and how could this statement be true if 'mass' is
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like Santa Claus or phlogiston?
Field offers a solution by distinguishing between 'denoting' 
and 'partially denoting'. Newton's term 'mass', for Field, partially 
denoted both 'proper mass' and 'relativistic mass', and didn't fully 
denote either. The consequence of this distinction is to allow us to 
accept the part of meaning-change views that claims that we can't always 
equate the same term in two different theories, while still rejecting 
the claim that the theories are incommensurable. If we allow for a 
previous term to partially denote later treatments of the same term, we 
can determine (some) truth values across the conceptual divide (e.g..
94
it does take more force to move an object with more mass in both theo­
ries), without claiming that there must be total determinacy of denota-
92
tion in the earlier case. In short, we can translate truth values of 
some statements, without being able to strictly determine the denotation 
of their component theoretical terms, as long as we can assign at least 
partial denotation to them in terms of later theories. Hence, theories 
of reference (note: no particular theory was employed by Field) may not
be crucial for establishing the truth of theoretical statements (i.e.,
scientific realism) as has often been assumed.
This is, I think, the most important insight in Field's arti­
cle, regardless of the adequacy of his treatment of the particular case
of 'mass'. Partial denotation, of course, cannot replace denotation in
93semantic theory, being parasitic on the prior notion. Still, the
tight link in semantic theory between assignment of truth value and the
denotation of terms seems to be partially sundered on Field's account. 
This is, I think, as it should be, especially concerning science. Theo­
ries of reference cannot establish the truth or falsity of theoretical 
statements, or whether theoretical terms have a denotation. Rather, 
they should be compatible with whatever reasons we already have for 
believing or not believing theoretical claims. Edwin Berk has argued
that (CT) views, for example, while supporting some realist desiderata, 
94undermine others. Some realists stress the referential (denotational) 
aspect of terms in a mature science, and the (CT) view can help to show 
how this can be defended (although, as has been shown, amendments are 
needed for theoretical terms). (CT) views, as has already been shown 
(as well as (CD) views) allow for the transtheoretical reference of
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scientific terms. On the other hand, insisting that the properties 
associated with a theoretical term have no real bearing on the denota­
tion of that term can actually undermine a realist position stressing 
the importance of evidence for a given theory (the position defended in 
this dissertation). For Kripke, of course, essential properties of a 
natural kind term cannot be lacking if an object is to belong to that 
kind. Still, epistemologically, what these essential properties are, 
and what our evidence for them is, is not only not a denotational mat­
ter, it ^ s a theoretical matter. By apparently downplaying the role of 
theories in determining the extension of theoretical kinds (at least), 
the (CT) view may actually undermine our chances of making realist 
claims concerning them. Hence, the amendments needed for the (CT) view 
to adequately handle theoretical kinds briefly addressed above have more 
than technical 'mopping up' importance.
Peter Smith uses some of these considerations to argue that an
amended (CD) view would be more germane to scientific realism and sci-
95entific progress than an amended (CT) view. While I think that a yet- 
to-be-formulated amendment of the (CT) view is more promising (it does, 
after all, nicely handle natural kind terms in science), the real les­
son of the above discussion is that an adequate defense of scientific 
realism as here formulated is not to be found in any denotational 
approach.
Briefly, while there are more than one amended theory of deno­
tation that can undermine anti-progress, anti-realist objections as 
found in writers such as Kuhn and Feyerabend, establishing that we 
should believe any theory, past or present, involves our evidence that
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the relevant theoretical terms are referential. This is, of course, not 
reasonably to be expected from theories of denotation, but from theories 
of scientific verification and theory testing. Whether we should be­
lieve that theoretical statements are true, including whether or not 
their component terms at least partially denote, has to do with what 
amount and type of evidence we have for the theory in question a^ a 
particular time. The next chapter will introduce my account of how the 
'virtues' of scientific theories can provide the framework for addressing 
these issues.
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CHAPTER III 
REALISM AND SCIENTIFIC 'VIRTUES'
If the most we can expect from theories of denotation is that 
they be compatible with our intuitions concerning scientific progress 
and the truth or falsity of specific theoretical claims, arguments for 
and against scientific realism must retreat to the level of evidential 
support for theories and the proper epistemic attitude toward such sup­
port. There is a long history of such debates within both philosophy 
and history of science. Conceptually, a realist must try to establish 
that some theories at various points in their development have enough 
evidential support to warrant rational belief in the unobservable 
entities, properties, and relations that these theories postulate. 
Historically, she must try to provide means to separate theories that 
had this support but are, nevertheless, now held to be false from cur­
rent theories that she wants to establish as warranting rational belief 
because they have this support. The classical debates between realists 
and anti-realists have taken place on both fronts, and it seems to me to 
be requisite for the realist to handle plausibly each kind of anti­
realist objection. Still, it seems methodologically preferable to 
separate, initially, conceptual and historical concerns. Consequently,
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the present chapter will be divided into two sections. The first will 
explain what I mean by 'virtues' of scientific theories and isolate 
those virtues that I think are relevant for supporting realist claims.
The second will defend these virtues against what I consider to be the 
most important conceptual anti-realist objections. The historical 
objections to scientific realism will be discussed in the following 
chapter, together with my responses and two detailed historical examples. 
The end result will provide, I hope, an adequate and plausible defense 
of scientific realism as delineated in Chapter One.
Virtues of Scientific Theories 
The 'virtues' of scientific theories that I have mentioned 
correspond to some of the criteria that have been argued historically to 
play important roles in rational theory evaluation, as well as theory 
choice when competing theories are involved. The term 'virtue' I have 
borrowed from Quine and Ullian,^ as well as the names of certain specific 
virtues that I will soon list and discuss. They have also been called 
'factors' or 'guidelines' of theory choice, and often include such con­
cepts as 'simplicity', 'testability', 'falsifiability', 'explanatory 
power', 'notational elegance', 'scope', 'unification', and the like. In 
fact, the variations in terminology seem almost endless in both philo­
sophical and historical treatments of science, and this terminological 
fecundity is further muddled by the equally variable interpretations of 
what these terms mean, and what methodological importance (if any) they 
have. The main purpose of this section is to limit this proliferation 
of terminology, and to explain the meaning of the terms which are 
employed as a prelude to my subsequent philosophical and historical
Ill
discussion.
As both an example of these conceptual confusions involving
theoretical virtues, and as a suitable introduction to my treatment of
them, the virtue of simplicity provides an excellent place to begin. It
is obvious historically that scientists have ^  fact utilized various
notions of simplicity in their assessment of the adequacy of scientific 
2
theories. It is also obvious, after reflecting on their various inter­
pretations of this virtue, as well as upon the voluminous philosophical 
work devoted to 'clarifying' this notion, that 'simplicity' is hardly a
3
univocal concept. Some interpretations have emphasized a notational 
treatment of simplicity, in terms of 'parametric families', or 'dimen­
sions' of a theory.^ Others stress one or another version of 'Ockham's 
razor', advocating a parsimony of logical or non-logical primitives in a 
theory,^  or the number of assumptions a theory needs to successfully deal 
with the relevant empirical data.^ Still others stress the 'overall 
simplicity' of a scientific theory, how it unifies diverse data within a 
given field of science, or even by combining previously theoretically 
disparate fields (e.g., Newton's 'unification' of terrestrial and celes­
tial dynamics).^ Sometimes, as one might expect, these and other inter-
g
pretations of simplicity may conflict with one another. Furthermore, 
all of the above represent 'synchronic' interpretations of simplicity, 
applicable to a theory isolated from its historical development. George 
Schlesinger argued twenty years ago that such notions cannot do justice 
to the actual use of the criterion of simplicity in historical cases of 
theory choice, and advocated instead a concept of 'dynamic simplicity',
9
which evaluates theories in terms of their historical development.
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As a further complication, Schlesinger points out that inter­
pretations of simplicity introduce many different factors into the 
problem of rational theory choice that need to be weighted when evalu­
ating actual historical cases.
Copernicus had to assign three types of movements to the earth: 
(i) lateral— an annual orbital movement encircling the sun; (ii) 
rotational— a diurnal revolution about its own axis; (iii) axial—  
an annual conical motion of its axis about the centre of the earth.
Ptolemy was able to account for all celestial phenomena with­
out postulating more than one type of movement for any body— lateral 
movement. Thus when it comes to the types of movements stipulated, 
the Ptolemaic system may be regarded as simpler.
On the other hand, Ptolemy had to postulate the alignment of 
the centres of the inferior planets to the sun, otherwise he could 
not explain their 'limited elongation'. In the Copernican system 
this phenomenon follows automatically from the fact that the 
inferior planets move inside the orbit of the earth and no special 
restriction on the movement of the inferior planets was needed. In 
this respect then the Copernican system is the simpler.
Thus we are faced with the problem of weighting different kinds 
of extra factors against one another. One theory introduces an 
extra sort of movement, the other a peculiar kind of restriction on 
movement, and we have to decide which one is to be regarded as more 
complex as a result.
Further complications, involving the status of any or all of the above 
interpretations of simplicity (whether it is a semantic, pragmatic, or 
syntactic virtue, whether it offers any evidence for a theory's truth, 
etc.) will be discussed in the next section. Already, however, the need 
for some agreement concerning what the virtue of simplicity amounts to, 
should be apparent. Such a move toward clarification is, I think, neces­
sarily prior to attempts to formalize or quantify this concept. Some of 
the difficulties faced by earlier attempts to formally handle this notion 
involve disagreements over what notion is being formalized.In any 
event, the present treatment of scientific virtues will attempt only 
intuitive and historical clarifications of those that I feel are impor­
tant for realist/anti-realist debates.
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A complication concerning the status of scientific virtues 
that must be considered in this section, however, is that they do not 
all have the same evidential status in theory evaluation. Gerd Buchdahl, 
for example, has long held that theory evaluation takes place at many 
levels. In one of his early papers he claims that assertions, doubts, 
and denials concerning the existence of theoretical entities can be ex­
pressed on at least two levels, the 'phenomenological' (iji-level), and the
12
'epistemological' (e-level). (^-level) assertions and denials occur in 
a language "which operates within a conventional framework where expres­
sions such as fiction, physical hypothesis, base assumption, evidence for
13the existence of, and so on, have a relatively fixed grammar." Within 
this conventional framework there can be both direct and indirect evi­
dence for the existence of theoretical entities, both sorts established 
by the ongoing community of practicing scientists within a field, and 
"strictly scientific considerations" determine the language of theory 
choice, (e-level) assertions and denials, on the other hand, are "ex­
tremely general," and questions concerning 'existence' and 'direct' and 
'indirect' evidence involve global criteria, instead of the conventional 
nature of such questions on the (^-level). It is characteristic of, and 
legitimate within, the (cji-level), for example, to make such claims as 
"whilst originally we had very little evidence for the atomicity of mat­
ter, later discoveries greatly strengthened our belief in the physical 
reality of a t o m s . T h e  (e-level), on the other hand, often does not 
admit of such degrees of "the strength of conclusions based on scientif­
ic evidence," but rather questions the meaningfulness of even discussing 
the existence of theoretical entities. The (e-level) is characterized
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by assertions concerning the impossibility of proving the existence of 
theoretical entities, or a retreat to only admitting entities for which 
we have direct e vide n c e . T h e (e-level), in other words, is meta- 
scientific, philosophical, and not directly challengable by any scien­
tific work or developments. Buchdahl's charge in this paper is that 
these levels are often muddled in debates concerning the existence of 
theoretical entities, and that they need to be carefully separated.
This 'levels' distinction is advanced and much elaborated by 
Buchdahl in a more recent p a p e r , i n  which he argues explicitly that 
typical scientific methodological criteria such as 'degrees of confirma­
tion' are not sufficient for understanding historical cases of theory
choice, and must be supplemented by "general notions and principles of
18a more philosophical kind." Specifically, he lists three components
involved in theory choice: the 'architechtonic', the 'explicative', and
the 'constitutive' components. The architechtonic component includes
criteria such as esthetic considerations, metaphysical preferences, and
privileged notions of a general sort such as 'an effect cannot be greater
than its cause', or whether or not 'action at a distance' is appropriate
19in scientific explanations. The explicative component is concerned
with the intelligibility of a theoretical concept, and often involves
concept formation or important shifts in the application of an already
occurring concept. Einstein's treatment of the 'proper' meaning of
'simultaneity', or Maxwell's treatment of the proper constituents in
'dynamical explanations' are examples of the use of the explicative 
20component. Finally, the constitutive component represents more fa­
miliar criteria for theory choice, such as degree of confirmation, and
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21the integration of scientific laws into a system. Since only the 
latter is typically included in discussions of scientific virtues, the 
addition of the former two once again complicates the status of these 
virtues.
Buchdahl's example of a historical problem which included all
three components of theory choice is Newton's postulation of gravity in
his dynamical system. The familiar constitutive components in defense
of this hypothesis were included in the Principia itself. Free fall,
the orbit of the moon, and the behavior of the tides are among the
empirical phenomena 'explained' by the use of this hypothesis and
Newton's other laws of motion. The ability of Newton's system to unify
and account for such diverse data is commonly held as providing evidence 
22
for its acceptance. Most of the original objections to Newton's sys­
tem, however, were not leveled at the constitutive component, but at the 
intelligibility and methodological acceptability of gravity interpreted 
as action at a distance. Since no mechanical 'pushes and pulls' were 
postulated as accounting for gravitational force in the Principia, the
proponents of the mechanical philosophy predominant at the time accused
23
Newton of introducing 'occult' forces into natural philosophy. In
other words, these criticisms were leveled primarily from the point of
view of architechtonic and/or explicative components. In fact, even the
eventual acceptance of gravitational force (and attractive and repulsive
forces in general) within natural philosophy was not exclusively because
24of its success at the constitutive level.
If I am correct in my interpretation of the development of 
Buchdahl's views, his earlier (e-level) was later divided by him into
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the architechtonic and explicative components. The 'intelligibility'
of attractive and repulsive forces, for example, depends on both
epistemological-metaphysical considerations (architechtonic component)
and on redefining dynamical terms to make them compatible with attrac­
ts
tive and repulsive forces (explicative component). If his arguments 
that these other considerations have greatly effected historical theory 
evaluation (and choice) are correct, the discussion of virtues must be 
correspondingly expanded if they are to act as criteria of theory eval­
uation (and choice). Such a separation of levels (or components) will 
be valuable, for example, in assessing 'external' factors involved in 
theory choice. Such an approach is typically employed by 'Marxist'
historians, usually claiming priority of socio-economic factors in the
27
development of scientific theories, though there are also many non-
Marxist 'external' interpretations of at least specific historical 
28
cases. I concur with many historians that the external/internal dis­
tinction leaves much to be desired, especially if external factors are 
relegated to the area of scientific discovery as opposed to justifica­
tion. But, however one interprets them, such aspects of theory evalu­
ation should certainly be distinguished from constitutive ((ji-level) 
factors. To so distinguish them is not to automatically import cor­
responding notions of relative rationality.
More importantly, distinctions of levels or components of 
theory evaluation in the spirit of Buchdahl's are important for sepa­
rating virtues as relevant or irrelevant for rational belief in a theory 
(or of the existence of the entities postulated by the theory). Kuhn, 
for example, argues that Copernicus' claims concerning the greater
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economy or accuracy of his system as compared with Ptolemy's are largely
illusory, much in the spirit of Schlesinger's quotation cited in the
text above. Kuhn argues instead that "the real appeal of sun centered
29astronomy was aesthetic rather than pragmatic." Certainly aesthetic 
components, as well as various metaphysical-epistemological factors like 
those discussed earlier, play a role in historical cases of theory 
choice, as do the 'external' factors discussed in the last paragraph.
It is another matter, however, to claim that these factors all play 
equal roles in theory evaluation, or that the roles played by the archi­
techtonic and explicative components (or whatever terminology one 
chooses to mark such factors) are as important in theory evaluation as 
the constitutive component.
In the case of Copernicus and Ptolemy, for example, Clark
Glymour has argued persuasively that Copernicus' theory was in fact at
30the time it was introduced more testable than Ptolemy's. Similarly, 
Mary Jo Nye, while acknowledging the role played by Buchdahl's archi­
techtonic and explicative components in the 19th century atomic 
31debates, maintains that the most important role was played at the 
32constitutive level. Finally, while Kepler's motivations for formula­
ting his laws of motion included both a belief in mechanical principles
33and neo-Platonic metaphysics, he certainly used constitutive factors 
such as 'fitting the data' to check his metaphysical explanations,^^ and 
his metaphysical speculations were not what led Newton, for example, to 
utilize his laws. In short, distinctions like Buchdahl's enable us to 
separate virtues and their respective influences on theory evaluation, 
and we need not expect them to have equal weight, or equal methodological
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significance.
With this in mind, I will now list the virtues I think impor­
tant for evaluating theories in light of realist/anti-realist debates, 
though my realist arguments for them will not be presented until the 
next section. It should be clear from the above that I am not claiming 
that the virtues listed are the only factors involved in theory evalu­
ation, but merely that the ones listed can play a special role in the 
realist/anti-realist debates. Furthermore, the introductory nature of 
the present work does not preclude possible further elaboration of the 
virtues listed, nor adding additional virtues to the list. In other 
words, the following list is not meant to be exclusive or exhaustive.
Given the plethora of interpretations of ’simplicity* partially 
listed above, I will not include this virtue, as such, in my list. In­
stead, I will introduce two notions which I think correspond to different 
interpretations of this virtue. They will not, of course, cover all of 
the former notions of simplicity found in particular cases of theory 
evaluation, nor all the notions isolated in philosophical discussions 
of the methodological import of simplicity. 'Notational' simplicity and 
'curve-fitting', for example, while no doubt playing a role in theory
evaluation, do not seem to me to represent constitutive considerations,
35
nor are they obviously relevant to the realist/anti-realist debates.
There seem to be no good reasons, after all, to think that theories 
expressed by 'simpler' mathematical expressions are (thereby) more 
likely to be true. Furthermore, if the above arguments concerning the 
different methodological import of various virtues have any weight, 
their omission does not stack the deck in favor of realism any more
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than does excluding socio-economic factors from epistemological con­
siderations. Again, while many factors play a role in theory evalu­
ation, they do not thereby have equal methodological weight.
The first virtue that I will discuss corresponds roughly to 
'Ockham's razor' interpretations of simplicity, that is, parsimony con­
cerning the number and types of theoretical assumptions needed by a
theory to cover the relevant phenomena. I will call this virtue
36'modesty', again borrowing from Quine and Ullian. As with most of
the virtues with which I am concerned, the role of modesty in theory
evaluation is most often comparative (it will generally be evaluated in
cases of theory choice, when the theory in question is competing with
at least one other theory). While this does not necessarily preclude
the possibility of evaluating its role within a single theory, it will
be seen later that this is almost never a historical factor within
actual scientific debates. Furthermore, the modesty of a given theory
is certainly relative (and contextual) in the sense that is more
modest than Tg, or with respect to the present state of the field in
question, or in terms of such-and-such weighting of the theoretical
components. Again, given the weighting problem discussed above in
evaluating Copernicus' and Ptolemy's astronomical systems, I see no
hope for a method of evaluating modesty that envisions simply counting
relevant factors. Some factors have and (as I will argue later) should
have more importance than others.
Examples of modesty in theory choice include such components as
whether or not a theory utilizes 'extra wheels' or 'useless appendages'
37to calculate experimental results. Ptolemy, for example, needed extra
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'special' assumptions to account for both the 'limited elongation' of 
the inferior planets mentioned above, and the fact that superior planets 
retrograde only during their synodic period. The latter is not only 
explained by Copernicus' putting the earth in orbit around the sun and 
interpreting both retrograde motion and synodic periods in terms of the 
colinearity among the positions of the earth, the planet, and the sun; 
it is also a commitment of his theory once the earth is placed in motion.
In this sense, the one assumption that the earth is in orbital motion and 
the corresponding reinterpretations of 'synodic period', 'siderial period', 
and 'apparent retrograde motion' account for a regularity that requires 
extra assumptions for Ptolemy's system that were clearly created just to 
account for this particular regularity.
Similarly, Einstein criticized the mechanical assumption of an 
'ether' as a medium for transmitting light because of the special assump­
tions needed to make this construct compatible with experimental data.
The discussion of all the various attempts to understand the 
mechanical nature of the ether as a medium for transmitting light 
would make a long story. Â mechanical construction means, as we 
know, that the substance is built up of particles with forces 
acting along lines connecting them and depending only on the dis­
tance. In order to construct the ether as a jelly-like mechanical 
substance physicists had to make some highly artificial and unnat­
ural assumptions. . . . The artificial character of all these 
assumptions, the necessity for introducing so many of them all 
quite independent of each other, was enough to shatter the belief 
in the mechanical point of view.^®
In cases such as this and of Copernicus and Ptolemy, theoretical con­
structs that play no role, except the handling of otherwise troublesome 
data, are spurned, especially if another theory can handle them without 
'extra wheels'. In such cases the latter theory can be claimed to be 
more modest than the former, relative to the contemporary state of both
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theories. In other words, accusations concerning a theory's use of ad 
hoc assumptions often depend upon another theory's ability to handle the 
same data without 'useless appendages', i.e., its being more modest.
Of course, what constitutes a 'useless appendage' is relative 
to the state of the science in question at a given time. As we saw 
earlier, modesty understood as simply counting the number of assumptions 
in a theory is not a historically propitious approach. Which assumptions 
and entities to count, for example, is not usually evident until after a 
historical debate has progressed for some time. Worse, as will be shown 
shortly, it is usually only in conjunction with other virtues that this 
question can be answered with any degree of methodological justification. 
A modest theory at one time may subsequently fail to account for the 
data as experiments multiply. A seemingly ^  hoc adjustment at one time 
may later become a justified addendum to a theory in light of further 
research. Consequently, modesty and all of the other virtues can only 
be claimed for a theory in light of contemporary evidence, and relative 
to other theories that attempt to account for the same data. It and the 
other virtues are also defeasible in light of further historical 
developments.
With this in mind, the virtue of modesty can be reformulated to 
favor the theory which does not unnecessarily multiply assumptions or 
entities in order to account for a given range of data. 'Unnecessarily', 
like ceteris paribus clauses, does not admit of exact formulation, and 
retains a certain 'fuzziness', much to the chagrin of many historians 
and philosophers. Still, like ceteris paribus clauses, being fuzzy does 
not necessarily render it unmanageable. Rather, being fuzzy may only
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indicate that there are many debated cases where the available evidence 
allows for rational disagreement. This much is true of any historical 
guideline, however uncontroversial the guidelines themselves may be.
Such guidelines have accomplished their task if the relatively clear 
cases come out in accord with out intuitions, and some of the contro­
versial cases can be changed into clearer ones. I think the troublesome 
'unnecessarily' addendum to the above formulation of modesty can be 
shown to have at least this much clarity.
The revised formulation of modesty can, for example, provide a 
reasonable account of the much debated 'inductivist' strain in Newton 
and many of his later admirers. In the famous General Scholium added to 
the second edition of the Principia in 1713, Newton seems to attack all 
theory construction that makes claims beyond the observable phenomena 
and laws describing these phenomena.
But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of 
those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypoth­
eses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called 
a hypothesis, and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, 
whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experi­
mental philosophy.39
That he is not arguing against all hypotheses has recently become widely
held by historians. Not only in the Principia itself (for example, in
the paragraph immediately following the above quotation), but even more
clearly in his letters and in his Opticks, he frames many hypotheses,
40both physical and metaphysical.
While the passage in the General Scholium has been interpreted
as a psychological-political response to criticisms concerning his
41
earlier prism experiments and the first edition of the Principia. as
well as in numerous other ways, I think that there is also a
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methodological point underlying it. In the Opticks, for example, imme­
diately before he beings his famous 'Queries', the following passage can 
be found.
When I made the foregoing observations, I design'd to repeat 
most of them with some care and exactness, and to make some new ones 
for determining the manner how the Rays of Light are bent in their 
passage by bodies, for making the Fringes of Colours with the dark 
lines between them. But I was then interrupted, and cannot now 
think of taking these things into further consideration. And since 
I have not furnish'd this part of my Design, I shall conclude with 
proposing only some Queries. .
A cursory reading of these Queries indicates that the language used does 
not express disdain for, or even disbelief in, the many hypotheses con­
tained therein. Nor are many of these hypotheses more 'theoretical' 
than others which he makes, even in the Principia. Rather, I think, 
they have not yet been experimentally justified to the point that Newton 
considers them proved, even though he clearly implies that he believes 
they could be. In other words, if I am correct, he is advocating some­
thing like the reformulated virtue of modesty presented above.
If we look again at his first 'Rule of Reasoning in Philosophy',
it appears to be very close to reformulated modesty ("We are to admit no
more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient
43to explain their appearances." ), especially if coupled with his fourth 
Rule, which also seems to be an argument against hypotheses.
In experimental philosophy we are to look upon properties 
inferred by general induction as accurately or very nerely true, 
not withstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined till 
such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be 
made more accurate, or liable to exceptions.
This rule we must follow, that the argument of induction may 
not be evaded by h y p o t h e s e s . * 4
If 'induction' is read as it is by inductivist methodologists, then the
above is an argument against all hypotheses. It seems clear from
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Newton's actual procedure, however, that this is not what he means.
Rather, one should not, according to Newton, frame hypotheses that do
not correspond to experimental data, and are not reviseable in light of
further data. In other words, do not unnecessarily multiply hypotheses
or theoretical assumptions and entities.
This interpretation succeeds quite well, I think, in accounting
for claims made by later scientists who share Newton's inductivist-
sounding approach. Joseph Priestley, for example, in discussing the
history of electrical theories proliferated in the 18th century, while
seemingly denigrating hypotheses in some passages, certainly does not
mean to spurn them all.
Any experiment in which there is any design, is made to ascer­
tain some hypothesis. For a hypothesis is nothing more than a pre­
conceived idea of an event, as supposed to arise from certain 
circumstances, which must have been imagined to have produced the 
same, or a similar effect, upon other occasions.^5
If this hypothesis is 'absolutely verified' for Priestley, it is no 
longer called a hypothesis, but a 'fact'.^^ The main danger in formu­
lating hypotheses is to 'jump too soon', or become too attached to a 
'favourite hypothesis' so as to "not be convinced of its falsity by the 
plainest evidence of fact."^^ Furthermore, while there are no limits to 
the imagination having full play in the formation of hypotheses, if a 
theorist can "frame this hypothesis so as really to suit all the facts, 
it has all the evidence of truth that the nature of things can admit.
For Priestley, it is also evident that these hypotheses must be defea­
sible in light of new facts (i.e., the earliest electrical theories
could be quite general, when the only electrical 'facts' to account for
49were attraction and repulsion).
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Similarly, Benjamin Franklin, though he'd come to be troubled 
by certain problems his 'atmosphere' hypothesis was encountering (e.g., 
the repulsion of negatively charged bodies), was not persuaded that 
cases of electrical repulsion could be reduced to cases of attraction.
He argues against Kinnersly that there are cases of apparent repulsion 
that are not easily handled by Kinnersly's proposed subsumption under 
attraction, and that there are other cases of repulsion in nature that 
certainly cannot be thus explained away. Finally, he argues that the 
apparent modesty acquired by reducing the causes of electrical phenomena 
to one cannot be bought at the expense of the recalcitrant data.
We should not, indeed, multiply causes in philosophy without 
necessity; and the greater simplicity of your hypothesis would 
recommend it to me, if I could see that all appearances might be 
saved by it. But I find, or think I find, the two causes more 
convenient than one of them alone.^0
Again, the argument is not to abandon hypotheses, but not to interpret
them as established as long as the jury of experience is still out— i.e.,
the reformulated expression of the virtue of modesty. In other words,
while 'fuzzy', the 'unnecessarily' addendum to this virtue seems to have
been effectively utilized by several past scientists.
It cannot be overemphasized that the relativity inherent in 
all of the virtues must be constantly kept in mind. Their defeasibility 
requires that judgments concerning a theory's modesty can only be justi­
fied given the available evidence, and whether or not successful compet­
itors exist. Again, however, this relativity, and the fuzziness of the 
'unnecessarily' addendum need not lead to rampant subjectivism or the 
Oz-like retreat to different conceptual schemes. In most historical 
debates the combatants are in basic agreement about which criteria to
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muster for and against accepting a proposed theory, but differ over how
well these criteria are met. As far as modesty is concerned, this can
be illustrated by Priestley's and Franklin's criticisms of the Abbé
Nollet for failing to let his 'favoured hypotheses' submit to the tri-
51bunal of experience. On the other hand, the Abbé defends his hypoth­
esis by claiming that some of its experimental commitments are verified, 
as opposed to the one-fluid theory (concerning the penetrability of 
glass by the electric fluid, and the direction of the electric flow
among other things), and he challenges his antagonists to submit their
52theory to the same tribunal of experience that they claim he ignores.
Also, while Priestley, in a different context, is among the phlogiston
theorists criticized by Lavoisier for maintaining, from his point of
53view, a hopelessly immodest theory, he (Priestley) insists that his
own experiments do not bear out the claims of the French antiphlogis-
tonists (Lavoisier, Berthollet, de Fourcroy, et. al.), but if they did,
54the new theory would be preferable because of its greater modesty.
Both of these cases represent disagreements over whether or not a theory 
unnecessarily multiplies assumptions and/or theoretical entities in 
order to account for the relevant data. That is, while there certainly 
can be disagreements over whether the virtue is satisfied in a partic­
ular case, it is not typically the case that the disagreement concerns 
whether the virtue itself is relevant.Furthermore, disagreements 
over particular cases also tend to diminish as the debates continue, and 
further research tends to favor one of the combatants, or some new 
theory.
This last claim coincides with Schlesinger's notion of 'dynamic
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simplicity' briefly mentioned earlier. Roughly, at an early stage of 
development one can expect disagreements concerning the relative modesty 
of competing theories, given the complexity of weighting factors and the 
general paucity of experimental data available. In electrical theory, 
for example, the first electrical phenomena recognized were only attrac­
tions between a narrow range of objects that had to first be rubbed 
before they produced this effect. Slowly phenomena concerning repulsion 
were added, as well as a great expansion of objects that produce elec­
trical effects. Then the Leyden Jar greatly proliferated the number of 
phenomena to be accounted for, etc. By the mid-18th century, the field 
of electricity had been expanded to the extent that fewer and fewer 
theories could even begin to handle the relevant data in a relatively 
modest manner. As the field expanded there was a corresponding conver­
gence of opinion concerning the modesty of competing theories. Such a 
convergence of opinion is also found in the history of chemistry, 
astronomy, the atomic theory, theories of light, etc.^^ While some 
historians have offered explanations of this convergence of opinion by 
using non-methodological considerations (e.g., Kuhn), I will argue in 
the next chapter that constitutive factors played the dominant role. In 
any event, the fact of convergence, however explained, helps to establish 
that the 'fuzziness' involved in the above formulation of modesty does 
not render it hopelessly vague, or inapplicable to actual cases of 
theory c h o i c e . T h e  next chapter will further support this claim by 
considering two historical examples in some detail.
58
The second virtue I will call 'generality'. It is also a 
subspecies of simplicity, but here the concern is with the amount of
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previously divergent data that a theory can account for, either within
a given field, or from previously diverse fields. In the conclusion of
the Origin of Species, for example, Charles Darwin defends his theory
of natural selection partially on the grounds that it accounts for
59"several large classes of facts." Similarly, Einstein, in his paper
on "The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies" utilizes the quantity
' /(i-v^/c^)' in a number of equations, unifying such diverse data as
transformation equations, the shortening of physical systems in motion,
the energy of light rays, and the longitudinal and transverse mass of an
electron.More generally, Einstein tells us:
New theories are first of all necessary when we encounter new 
facts which cannot be 'explained’ by existing theories. But this 
motivation for setting up new theories is, so to speak, trivial, 
imposed from without. There is another, more subtle motive of no 
less importance. This is the striving toward unification and sim­
plification of the premisses of the theory as a whole.
Maxwell defended the kinetic theory of gases, in part, because it could
explain a number of previously disparate laws, including gas laws
relating the volume, pressure, and temperature of gases, and Gay-Lussac's
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law of equivalent volumes. In other places. Maxwell praises Faraday's 
theory for "taking in at one view, all the phenomena which former
go
inquiries had studied separately," as well as the work which led to 
the uniting of theories of light with theories of electromagnetism (i.e., 
the transverse nature of electromagnetic disturbances, corresponding 
with Young's and Fresnel's treatment of transverse light waves).
Other examples of generality include Newton's unification of celestial 
and terrestrial dynamics, and the 19th-20th centuries' atomic theory's 
eventual application to virtually all fields of exact science.
The addition of this virtue further complicates the treatment
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of modesty presented earlier. Clearly the desires to use as few assump­
tions as possible and to account for as wide a range of data as possible 
can tug our methodological consciences in different directions. In 
early electrical theory, when virtually the only electrical phenomenon 
known was attraction, "many superficial philosophers thought they had 
given a very good account of electricity, cohesion, and magnetism, by 
calling them particular species of attraction peculiar to certain 
b o d i e s . W h e n  smell, sight, and the emission of strong sparks (with 
accompanying pain) were added to the electrical data, however, "elec­
tricians were obliged to make their systems more complex, in proportion 
as the facts were so."^^ As the complexity of theoretical assumptions 
proliferated to account for an ever-widening range of data, the counter 
demand for modesty again asserted itself, relegating all but a few of 
the theoretical candidates to the limbo of false starts.
The tension between the unifying power of a theory and its 
relative complexity occurs perennially within the history of science. 
What makes the previously cited examples so striking, however, is that 
they each managed to somehow satisfy both virtues. In fact, the scien­
tific excitement engendered by such cases is largely due to the remark­
able capacity of such theories to unify more data, while reducing or 
holding constant the number of theoretical assumptions involved. It is 
usual scientific practice to neither accept a theory with unnecessary 
extra wheels, nor accept a theory that does not tie in with other 
accepted theories, or phenomena. Being labeled hoc' can involve 
either having special assumptions with no extra support, or being 
restricted to too narrow a range of phenomena with no obvious tie in to
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other accepted laws. It was an ad hoc assumption on the part of Ptolemy, 
for example, to add special requirements to his theory to account for 
the superior planets being in retrograde motion during their synodic 
period, both because these assumptions were not needed by Copernicus 
(modesty), and because they played no role except to account for this 
phenomena (generality). Of course, at a particular stage of development, 
both aspects of ad hoc assumptions can be debated. As long as there was 
no general physical system backing up Copernicus' astronomical theory, 
for example, it could have been maintained that Ptolemy's was more 
general (i.e., not only in astronomy, but it also fit in with 
Aristotelian physics and cosmology). After the new dynamical systems of 
Galileo and Newton, however, the Copernican-Keplerian astronomy quickly 
became much more general (terrestrial and celestial phenomena could now 
be handled by the same set of laws). Similarly, in the 19th century, 
there was a time when the distinction between atoms and molecules seemed 
ad hoc, in that it seemed to only rescue failed predictions of the 
atomic theory.Again, both virtues do involve an aspect of relativity 
and fuzziness. Still, however, as the debates progressed this fuzziness 
gave way to convergence of scientific opinion. Again, then, these 
virtues are not historically unmanageable.
The last virtue that I will claim plays a methodological role 
in realism/anti-realism debates is related to notions such as 'preci­
sion', 'testability', 'refutability', etc. I will call this virtue 
68'determinateness'. Very generally, one theory is more determinate 
than another if it has a greater number of theoretical commitments than 
the latter. The number of theoretical commitments a theory has can, of
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course, be unpacked in a number of ways, including the number of predic­
tions it generates, the range of phenomena it is designed to cover, the 
precision of its formulation and its predictions, etc. While ’determi­
nateness’ may thereby be taken as exemplifying several virtues (testabil­
ity, falsifiability, precision, etc.), there is a core notion underlying 
them all which (I think) justifies incorporating them under one concept. 
Briefly, they are all concerned with how many and how precise the pre­
dictions are that can be derived from a given theory, not only in terms 
of strict logical deducibility, but also in terms of what else (some­
times rather vaguely— hence the loose term ’commitments’) we would expect 
to be the case if the theory were true. On this reading, Copernicus’ 
theory was more determinate than Ptolemy’s at the time it was formulated, 
because putting the earth in orbit made it a consequence of Copernicus' 
theory that the inferior planets would achieve limited elongations, that 
the superior planets would be in retrograde motion during their synodic 
periods, and that the sum of the sidereal and synodic periods of the 
superior planets would equal the number of solar years passed.Stated 
another way, these phenomena individually and collectively test 
Copernicus’ theory, while Ptolemy’s is only compatible with the first 
two, and offers no theoretical account of the third. Not only would 
Ptolemy’s theory not suffer refutation if the first two of these phenom­
ena didn’t occur, it would be a more modest theory as a consequence. 
Copernicus’ theory, on the other hand, would be refuted if any of these 
three phenomena didn’t occur.
Similarly, Franklin’s theory, accepting the law of conservation 
of electric charge, is committed to the total quantity of ’electrical
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fire' ('fluid', 'matter') in the Leyden Jar being the same before and 
after 'charging'Before this assumption, electrical theories 
struggled to be merely compatible with the new electrical phenomena 
associated with the Leyden Jar. On Franklin's theory there was also a 
commitment concerning the direction of the movement of the electrical 
fluid (determinateness), the accounting for a wide variety of electrical 
data (generality), and all of this with a relative paucity of theoretical 
assumptions (modesty). Similarly, while both Aristotelian and Newtonian 
dynamics were committed to heavy objects near the surface of the earth 
falling if unsupported, Newton's theory is more determinate in that it 
is committed to a specific velocity of the falling body. In short, many 
of the claims involving the alleged underdetermination of theories by 
the available evidence do not make the appropriate distinction between 
being comaptible with (or even generally committed to, e.g., Aristotle) 
an experimental result, and being theoretically committed to (or more 
precisely committed to, e.g., Newton) this result. I would go so far 
as to argue that hardly any of the usual cases of alleged underdeter­
mination are convincing if all three of these virtues are taken into 
consideration.
While it is a virtue of a theory to be more determinate than 
its competitors, there are of course more experimental hazards facing 
the theory precisely because it has more (or more precise) commitments 
(for example, phlogiston theory ran into increasing difficulties pre­
cisely because it was becoming more determinate). It was also a com­
mitment of Franklin's theory, for example, that 'positive electricity' 
be taken as basic (i.e., it is a surfeit of this that leads to a body's
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being negatively charged), and that the explanatory model of the elec­
trical fluid be interpreted mechanistically (i.e., he seemed to favor 
some sort of direct mechanical interaction as opposed to any notion of 
action at a distance which would take attraction and repulsion as basic, 
though this may be a bit oversimplified as we will see in the next 
chapter). These assumptions led to his positing electrical 'atmospheres' 
to account for the mutual repulsion of positively charged objects, and 
to problems with interpreting the facts that negatively charged bodies 
also repel one another. More commitments, then, make a theory more 
testable, and more refutable; scientifically superior to less determi­
nate theories, but also more subject to experimental failure. In other 
words, determinateness cuts across testability and falsifiability as one 
would expect, and explains, I think. Popper's insistence that the 
stronger theory contains more potential falsifiers. Having more com­
mitments is a virtue, having these commitments backfire constitutes a 
problem.
The main disagreements in the history of science concerning 
determinateness most often concern whether a theory's commitments are 
satisfied, rather than whether determinateness is a virtue. Hence 
Kuhn's 'normal science' constitutes attempts on the part of proponents 
of a theory to try to attach 'friendly amendments' to the theory in 
order to cash in on the theory's commitments without violating modesty 
or generality (i.e., without making ad hoc adjustments). At different 
stages of a theory's development, these friendly amendments may seem 
more or less justified, and, hence, disagreements arise concerning 
whether or not these amendments are ^  hoc. It seemed arbitrary, we
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noted, (given the contemporary experimental evidence) to make a dis­
tinction between atoms and molecules in the first quarter of the 19th 
century.Later in the same century the quantities involved became
more determinate (measureable in a variety of ways, theoretical commit-
72
meats supported by organic chemistry, etc.), and the distinction 
between atoms and molecules was no longer generally regarded as a^ hoc. 
Many such cases can be found in the history of science, the basic out­
line generally being that a new assumption added to a theory to make it 
square with experimental data must (eventually) itself involve commit­
ments that are borne out by experiment or be labeled ad hoc. How long 
one should wait for this experimental verification depends on whether 
or not there is an equally 'successful' rival theory, as well as on the 
generality and modesty of the amended theory. Of course, other consid­
erations such as one's philosophical preferences ((e-level), architech- 
tonic components, etc.) also play a role. But I will later argue that 
the former considerations are methodological ((^-level), constitutive 
components) and play a more important role.
A fourth methodological virtue should at least be mentioned, 
and has already been briefly alluded to in the preceding discussion. A
theory must, of course, 'fit the facts' to even be a candidate for a
73scientific theory (no theory, of course, fits all of the facts). 
Generally, the virtue of corroboration represents a theory's 'agreeing 
with' both experimental facts and the existing body of accepted theories. 
This virtue, however, cuts across realism/anti-realism debates, and 
consequently will not play an explicit role in the succeeding section.
It does, however, play an important role as a methodological virtue.
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and hence represents yet another reason for separating virtues into 
'levels'.
Having positive results regarding a theory's commitments is 
what ultimately sways general scientific opinion. Having commitments 
(being determinate) is itself a scientific virtue, but only in conjunc­
tion with corroboration does this virtue support scientific realism. In 
other words, as a historical tool, before the jury of experiment is in, 
having more determinateness counts in favor of a scientific theory.
After these results are in, only a corroborated theory will be accepted. 
As might be expected, it is primarily during the waiting period that 
serious debates occur concerning the relative determinateness- 
corroboration of a given theory (i.e., while even positive results may 
leave some scientists unswayed, a determinate theory with positive 
results will eventually lead to the convergence of scientific opinion). 
Furthermore, just being corroborated is not enough if the commitments 
of the theory are not precise enough, or if there is an insufficient 
number of them (again, Aristotle/Newton on free fall). Consequently, 
determinateness will be one of the three virtues discussed in the 
remainder of this dissertation, while corroboration will 'tag along', 
not because it is unimportant, but because it does not distinguish 
between realist/anti-realist claims.
So far then, three virtues have been delineated as constituting 
rational grounds for favoring a given theory over its competitors; 
modesty, generality, and determinateness. Again, it must be emphasized 
that this does not deny the importance of other virtues for such a 
choice, but it will be argued that these three (with corroboration
136
'tagging along') offer the most conclusive reasons for theory choice, 
and that they can be used to support scientific realism as described in 
chapter one. Furthermore, the history of science does not generally 
support a synchronic interpretation of these virtues, but rather a con­
vergence of evaluation during a successful theory's development, given 
the evidence and other theories available at various times during this 
development. The next section will provide the realist interpretation 
of these virtues, while historical problems will be considered in the 
fourth chapter.
Virtues of Theories and Scientific Realism 
There are at least two sorts of objections that can be leveled 
against the account of scientific virtues just presented. The first and 
more general of these is that the history of science does not support 
the methodological/non-methodological distinction between virtues that I 
have made. Convergence of scientific opinion, from this point of view, 
has at least as much to do with the paradigmatic nature of scientific 
texts (Kuhn), or with non-methodological factors of aesthetic, socio­
logical, philosophical, and psychological types as it does with method­
ological, constitutive factors. What is 'rational' or 'irrational' 
about scientific theory choice cannot be determined apart from the pre­
vailing methodological views held by contemporary scientists, and such 
views can be shown to have changed historically (i.e., they are context
dependent). Furthermore, adherence to a new theory is not primarily won
74by methodological considerations, but by acts of faith, or at least by 
general commitments to a given research tradition, etc. These general 
historical objections go far beyond realist/anti-realist considerations.
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The most extreme historical objections threaten the very distinction 
between rational and irrational factors in scientific choice, and more 
moderate ones at least threaten any methodological, or empiricist at­
tempts to ground such a distinction. Both because they are general, 
and because they are primarily historical, these types of objections 
will be addressed in the next chapter.
The second type of anti-realist objection accepts notions of 
rationality, and the importance of methodological considerations in 
cases of theory choice, but maintains that no amount of evidence 
mustered in favor of a theory need lead us to believe the theory, or 
accept its theoretical statements as true. This is the type of anti­
realist approach I am concerned with in this section. First, however, 
in order to provide a background for this new anti-realist position, 
some previous attempts to provide a realist interpretation for certain 
virtues of scientific theories will be presented.
The predominant philosophical approach to scientific method­
ology in the first fifty years of this century was logical positivism 
in its various forms. The earliest approach to theoretical entities 
found in this tradition attempted to eliminate theoretical vocabulary 
in favor of observational vocabulary. Bridgman's 'operational defi­
nitions' or various attempts to deal with the theoretical vocabulary 
of a theory syntactically in terms of observational primitives'^ are 
good examples of this approach. Generally, the predominant view was 
that the only cognitively significant components of scientific theories 
were their empirical predictions, and the theoretical vocabulary, at 
best, provided a calculative device for organizing and specifying these
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predictions.^^ The attitude toward virtues of theories from such an 
approach was essentially twofold. On the one hand, since there was no 
cognitive status given to the theoretical vocabulary itself, the only 
legitimate criterion for accepting or rejecting a theory was its ability 
to unify and predict experimental data, i.e., only its empirical content 
mattered. On the other hand, for heuristic purposes, simplicity, ele­
gance, and familiarity of principles might be valued, but they could
78not, of course, carry epistemic weight. This entire enterprise, as 
originally formulated, was based on the distinction between theoretical 
vocabulary and observational vocabulary of a theory. As this distinc­
tion was increasingly undermined, so was the attitude of this approach
79concerning scientific theories and their virtues.
What followed was increasing attention to scientific virtues, 
especially 'explanatory power', and the topic of scientific explanation 
began to dominate the literature. If an important, or perhaps the most 
important, role assigned to scientific theories was their relative 
ability to explain individual events and/or scientific laws, the dis­
cussions of scientific virtues and realism/anti-realism debates became
(at least partially) reformulated in terms of accounts of scientific 
80explanation. In brief, the empirical content of a theory, however 
construed, was increasingly giving way as the focal point of the cog­
nitive significance of the theory to the explanatory power of a theory. 
As indicated by the various citations listed in note 80 above, for some 
the predictive and explanatory power of a theory followed from the same 
(deductive) structure— the so-called 'hypethetico-deductive' or 
'deductive-nomological' view of scientific explanation. For others, a
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deductive structure that generated predictions constituted neither
81necessary nor sufficient conditions for scientific explanation. Espe­
cially for the latter, the explanatory power of theories was evaluated 
by other criteria than its ability to predict empirical results.
As might be expected, a variety of such criteria have been 
offered as reasons to accept a theory as the 'best explanation' avail­
able of the relevant phenomena. Michael Friedman has argued that 
'unification' (a combination of generality and modesty) "increases our
understanding of the world by reducing the total number of independent
82
phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or given." The kinetic 
theory, for example, accomplishes this by integrating the Boyle-Charles' 
law, Graham's law, and laws relating to the specific heats of gases into 
one theoretical account; i.e., the law of mechanics. Furthermore, this 
theory "allows us to integrate the behavior of gases with other phe­
nomena, such as the motions of the planets and of falling bodies near 
83the earth." Paul Thagard has argued that three virtues provide a 
sufficient criterion for evaluating the explanatory power of a given 
theory, 'consilience' (generality), 'simplicity' (modesty), and 'anal­
ogy Thagard's 'analogy' is something like corroboration of the
theory with already established theories.
We get increased understanding of one set of phenomena if the 
kind of explanation used— the kind of model— is similar to ones 
already used. This seems to be the main use of analogy in Huygens 
and Darwin. The explanatory value of the wave hypothesis is en­
hanced by the model taken over from the explanation of certain phe­
nomena of sound. Similarly, the explanatory value of the hypothesis 
of evolution by means of natural selection is enhanced by the famil­
iarity of the process of artificial selection.®^
Of course, all of these proposed virtues constitute criteria for theory
evaluation above and beyond fitting the data (the other sense of
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corroboration discussed in the last section), which, again, is assumed 
by all evaluation schemes. They are thus criteria that involve giving 
theories more of a role than that allowed by positivism, and as such, 
often constitute a more realist interpretation of scientific theories.
In brief, since ’better' theories do more than simply predict phenomena 
(have empirical content), they must be interpreted as more than simple 
heuristic calculating devices. Consequently, if a theory postulates 
micro-entities in its explanation of phenomena, the better the theory 
is, the more reason there is to believe in the micro-level so postulated.
Another strain of realist interpretations arising from the 
explanatory power of theories involves the causal role of theoretical 
explanations. The basic position of such an approach is that correla­
tions between data depict known or unknown common causes, which account 
for these correlations. The belief in a common cause when divergent 
phenomena exemplify law-like correlations is, of course, an old realist 
perspective. When further enhanced by scientific virtues such as 
generality, it is often claimed that it is rational to believe in 
theories that postulate such common causes, especially at the micro­
level. Wesley Salmon, for example, has long argued that an instrumen­
talist account of such amazing coincidences is untenable.
The fundamental fact to which I wish to call attention is that 
the value of Avogadro's number assertained from the analysis of 
Brownian motion agrees, within the limits of experimental error, 
with the value obtained by electrolytic measurement. Without a 
common causal antecedent, such agreement would constitute a remark­
able coincidence. . . . In my opinion, the instrumentalist cannot, 
with impunity, ignore what must be an amazing correspondence between 
what happens when one scientist is watching smoke particles dancing 
in a container of gas while another scientist in a different labo­
ratory is observing the electro-plating of silver. Without an 
underlying causal mechanism— of the sort involved in the postulation
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of atoms, molecules, and ions— the coincidence would be as mirac­
ulous as if the number of grapes harvested in California in any 
given year were equal, up to the limits of observational error, to 
the number of coffee beans produced in the same year.86
Such an account relies on the explanatory power of a theory in the sense 
that what the theory explains can be linked together by a common causal 
mechanism (generality), and that more than one way is developed to 
measure some of the theoretical quantities involved (a kind of deter­
minateness) . The latter condition especially has long been held to be a
criterion for the reality of theoretical entities, even by many posi- 
87tivists, though 'real' and 'true' in their sense do not go beyond 
experimental verification.
In a sense, then, the demise of the positivist's narrow role 
for scientific theories led to a variety of realist interpretations in 
the general form of 'theories do more than describe and predict obser­
vational phenomena, they also describe non-observational phenomena'.
The breakdown of the theoretical/observational distinction, however, 
also led to non-realist interpretations of science, usually of a his­
torical variety, attacking the very notion of objective theory confir­
mation and progress (the latter was discussed in chapter two). In 
short, if a theoretical/observational dichotomy cannot be maintained, 
the theories themselves at least partially determine what constitutes 
their experimental verification. That is, if there is no theoretically 
neutral tribunal (like observation statements) that one can appeal to 
in support of a theory, one seems forced to appeal to the theory itself 
(at least in part). If this is so, theory acceptance transcends the 
cumulation of positive test-instances, and the very notion of 'relevant 
evidence' becomes problematical. Both probability theories of 'relevant
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evidence' (especially Bayesian models), and Glymour's 'bootstrap strat­
egy' provide ways of answering these objections (and, as was shown in 
chapter two, a variety of theories of reference can help to answer the 
anti-cumulative charges concerning scientific progress). These histor­
ical objections, however, will be treated in more detail in the next 
chapter. At present, arguments against the realist interpretations 
stemming from the explanatory role of scientific theories must be 
considered.
While it is commonly maintained that explanatory virtues are 
important in cases of theory choice, this does not, in itself, support a 
realist interpretation of scientific theories based on these virtues.
R. A. Fumerton, for example, makes a much needed distinction between 
preferring a given theory on the basis of various explanatory virtues, 
and believing the theory on the basis of these virtues (specifically, on 
the basis of Thagard's 'consilience' (generality) and 'simplicity' 
(modesty)).
A theory which is more consilient and simple than alternatives 
(in Thagard's sense and in a number of other senses) is certainly
more desirable than its competitors in the sense that it would be
nice if it turned out to be true. In general, I assume we are 
interested in explaining as much as we can and a theory which ex­
plains a great deal, both in terms of number and kinds of facts, 
while avoiding unwieldy ad hoc additions, would be a happy theory 
to have. But this not being the best of all possible worlds (some 
theologians aside) what would be nice is not always so.®®
Similar remarks, accounting for our preference for the simplest theory
in terms of convenience can be found in Quine, though his overall prag-
89matism makes his position sound more like a realist position. In 
short, barring metaphysical-theological claims concerning the simplicity 
of nature, why should the simpler theory be considered more probable?
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Similar doubts have been proposed concerning Salmon's insistence that 
empirical correlations and more than one technique for measuring a theo­
retical entity necessitate the existence of a 'common cause' underlying
90
the data.
The conceptual level of anti-realist attacks, then, has to do 
with the epistemic status of scientific virtues, and no longer with
91whether theories can be said to have virtues beyond covering the data. 
Given the need for a comparative, diachronic treatment of scientific 
virtues outlined in the last section, a realist defense of these virtues 
cannot be expected to be formally precise. Rather, intuitive and gen­
eral epistemic considerations need to be addressed at the present time, 
defending the rationality of interpreting these virtues realistically. 
Furthermore, as argued in the first chapter, we should not expect a 
categorical defense of realist interpretations of scientific theories. 
Given the comparative and developmental nature of scientific theory 
choice, we may well get different judgments at different times, even 
regarding the same scientific theory. Realist claims, like knowledge 
claims, depend on the contemporary evidence and the level of available 
competing theories. Again, atomic theory did not always support a real­
ist interpretation, nor were epistemological discussions regarding it 
restricted to methodological (constitutive) components at all stages of 
its development. Some of the anti-realist attacks at the conceptual 
(and historical) level hinge on an a-historical, synchronic account of 
realism, or on mistakes in premature formal treatments of scientific 
virtues. I will next offer intuitive support for a realist interpreta­
tion of the three virtues I listed in the last section, and then address
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what I take to be the most advanced anti-realist arguments, those found 
in the works of Bas C. Van Fraassen.
The general realist interpretation for modesty, generality, and
determinateness stems from an introductory treatment of theory testing
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found in an elementary textbook by Ronald N. Giere. In the fifth
chapter of his book, Giere lists two conditions for a successful test of
93a scientific theory. The first condition for a good test of a theory, 
according to Giere, involves the prediction of experimental results on 
the basis of commitments of the theory in question, the accuracy and 
appropriateness of experimental measurements and apparatus, and whatever 
auxiliary assumptions are presently taken to be background knowledge for 
the theory. Clearly, this condition involves little more than the 
theory's fitting the data, and if this were the only condition required, 
cases of the underdetermination of the theory by the available evidence 
would abound. We noted earlier, for example, that it is a commitment of 
both Aristotle’s and Newton's theories that heavy, unsupported objects 
will fall, and both Ptolemy's and Copernicus' theories 'saved the phenom­
ena' in this sense. Furthermore, it is not that difficult to construct 
theories such that if they were true, the experimental phenomena would 
result as deductive (or inductive) consequences. Pseudo-science is full 
of cases of theories being saved by being made compatible with the rele­
vant phenomena. Also, merely deducing experimental results is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for scientific explanation, as the 
recent disenchantment with hypothetico-deductive models of explanation 
indicates.
The second condition for a good test of a theory, according to
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Giere, is both more difficult to establish, and more important episte- 
mically. It must also be established, on this condition, that if the 
conjunction of the theory, statements about measuring procedures and 
results, and auxiliary assumptions are not true, then the experimental 
results predicted would not be expected. Intuitively, if my theory is 
committed to the occurrence of rain in Oklahoma in April, a positive re­
sult would not tend to influence our epistemic attitude toward the theory. 
It would, after all, probably rain in Oklahoma in April whether my theory 
was correct or not. A more important example can be generated if we 
(counterfactually) imagine that Hailey had used Newton's theory to pre­
dict phenomena concerning free fall, or projectile motion, instead of the 
reappearance of the comet. These phenomena, unlike the comet, were al­
ready to be expected, given the work of Galileo and Newton's own claims 
in the Principia. To be committed to unexpected, or previously unex­
plored phenomena, intuitively counts more in favor of a theory than phe­
nomena that would be likely or expected regardless of the theory's ade­
quacy. Or, the more precise commitments of Newton's theory concerning 
free fall make it better tested than Aristotle's, much as predicting 
one-half inch of rain in Norman on April 3rd between 4-5:00 p.m. would 
constitute a much better test of my meteorological theory than merely 
predicting rain in April. As an account of theory testing, Giere’s sec­
ond condition offers few surprises, accounting as it does for the common­
place desiderata of variety of evidence, and the importance of new types 
of tests instead of repeating existing tests ad infinitum. Epistemically, 
however, I think this condition can help to articulate issues that are 
much less obvious and accepted.
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It is my contention that Giere's second condition for a good 
test of a theory can be construed as a claim that the more difficult it 
is for experimental data to be handled (ceteris paribus), the more con­
fidence we should have in a theory that manages to handle it. Generally, 
fitting the data (Giere's first condition) is difficult enough, once the 
range of relevant data begins to proliferate. To fit this data while 
remaining more modest, general, and determinate than all existing com­
petitors is correspondingly even less likely. That is, given the dif­
ficulty involved in getting a theory to be modest while at the same time 
being general and determinate, not just any consistent theory that covers 
the data will succeed, and the eventual convergence of opinion within the 
scientific community during the development of such a theory testifies to 
the confidence that a 'successful' theory (in this sense) engenders. 
Furthermore, our confidence in a theory should grow proportionately to 
its ability to cover a wide range of data in a relatively modest, general, 
and determinate manner. Intuitively, even if a theorist's imagination is 
allowed full play, with no restrictions as to the number of assumptions, 
different types of data, and theoretical commitments that a theory can 
muster to account for the experimental data, it will be difficult to 
provide a consistent theory that satisfies the first condition as the 
data accumulates. Priestley’s earlier account of the narrowing range of 
acceptable theories accounting for electrical phenomena as the types of 
electrical phenomena multiplied bears witness to this claim. If restric­
tions such as avoiding the unnecessary proliferation of assumptions to 
account for the data, covering as many types of data as possible within 
and outside of the science in question, and having more (or more precise)
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theoretical commitments are added, the range of acceptable theories 
should diminish even further. Furthermore, with these added require­
ments of relative modesty, generality, and determinateness, it becomes 
correspondingly less likely that a theory can make good on its commit­
ments unless it is at least partially true (or as we will explain later, 
'on the right track'). Put another way, the less prior probability we 
are intuitively willing to assign to a theory's chances of making good
on its claims, the more epistemic probability we should assign to it if 
94it succeeds. Our level of belief in a theory should increase propor­
tionately as its initial likelihood of being successful drops below 
chance or coincidence (or 'lucky guesses'). If this seems intuitively 
sound, it must now be argued that these conditions are met (relatively) 
proportionately as a theory is judged to have the three virtues I out­
lined above.
The virtue of modesty adds restrictions to a theory concerning 
whether or not it unnecessarily adds assumptions and/or theoretical 
entities to account for the relevant data. Intuitively, the less theo­
retical equipment allowed to 'save the phenomena', the harder it is to 
save the phenomena, and the less likelihood the theory should initially 
be given to succeed. If Archimedes only needed a place to stand in 
order to move the earth, a theoretician only needs an unlimited range of 
theoretical assumptions in order to explain it. Furthermore (ceteris 
paribus), the fewer independent assumptions a theory has, the more each 
one of these assumptions is 'committed to'— 'useless appendages' are not 
likely to be measurable in more than one way, or be committed to more 
than the initial phenomena to be explained. It is very unlikely, for
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example, that Ptolemy should have succeeded in using in his extra as­
sumptions to explain any more than the data they were introduced to 
explain. It is also unlikely that adding the property of 'negative 
weight' or 'levity' to phlogiston would enjoy any other experimental 
payoff than rescuing phlogiston theory from Lavoisier's troublesome 
experimental results (if it had, the history of chemistry might be quite 
different). A more modest theory, therefore, should increase our confi­
dence, both because it is initially less likely for the theory to suc­
ceed, and because it is (in a sense) thereby more determinate.
The virtue of generality adds restrictions to a theory con­
cerning the unification of previously disparate data, within the field 
in question and/or from other fields. Intuitively, again, the more di­
verse data it attempts to unify, the harder it is for a theory to suc­
ceed. Consequently, a theory that manages to unify a (relatively) larger 
amount of data than its competitors should proportionately increase our 
confidence in the theory. Again, a theory that unifies more data is also 
committed to more experimental results. Since Copernicus' theory, for 
example, managed to deal with the correspondence of the retrograde motion 
of the superior planets with their synodic period, the lesser elongation 
of the inferior planets, and the correspondence between the sum of the 
superior planets' synodic and siderial periods and the total number of 
solar years, without extra assumptions beyond putting the earth in or­
bit, each of these represented independent tests of the theory of the 
earth's motion, and for each other. Consequently, as was the case with 
the virtue of modesty, a more general theory should increase our confi­
dence both because it is initially less likely to succeed, and because
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it is (in a sense) more determinate as well.
Finally, the virtue of determinateness adds restrictions to a
theory concerning the number and precision of that theory's commitments.
While Glymour's reservations about believing a theory simply because
some of its theoretical quantities can be measured in more than one way 
90are well taken, surely such occurrences are less likely than chance 
correlations, especially if the proposed theory is modest and general as 
well. Furthermore, intuitively, the more commitments a theory has, the 
more likely some of them are to fail (i.e., the less likely it is that 
the theory will succeed). Also it seems highly unlikely that a theory 
which makes very precise (especially quantitative) predictions would be 
able to succeed by chance or coincidence (e.g., predicting that it will 
rain one-half inch on April 3rd between 4-5:00 p.m.). Copernicus' the­
ory was committed to many phenomena that Ptolemy's theory was merely 
compatible with (including the above examples, and the relative sizes of 
the planetary orbits), and satisfied these commitments without adding 
new assumptions to account for each one. Furthermore, while both 
Aristotelian cosmology and Newton's law of universal gravitation are 
committed to heavy objects falling, Newton's theory is committed to many 
other phenomena, and to the speed at which an object will fall. While 
both theories thereby satisfy Giere's first condition, Newton's clearly 
better satisfies the second condition in the sense that it seems highly 
unlikely that the commitments of his theory (being both more general and 
more precise) should be satisfied unless the theory were at least par­
tially right ('on the right track'). Again, the harder it is for a the­
ory to make good on its commitments, the more we should be willing to
150
increase our confidence in it when it succeeds.
All three of the virtues of scientific theories that I've de­
lineated both individually and (especially) conjointly provide reasons 
for increasing our confidence in a theory proportionately as its success 
would otherwise seem unlikely. At the intuitive level, I think such 
reasoning is sound. There are three main difficulties that philosophers 
and historians might have with such an account: first, that such vir­
tues can be (synchronically) read off of a theory without considering 
its development and main competitors; second, in trying to formally 
specify the intuitive account of probability utilized; third, in main­
taining that a realist interpretation follows automatically from the 
above account. The first problem can be handled by my repeated insis­
tence that the assessment of a theory's virtues is almost always a his­
torically relative affair, justified if in fact there turns out to be a 
great deal of convergence of opinion in historical cases and/or whether 
one can claim there should have been, given the evidence available at 
the time in question. The second can be solved by insisting that at 
this stage of realist/anti-realist debates formal precision should await 
intuitive consensus. No particular theory of probability or assignment 
of degrees of the virtues I've listed was assumed in the above account. 
If these notions were made clear enough to achieve intuitive agreement,
I would claim that the above account is 'on the right track', and pos­
sible formal treatments can be seen as later desiderata. The third 
problem can be handled by my continued insistence that realist/anti­
realist verdicts should not be categorical, but must be decided for 
particular cases of theory choice at a particular stage of the relevant
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theory's development. I will subsequently argue that some scientific 
theories have met a sufficient level of these virtues at particular 
times to warrant rational belief. It is not part of my claim that any 
level of these virtues being met constitutes sufficient reason for ra­
tional belief in the relevant theory, or that all cases of theory choice 
can be so decided by evidence that we now have available. The same can 
be said, I think, for various knowledge claims, which also have a cer­
tain amount of intuitive support without generating necessary and suffi­
cient formal conditions for assessing such claims. That is, we have yet 
to establish universally accepted criteria for when a knowledge claim is 
justified. Still, there are numerous intuitively unproblematical cases. 
This is enough to establish that knowledge claims can 'make sense' and 
be warranted, even though we cannot specify necessary and sufficient 
conditions for their being warranted. Also, all knowledge claims are 
not warranted, since attention must always be focused to the evidence 
available for particular cases at particular times. With these provi­
sions in mind, if the above arguments seem intuitively plausible, part 
of my realist defense is complete.
Furthermore, though I have tried to establish some historical 
support for my position thus far, it should be remembered that this sec­
tion is concerned with abstract conceptual issues. Given this, it is 
not yet important to base my realist arguments for the three virtues on 
whether we actually have these intuitions about any actual historical 
theories. Rather, they can be argued to be conceptually plausible if we 
can generate ideal cases where our intuitions concerning these realist 
arguments may converge. Consider then (for now) an imaginary theory
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which covers all of the relevant data by utilizing a handful of assump­
tions, all of which have their own testable consequences and a great 
number of very precise quantitative commitments that are borne out by 
experiment. I think that, given such a case, most of us would intu­
itively think it rational to believe in the theoretical entities this 
theory postulates, because it does not seem likely that a theory could 
do such a complete job without being true (or 'on the right track').
If this seems plausible, I think that the above treatment of scientific 
virtues as restrictions on a theory receives conceptual support— i.e., 
such considerations would tend to effect our epistemic attitudes i^ they 
were realized. Again, conceptual support does not thereby establish 
that this approach can be adequately applied to actual theories, but 
that is also not a particularly conceptual issue.
A further defense for a realist interpretation of theories 
based on the above virtues being met should be mentioned now, though it 
is not fully articulated or defended until the next chapter. An intu­
ition that grounds many realist interpretations concerns explaining the 
success of certain scientific theories at various times. A naive but 
intuitively compelling statement of such an intuition would be that 
there seems to be no other way to account for the remarkable level of 
virtues met by some theories, in the face of the extreme unlikelihood of 
their achieving this level by chance, than to claim that these theories 
are so successful because they are true (or 'approximately true'). Re­
cent attempts to state such a realist position have come under serious 
attack by Larry Laudan and others, and these attempts will be dealt with 
in the next chapter. As a promissory note, I will now merely claim that
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such intuitions can be supported by my account of scientific virtues, 
and that some of the problems involved in past attempts to state such 
intuitions involve, again, categorical claims about realism, insuffi­
cient theories of reference to ground such intuitions, premature at­
tempts to formalize this intuition, too much weight being given to the 
role of non-methodological virtues in historical cases of theory choice, 
and the use of concepts (such as 'approximate truth') that are both too 
vague and too strict to do justice to historical cases. In any event, I 
will not attempt to cash this promissory note at this time, but supporting 
such widespread realist intuitions will later provide further support for 
the type of realist position I am defending.
Bas C. Van Fraassen has developed a version of anti-realism that
is both broader and more adequate than any previous version. It is set
up in such a way as to avoid most of the realist and historical objec­
tions to prior positivist and instrumentalist views, and to attack the 
most common current realist positions. In my opinion, his works taken 
jointly constitute the state of the art as far as (conceptual) anti­
realism is concerned. It will consequently be necessary to consider his 
position in some detail, and to determine whether my intuitive arguments 
for scientific realism can answer his objections.
Van Fraassen labels his anti-realism 'constructive empiricism’, 
which is supposed to maintain the classical empiricist notion that the 
main purpose of scientific theories is to 'save the phenomena', and 
construe the empirical content of a theory in such a way that it does
not fall victim to the objections which destroyed the earlier empiricist
95
accounts. The 'empirical content' of a scientific theory from the
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older empiricist perspective was, again, based on the theoretical/obser­
vational term distinction that has since been largely abandoned. Even 
after Carnap had abandoned his earlier attempts to describe the cognitive 
significance of theoretical statements individually (i.e., after he had 
changed to a more 'holistic' picture of theories), he still maintained 
that the 'empirical meaningfulness' of theoretical terms must be unpacked 
in terms of their predictions at the observational l e v e l . I t  was soon 
argued, as my brief historical acocunt has shown, that this is not the 
only empirical content of the theoretical terms, but rather that theories
themselves at least partially determine what the phenomena are that need 
97to be 'saved'. Consequently, one aspect of Van Fraassen's anti­
realism consists in developing a notion of empirical content (or empir­
ical adequacy), that does not depend on the theoretical/observational 
distinction or on such a niggardly interpretation of the status of sci­
entific theories.
He does this by arguing for a semantic (as opposed to the early
syntactic) approach to formalizing scientific theories in terms of models
98which satisfy the theorems of the theory in question. On such a view,
the empirical content of a theory can be delineated as parts of these
models that the theory itself specifies as "images of the structures
99described in measurement reports." This formulation escapes the above 
objections concerning the theoretical/observational distinction by not 
being committed to any particular linguistic presentation of the models 
in question (i.e., it does not require an observational vocabulary as 
opposed to a theoretical vocabulary), and it is quite compatible with 
the empirical content of a theory being 'immersed' in the language of
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the theory. A claim that a theory is 'empirically adequate', in other 
words, is only committed to the theory having "at least one model that 
all the actual phenomena fit inside.'Phenomena', again, are no 
longer non-theoretical 'observations', but rather predicted outcomes of 
measurements made by the theory in question. Put another way, an 'ele­
mentary statement' in a theory asserts a proposition that a given magni­
tude that the theory is committed to has a certain value at a certain 
time.^®^ The only distinction necessary for specifying the empirical 
content of a theory is between 'elementary statements' so described, and
other statements within the theory, or between 'phenomenal', interpreted
102
in this way, and 'transphenomenal' commitments of the theory.
That is, between statements within a model of the theory that 
specify achieved or expected measurement results, and statements 
which specify conditions, states, or entities which transcend these 
measurement results. Measurement results, whether achieved by me­
chanical or human 'instruments' (i.e. whether due to complicated 
measuring apparatus or to the mere use of human 'senses') are them­
selves described by the theory in question, or by other theories 
(for example, theories of light refraction, theories of perception 
and psychology, etc.). So that (again) 'phenomenal' need not mean 
theory independent in the old positivist formulation.
The phenomenal/transphenomenal distinction claimed here is defended and
explicated by Van Fraassen in terms of an example.
Newton distinguished between the phenomena that his theory was
supposed to save and the (theoretical) reality that he postulated to 
save them.
It is indeed a matter of great difficulty to discover, and ef­
fectually to distinguish, the true motions of particular bodies from
the apparent; because the parts of that immovable space, in which
those motions are performed, do by no means come under the observa­
tion of our senses. Yet the thing is not altogether desperate; for 
we have some arguments to guide us, partly from the apparent motions, 
which are the differences of the true motions; partly from the 
forces, which are the causes and effects of the true m o t i o n s .1^4
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The 'apparent motions' listed here by Newton are what Van Fraassen calls 
the 'appearances(or, again, 'phenomena' or 'elementary statements') 
saved by Newton's theory. Newton's theory goes on to postulate 'Abso­
lute Space' by which the 'true motions' can be determined, as well as 
'gravitational force', etc. However, given Van Fraassen's 'model' ap­
proach presented above, the 'appearances' ('apparent motions') are a 
sub-group within (possibly a number of different) models that can be 
constructed from Newton's axioms and theorems. Consequently, "when 
Newton claims empirical adequacy for his theory, he is claiming that his 
theory has some model such that all actual appearances are identifiable 
with (isomorphic to) motions (structures which are defined as exact re­
flections of the 'appearances') in that m o d e l . O r ,  there is some 
model for Newton's theory that is faithful to the observed ('phenomenal' 
as described above) motions of the objects it is concerned with (there 
are 'measurement reports' within the model that 'match' the predictions 
of the theory). It is admitted by Van Fraassen (as opposed to earlier 
empiricist accounts of theories) that the axioms and theorems of Newton's 
theory are themselves a much broader class and that the role of their 
transphenomenal assumptions is more than just as 'calculating devices' 
(i.e., Newton's theory is committed to the existence of Absolute Space, 
etc.). Newton himself admitted that the appearances would be the same 
if, instead of the center of gravity of the solar system being at rest 
in Absolute Space, it were instead in any kind of constant absolute 
motion.Therefore, for Van Fraassen, another theory that postulated 
that the center of gravity moved uniformly in a straight line, would 
have models that were also isomorphic with the appearances, but clearly
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this new theory would have different theoretical commitments from 
Newton's. In short, theories can be empirically equivalent (i.e., parts 
of their respective models are isomorphic to the same appearances), with­
out being generally equivalent. This is the genesis of Van Fraassen's 
anti-realism.
Consider, for example, someone who agrees that Newton's theory 
is empirically adequate. This person would be committed to believing 
that Newton's theory has at least one model which is isomorphic to the 
appearances. For Van Fraassen, this person would not thereby be com­
mitted to a belief that the theory as a whole was true (i.e., he or she 
need not accept the existence of Absolute Space, etc.), but only that it 
was true that at least one model of the theory could save all the appear­
ances. This in itself involves a risk in the sense that claims for the 
empirical adequacy of a theory, like claims for its truth, must be 
defeasible in light of further evidence. Still, accepting a theory as 
empirically adequate, is not the same as the epistemic attitude of be­
lieving that the theory is true. Furthermore, while accepting a theory 
has an epistemic element (believing that the theory is empirically ade­
quate), it also involves what Van Fraassen calls a 'pragmatic' element 
(being committed to a research program, etc.).
On the view I shall develop, the belief involved in accepting 
a scientific theory is only that it 'saves the phenomena', that is, 
correctly describes what is observable. But acceptance is not 
merely belief. We never have the option of accepting an all- 
encompassing theory, complete in every detail. So to accept one 
theory rather than another one involves also a commitment to a re­
search programme, to continuing the dialogue with nature in the 
framework of one conceptual scheme rather than another. Even if 
two theories are empirically equivalent, and acceptance of a theory 
involves a belief only that it is empirically adequate, it may still 
make a great difference which one is accepted. The difference is
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pragmatic, and I shall argue that pragmatic virtues do not give us 
any reason over and above the evidence of the empirical data, for 
thinking that a theory is t r u e .108
As we shall see later. Van Fraassen goes on to argue that neither does
the evidence of the empirical data warrant belief in the truth of a
theory, but rather, only that the theory is empirically adequate.
So far, then. Van Fraassen's position can be summarized as a
semantic 'model' approach to interpreting scientific theories as opposed
to earlier syntactic approaches. The main point in such a procedure as
far as anti-realism is concerned is to save a notion of the empirical
content and empirical adequacy of a theory from the demise of the
theoretical/observational distinction. As such, I have no particular
109quarrel with this move. Regardless of the ultimate formal success 
of this admittedly programatic approach, there are good independent 
reasons for rejecting unqualified holistic approaches that deny any 
distinction between what a theory postulates, and what a theory is 
about. Clark Glymour, for example, has offered an approach to objective 
theory testing that also does not depend on a strict theoretical/obser­
vational distinction— what he calls the 'bootstrap s t r a t e g y ' F u r ­
thermore, it is also a realist desiderata that a theory can be objec­
tively tested by instances, requiring some sort of (at least relative) 
distinction between the phenomena to be saved, and the theories that 
attempt to save them. Also, if the discussion of further virtues is 
left aside for a moment, I have no particular reason for disagreeing 
with Van Fraassen's claim that theories can be empirically equivalent 
(in his sense) without thereby being generally equivalent. In fact, it 
is a consequence of the type of realism I am advocating that theories
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go beyond the empirical data, in that I (and all the realists I am 
familiar with) share Van Fraassen's views concerning the inadequacy of 
early empiricism. It is also clear that my position shares Van Fraassen's 
insistence that the decision to accept (or believe) a theory transcends 
the belief that the theory is empirically adequate (from my perspective 
this is tantamount to a claim that the theory satisfy only Giere's first 
condition for a good test of a theory). In fact, the only difference I 
have with Van Fraassen so far is that beyond a commitment to a theory's 
empirical adequacy, criteria for theory choice are pragmatic, since he 
interprets this as irrelevant to a theory's truth. This, however, is a 
major difference on which much of his anti-realism seems to depend.
Van Fraassen depicts the differences between realism and anti­
realism (correctly) as an epistemic difference.
Scientific realism is the position that scientific theory con­
struction aims to give us a literally true story of what the world 
is like, and that acceptance of a scientific theory involves the 
belief that it is true. Accordingly, anti-realism is a position 
according to which the aim of science can well be served without 
giving such a literally true story, and acceptance of a theory may 
properly involve something less (or other) than belief that it is 
true.Ill
Concentrating on what is believed by a realist or anti-realist does seem 
to capture the essence of the philosophical and historical debates con­
cerning the two positions. This has all too often been side-tracked by 
arguments concerning theories of reference, essentialism, the analytic- 
synthetic distinction, whether scientific theories are just calculating 
devices, and so on. While all of these issues are (or may be) important 
for realist/anti-realist debates, they each emphasize topics that are 
tangental to the core of these debates. No one, it seems to me, would 
deny that ^  'heat is the motion of molecules', or the term 'electron'
160
denotes an object, then there are such entities. Nor would many philos­
ophers (presently) deny that theoretical statements are either true or 
false, i.e., theoretical statements have meanings and alleged references 
that go beyond the empirical data. The argument is (and almost always 
has been) concerned rather with whether we are warranted in asserting 
that 'electron' denotes or that 'heat i^ the motion of molecules' or 
that we have reason to believe in the entities that a theory postulates, 
etc. This much of Van Fraassen's depiction of realism and anti-realism 
I readily agree with. On the other hand, his formulation of the disagree­
ment is categorical in that it is important to Van Fraassen's anti­
realism that a realist be committed to the view that all acceptable 
(successful) scientific theories be regarded as true (or even 'approxi­
mately true', or 'on the right track'). This I have repeatedly denied.
Realist claims should be restricted to particular theories at 
particular stages of their development, and are defeasible in light of 
further development and new competitors. Consequently, it is quite 
compatible with my formulation of scientific realism that the most ap­
propriate epistemic attitude towards some theories at a given stage of 
their development may well be something like Van Fraassen's acceptance 
of the theory as empirically adequate. It will be argued in the next 
chapter that this was precisely the case at certain stages of the 
development of the atomic theory in the 19th century. It also may be 
the case with some of our current scientific theories, etc. Analogously, 
to claim that it makes sense to talk in terms of empirical knowledge 
does not commit one to claim that he or she 'knows' all statements that 
appear likely, or that the rationality of making a knowledge claim at a
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certain time is affected by the possibility that it may later need to be 
withdrawn (defeasibility). Insofar, then, as Van Fraassen's attacks on 
realism depend on a categorical interpretation of realism, they are 
neither conceptually nor historically compelling (or even 'appropriate' 
if the present enterprise proves successful). Van Fraassen's attacks on 
realism, however, are not completely dependent on this categorical inter­
pretation, and consequently, some of them will need to be investigated 
in more detail.
The main stalking-horses for Van Fraassen's anti-realism are, 
as might be expected, attempts to justify scientific realism in terms of 
scientific explanation. The main realist positions in this century have, 
as shown above, been based on such ideas as that the best explanation 
available is likely to be true or that since science aims primarily at 
explanation, and we do not have a real explanation unless the explanans 
are true, science must aim at true theories or, that postulating common 
causes to account for phenomenal correlations does not make sense with­
out realist commitments, etc. Van Fraassen's attacks on such positions 
are mainly twofold. First, he argues that explanation does not consti­
tute the goal of scientific theories (being empirically adequate is, for 
him, their goal). Second, he argues that explanatory power is one among 
many virtues of scientific theories, and like all other virtues besides 
empirical adequacy, it is irredeemably contextual (pragmatic), and hence, 
not related to belief in the truth of a theory. While the second claim 
is the one I will be most concerned with, it will be worthwhile to begin 
with a brief examination of Van Fraassen's arguments for the former.
Again, Van Fraassen shares with most realist positions the view
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that classical empiricism did not assign sufficient status to scientific 
theories— i.e., they do more than predict and organize empirical data. 
Consequently, Van Fraassen's anti-realism is not a version of classical 
instrumentalism.
To my mind, theoretical entities are fictions. To explain 
this, let me draw an analogy. Suppose someone writes a short story 
about a quarrel between a man and a cat. There may be or have been 
in the world, somewhere, a man and a cat who quarreled, and who are 
by and large just like the characters in the story. This possibility 
is quite irrelevant to what the author is doing, and to our evalua­
tion of the story. Of course, it keeps us from saying categorically 
that all short stories are false; but this too is quite irrelevant. 
Still I do not suppose that this makes you think that short stories 
are uninterpreted symbolic devices, or mere Instruments; nor that we 
cannot meaningfully talk either about the story's internal structure 
or about what it says, or about how good it is.^^^
For Van Fraassen, in other words, we can evaluate theories ^  theories 
(not as shorthand for empirical phenomena), and assess their relative 
merits above and beyond their ability to save the phenomena, and even 
believe that what the theory 'says' is either true or false, without 
being committed to the truth of the theories. Hence, merely claiming 
that theories are more than predictive devices, or that they have 
meaning over and above their empirical content, does not affect 'con­
structive empiricism' as Van Fraassen formulates it. The fact that 
scientific theories often explain phenomena, and that this explanatory 
power is over and above their predictive power, is quite compatible with 
constructive empiricism. Realist arguments must therefore argue not 
only for scientific explanation, but must make special claims about sci­
entific explanation if realism is to be based on a theory's explanatory 
power.
One common opinion among realists is that the 'empirical part' 
(however generously construed) of a theory is not sufficient to account
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for theory choice when the 'phenomena saved' are the same (or nearly the 
same) for two competing theories. Briefly, a theory's explanatory power 
leads to greater unification, etc., and its consequent increased test­
ability (or confirmation) is due to theoretical explanation, as opposed 
to (or in addition to) empirical adequacy. As Glymour puts it:
When we see a common pattern, what we see is the applicability 
of a common set of principles to diverse circumstances. In scien­
tific contexts, that application ordinarily results in tests of 
those principles in diverse ways, with the result that disparate 
regularities, which have alone no mutual bearing, in common support 
a theory which entails and explains them all. Thus it happens that 
a finite body of observational consequences of a theory can provide 
better evidence for that theory, with respect to the theory itself, 
than that same body of observational consequences provides for the 
set of observational consequences of the theory with respect to the 
set of observational consequences of the theory. . . . Successful 
tests and satisfying explanations are two different sorts of rea­
sons to believe a theory; both make demands of theories far beyond 
the demand of empirical adequacy alone, and both are virtues of 
theories which may override small defects of empirical adequacy.
Hence, although both Copernicus and Ptolemy saved the phenomena, 
Copernicus' theory had more commitments (internally and in virtue of the 
phenomena) than did Ptolemy's. If the theories are indeed both empiri­
cally adequate, then choosing Copernicus' because of its greater deter­
minateness and generality (within astronomy at least) is both rational, 
and not based solely on his theory's greater empirical adequacy.
A common recent way to interpret this claim in virtue of a 
theory's explanatory power, is by insisting that it must be interpreted 
in terms of 'global properties', or the overall simplification and uni­
fication of our world picture.Although particular attempts to for­
malize or clarify this intuition have run into specific problems, 
others have been proposed that may or may not be subject to new objec- 
tions.^^^ Van Fraassen, however, has more general arguments against any
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such attempt. First, it is generally accepted that a theory may explain 
some phenomena while not being accepted as true (e.g., Newton's theory 
'explains' the tides).Consequently, claims about a theory's explan­
atory power do not lead necessarily to a realist interpretation of that 
theory. Furthermore, Van Fraassen does not deny the empirical fruitful­
ness of full-fledged theories as opposed to mere calculating devices or 
phenomenological laws. What he denies is that besides empirical adequacy,
explanatory power gives us any reason to believe in the truth (or even
1X8the empirical adequacy) of a theory. The empirical adequacy of a
theory also demands that it cover as wide a range of data as possible,
so that the kinetic theory, by unifying more data, was more empirically
adequate than phenomenological thermodynamics. So even if 'inference to
the best explanation' can be formulated adequately, this in itself does
not provide a means for supporting claims for a theory's truth, over
claims for its empirical adequacy.
Realism, for Van Fraassen, needs an 'extra premise' in such
cases, that all universal regularities need an explanation, before "the
rule (of inference to the best explanation) will make realists of us 
119all." This extra premise is rejected by Van Fraassen, because re­
quests for explanation come to an end in science (e.g., at different 
times— accepting action at a distance as 'basic', accepting no change
in velocity for a body unless there is some kind of force added to the 
120system, etc.). Furthermore, demands for hidden variables or causes
are not always acceptable to science, as indicated by the major current
121interpretations of quantum mechanics. Still, Van Fraassen does not 
deny that the principle of inference to the best explanation or to
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search for common causes play roles in scientific methodology. But
constructive empiricism can interpret such demands in terms of advice
for formulating empirically adequate theories that find "larger scale
122correlations among observable events." Such advice, however, will 
be 'vindicated' or 'not vindicated' by actual attempts to discover such 
explanations and common causes. Even if vindicated, such constructs 
need not commit us to belief in the truth of theories thus formulated.
One way to construct a model for a set of observable correla­
tions is to exhibit hidden variables with which the observable one's 
are individually correlated. This is a theoretical enterprise, re­
quiring mathematical embedding or existence proof. But if the re­
sulting theory is then claimed to be empirically adequate, there is 
no claim that all aspects of the model correspond to 'elements of 
reality'. As a theoretical directive, or as a practical maxim, the 
principle of the common cause may well be operative in science— but 
not as a demand for explanation which would produce the metaphysical 
baggage of hidden parameters that carry no new empirical import.^23
Insofar as the demand for scientific explanation leads to greater empir­
ical adequacy, then, it is acceptable to constructive empiricism. Inso­
far as it goes beyond this, it is at best a pragmatic consideration, and 
at worst metaphysical baggage.
Some of my objections to Van Fraassen's first attack on realism
via explanation should be obvious. I do not accept that realism need be
committed to the view that all regularities need explanation, or that
all scientific explanations are true. There are coincidences in nature
that can be proliferated almost at will with the added power of mathe-
90matical formulae and statistics. Furthermore, I have no objection to 
interpreting demands for scientific explanation and scientific virtues 
as demands for greater unification of empirical phenomena, since my 
realist arguments partially depend on 'saving the phenomena' in such a 
way that the theory has enough restrictions placed on it to make it
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unlikely that it could cover the data so effectively by chance. I do 
not agree that this part of Van Fraassen's concept of the empirical 
adequacy of a theory is divorced from notions of the truth of a theory 
(though, of course, one can assent to the empirical adequacy of a theory 
without thereby assenting to the truth of that theory, as I've repeatedly 
claimed). Rather, I think that some levels of empirical adequacy (sup­
plemented by scientific virtues) provide adequate reasons for believing 
the theory. Furthermore, while generality and determinateness may be 
open to interpretations in terms of empirical adequacy, I do not believe 
that modesty can. This issue, however, should await our discussion of 
Van Fraassen's second attack on scientific realism via scientific 
explanation.
Van Fraassen also claims that the decision to accept a theory 
involves more than epistemic considerations. We would both agree, for 
example, that some aspects of theory choice involve notions such as 
computational ease, philosophical commitments, socio-economic consider­
ations, etc. (architechtonic, explicative components). We disagree, 
however, on how to classify some of the other virtues. For Van Fraassen, 
anything other than empirical adequacy is classified as a pragmatic 
component, which he interprets as being irrelevant for assessing truth 
(or empirical adequacy, for that matter). This constitutes the main 
disagreement between the type of realism I am proposing and Van 
Fraassen's constructive empiricism. Consequently, his arguments for the 
pragmatic aspect of scientific explanation and scientific virtues must 
be considered in some detail.
To establish his claim that the explanatory power of a theory
167
is yet another pragmatic virtue, Van Fraassen first discusses a wide­
spread problem with all attempts to formulate scientific explanation.
It was quickly seen that the deductive-nomological (hypothetico- 
deductive) model for scientific explanation and prediction constituted 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for scientific explanations. 
Sylvan Bromberger, for example, listed many counterexamples to this 
view, showing that true deductive relationships can nevertheless fail to 
explain (i.e., the model is not s u f f i c i e n t ) T h e  main feature of 
these counterexamples consists in showing that there are cases where we 
can deduce from true empirical laws and accepted theories accurate re­
sults, without thereby explaining these results. We can deduce, for 
example, from a number of laws that the Andromedan Galaxy is 1.5 x 10^ 
light years away from the earth. Still, of course, these laws that
permit us to make this prediction do not provide an explanation of why
125this galaxy is to be found at this distance. There are also laws in
elementary trigometry that allow us to deduce the height of a building,
mountain, or pole, from information concerning the angle which a ray of
light forms in a line to the base of the object to a spot x feet away 
126
from the object. Clearly, we would not claim that we have thereby
explained the height of the building, even though the example also fits
the deductive-nomological model. Such cases can be multiplied, and
various accounts have been formulated to respond to such counterexamples,
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called the problem of 'assymetries' in scientific explanation.
Whether or not non-deductive-nomological accounts can handle the assym- 
metry problem, however. Van Fraassen argues that the correct answer
128depends at least partially on the context-dependence of explanations.
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Aristotle discussed the difference between deduction from true
premises and scientific explanation, in terms of the difference between
129'knowledge of the fact' and 'knowledge of the reasoned fact'. Knowl­
edge of the reasoned fact requires, besides (or perhaps in some cases
' instead of) deduction from true premises, that the proper 'middle
130term' be used— i.e., that true causal links are involved. True
causal explanations, however, depend at least partially on what kind of
question is being asked, although Aristotle implies that scientific
131knowledge involves answering all four of his 'why questions'. Van 
Fraassen pushes this distinction between deducibility and explanation 
further, claiming that the demand for explanation, as such, is outside 
of science and (as above) highly contextual. "Which features are ex­
planatory is decided not by features of the scientific theory, but by
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concerns brought from outside." Furthermore, while examples like
Bromberger's flagpole seem to establish assymmetry (it is not generally
an explanation of why the pole has a certain height, that this follows
from trigometric laws and stated initial conditions), this assymmetry
can be reversed in certain contexts. Van Fraassen tells a story in
which the above information does explain the height of a given tower,
showing (he thinks) that the relevance of explanations cannot be estab-
133lished in a context-independent manner. Briefly, a spurned lover
built his veranda so that at a certain time of day a shadow would cover
the exact point at which his former lover stood when . . .— i.e., the
length of the shadow does explain why the veranda (or whatever) is x 
133feet high. This is the background of Van Fraassen's claim that 
explanatory power and other scientific virtues that do not directly
169
enhance the empirical adequacy of a theory, are pragmatic.
This is where Van Fraassen and I part company concerning the 
varying levels of scientific virtues.
When a theory is advocated, it is praised for many features 
other than empirical adequacy and strength; it is said to be mathe­
matically elegant, simple, of great scope, complete in certain re­
spects; also of wonderful use in unifying our account of hitherto 
disparate phenomena, and most of all, explanatory. Judgements of 
simplicity and explanatory power are the intuitive and natural 
vehicle for expressing our epistemic appraisal. What can an empir­
icist make of these other virtues which go so clearly beyond the 
ones he considers preeminent?
There are specifically human concerns, a function of our in­
terests and pleasures, which make some theories more valuable or 
appealing to us than others. Values of this sort, however, provide 
reasons for using a theory, or contemplating it, whether or not we 
think it true, and cannot rationally guide our epistemic attitudes 
and decisions. For example, if it matters more to us to have one 
sort of question answered rather than another, that is no reason to 
think that a theory which answers more of this first sort of ques­
tions is more likely to be true (not even with the proviso 'every­
thing else being equal*). It is merely a reason to prefer that 
theory in another r e s p e c t . 13^
While I concur that some of the virtues Van Fraassen lists here are not 
directly related to our epistemic attitudes concerning scientific theo­
ries, though they may provide other reasons for accepting a theory, I 
disagree about others. Generally, Van Fraassen labels any virtue other 
than consistency, empirical adequacy, and empirical strength 'prag­
matic*. While this in itself may not be objectionable (depending on 
one's treatment of 'pragmatic'). Van Fraassen explicitly makes the 
further claim that the other virtues are not related to decisions con­
cerning a theory's truth.
The other virtues claimed for a theory are pragmatic virtues. 
In so far as they go beyond consistency, empirical adequacy, and 
empirical strength, they do not concern the relation between the 
theory and the world, but rather the use and usefulness of the 
theory; they provide reasons to prefer the theory independently of 
questions of truth.
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There are two things wrong with this claim. One involves an ambiguous 
use of the term 'pragmatic', and the other (following upon the first) 
is the claim that 'pragmatic' virtues, so described, have no epistemic 
significance.
Van Fraassen first uses Charles Morris' original introduction
of the term 'pragmatics' in symiotics; "By 'pragmatics’ is designated
the science of the relation of signs to their interpreters." Then
he further characterizes pragmatics formally in terms of studies con-
137earning context-dependent expressions. These are not the same con­
siderations, at least if 'relative to their context' and 'relative to 
their interpreters' have their usual interpretation. 'Relative to their 
interpreters' has the connotation of being 'subjective', 'psychological', 
etc.; the type of pragmatics criticized by positivists, and not related 
to epistemic considerations. Van Fraassen and many others criticize 
this subjective interpretation of pragmatics. He certainly does not
claim that pragmatics in terms of context-dependent assertions cannot
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be formalized, and often mentions David Kaplan's work in this field 
as paradigmatic. Context-dependence, however, does not divorce a state­
ment from truth, but only from formal semantics. Here, I think, is the 
hidden ambiguity in Van Fraassen's use of the term. Traditionally (and 
vaguely), notions concerning truth are assigned to semantics, and some 
of my arguments in the last chapter tried to establish that theories of 
reference often muddle this by confusing 'being about x' with 'denoting 
x'. In this sense, 'pragmatics' as opposed to 'semantics' is indeed 
unrelated to truth. However, the formal treatment of context-dependent 
expressions, also called pragmatics, does not share the view that
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semantics enjoys autonomy with respect to truth. "I am now sitting at 
my desk in Dale Hall Tower" is contextual (given the demonstrative 'I'), 
and so, for Van Fraassen, should be handled by pragmatics. It is also, 
however, true. Consequently, his arguments against the epistemic status 
of scientific virtues besides consistency, etc., cannot follow from 
their contextual nature, or their being labeled pragmatic because of 
this contextual nature.
I concur with Van Fraassen that 'explanatory power' is yet 
another virtue of scientific theories and that it is contextual (as are 
modesty, generality, and determinateness). Nothing I have said commits 
me to taking scientific explanation as the goal of scientific theories, 
nor that all scientific explanations are true. I have also developed my 
account of scientific virtues directly in terms of scientific theories 
and not in terms of their relation to scientific explanation. I choose 
to remain open as to whether explanation is a fundamental feature of 
science, or a result of having good scientific theories. The remaining 
question is, then, if explanation is temporarily bracketed, has Van 
Fraassen provided any reasons to reject my formulation of scientific 
realism?
I think not. Other than some of the earlier passages cited
where Van Fraassen claims that belief in the empirical adequacy of a
theory accomplishes everything that believing in the theory's truth
139accomplishes, without 'metaphysical baggage', his usual claim is 
simply that acceptance of a theory in terms of its empirical adequacy 
is at least as rational as believing in the theory's truth.
We have warrant to believe a theory only because, and in so 
far as, we have warrant to believe that it is empirically adequate.
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In that case it is left open that it is at least as rational as 
believing that the theory is empirically a d e q u a te .1^0
From my diachronic account of realism, this claim is sometimes true.
There are cases where the most appropriate epistemic attitude toward a 
theory at a given time is acceptance of its empirical adequacy, and non- 
commitance concerning its truth. There are other cases where either 
view might be rational, and, I will argue, cases where believing the 
theory is most appropriate. A diachronic realist need not maintain 
that a (diachronic) anti-realist position is irrational, though I do 
think that a synchronic position on either side is at least inadequate, 
both historically and philosophically. Furthermore, I have already pro­
vided intuitive arguments which, if successful, should counteract Van 
Fraassen’s claims both that consistency, etc., are the only epistemically 
relevant virtues, and that the only appropriate epistemic attitude to­
ward a theory is believing it to be empirically adequate. Nothing Van 
Fraassen has said counteracts these arguments, but it will be worthwhile 
to consider some possible constructive empiricist responses to my posi­
tion, both in order to further clarify and support it, and to make way 
for the following chapter.
First, as I’ve already hinted, a constructive empiricist can 
claim that generality and determinateness are related to the empirical 
adequacy of a theory. As I’ve presented these virtues, they concern 
the amount of data that a theory covers, as well as the number and pre­
cision of the commitments of that theory. These can be taken as claims 
for a theory’s empirical adequacy, provided that ’phenomena’ and ’empir­
ical content’ are not taken too narrowly. It is crucial to my claim, 
for example, that generality and determinateness both lead to a theory
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being better tested. While it is sometimes unclear how narrowly Van 
Fraassen interprets empirical adequacy, I find nothing that would com­
mit him to arguing against these claims (I am made somewhat confident 
regarding this last claim in view of Van Fraassen's claim in a footnote 
in The Scientific Image, that he doesn't see why Glymour's bootstrap 
strategy could not be adopted to anti-realist views^^^). In any event, 
if a constructive empiricist claims that generality and determinateness 
can be related to empirical adequacy, the realist/anti-realist argu­
ments concerning this would then hinge on whether a sufficient amount 
of empirical adequacy is not itself a reason for believing in the truth 
of a theory. Since I have already given most of my realist arguments 
for generality and determinateness, I would now claim that if such a 
subsumption under empirical adequacy were successful, this would provide 
an argument for a realist interpretation of (certain levels of) empir­
ical adequacy. I claim, after all, that it is the way a theory covers 
the data, and not just its covering the data, that warrants rational 
belief in the theory. A constructive empiricist would then either need 
to claim that a theory itself is not to be interpreted over and above 
its phenomenal consequences (a regress, I fear, back to classical em­
piricism) , or claim that these virtues warrant no more than acceptance 
of the empirical adequacy of a theory (first, however, my realist argu­
ments for these virtues would have to be refuted).
Since the first alternative does not seem attractive for con­
structive empiricism, I will investigate the consequences of opting for 
the latter. It would be somewhat deceptive, in the absence of actual 
constructive empiricist arguments against my position, to formulate
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possible constructive empiricist objections and then knock them down. 
This is not, however, the only way to investigate the second option in 
more detail. I have, after all, made exactly parallel realist claims 
for the virtue of modesty as for generality and determinateness. If it 
can be shown that this virtue cannot be easily subsumed under the con­
cept of empirical adequacy, then the second option will be considerably 
weakened without setting up straw-men counter arguments. Though all of 
the virtues I've developed were formulated in terms of how a theory 
covers the data, modesty in particular is not even directly related to 
the data alone. Not to unnecessarily proliferate assumptions and theo­
retical entities in order to account for the phenomena is a guideline 
for the formulation of the theory itself. According to Van Fraassen, 
two theories can be empirically equivalent, without being generally 
equivalent (and I concur). Choosing one of these empirically equivalent 
theories would, for him, only involve pragmatic criteria (as he formu­
lates this). If my above arguments hold, however, a theory which covers 
the data while retaining relative modesty is thereby less likely to 
work than a theory which accomplishes this without the modesty restric­
tion, and consequently we should have more confidence in the former 
theory. In other words, a more modest theory effects our epistemic 
judgments, contrary to Van Fraassen's claims. This should suffice (in 
the absence of constructive empiricist arguments against my position) 
to weaken the second option open to constructive empiricism.
Another possible response of a constructive empiricist to my 
position might attempt to use the virtue of modesty against it (hoist 
me on my own petard). Since there is certainly less commitment involved
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in accepting a theory's empirical adequacy as opposed to believing the 
truth of the theory, would modesty not compel us to choose constructive 
empiricism over realism, since it can (allegedly) cover the same data 
without these extra assumptions? Briefly, if at least modesty involves 
epistemic attitudes toward theories that are not confined to empirical 
adequacy, there is at least this aspect of our epistemic behavior that 
constructive empiricism cannot account for. This, of course, depends 
on my arguments having at least intuitive appeal, and, in the absence 
of counterarguments, I think it is appropriate to provisionally accept 
this. Second, I'm not sure that epistemology is that 'rationalized'. 
Briefly, I think further arguments are needed to treat epistemic con­
cerns on a par with scientific concerns— it is not clear that such a 
move would constitute a proper use of the virtues I've developed. Fi­
nally, and most importantly, even if the above considerations fail to 
hold, there is another problem with using modesty to argue against my 
version of scientific realism. For such a move to work, it would need 
to be made quite generally— not only for theoretical entities, but for 
all inferred entities. Van Fraassen, at least, does not seem willing 
to accept such a restriction for all inferences. He considers 'infer­
ence to the best explanation', for example, as telling in 'ordinary' 
cases, but argues that establishing this rule as a methodological maxim 
at the ordinary level does not justify it at the level of theoretical 
entities.
Surely there are many telling ordinary cases; I hear something 
in the wall, the patter of little feet at midnight, my cheese dis­
appears— and I infer that a mouse has come to live with me. Not 
merely that these apparent signs of mousely presence will continue, 
not merely that all the observable phenomena will be as if there is 
a mouse, but that there really is a m o u se .142
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It would be more modest in the above sense to bracket commitment to 
'real mouseness' in this case, but it would also be a silly use of this 
virtue. This, if anything, would violate the 'unnecessarily' addendum 
added to modesty. Hence, more argumentation would be needed to scuttle 
my position by using my own virtue against me, to the tune of clearly 
separating the above inference from theoretical inference.
In conclusion, another analogy between knowledge claims and my 
characterization of realist claims may help to summarize this chapter. 
Sometimes the most rational account of our experience is an inference to 
beliefs that go beyond experience, both in ordinary (mousy) cases as 
well as in science. Very few knowledge claims in such circumstances are 
not defeasible and probably no scientific realist claims are not defea­
sible. Still, we intuitively feel warranted in believing many such 
knowledge claims— 'intuitively', here, means that no universally recog­
nized necessary and sufficient conditions have yet been established for 
knowledge. My arguments in this chapter have tried to establish weaker, 
but analogous claims for some realist assertions. If we can agree that 
some levels of evidential support via the three virtues I've listed can 
support reality claims, then the (conceptual) case for my formulation of 
realism is established. Imagine, again, a theory that is as modest, 
general, and determinate as you wish (at the limit, all relevant data 
are handled in a modest, general, and determinate manner), then I would 
argue that we have good reasons to believe the assertions of the theory 
in question. That actual cases in the history of science can be argued 
to have achieved a level of virtues sufficient to warrant belief is, 
admittedly, harder to establish. This is where 'benign chauvinism' and
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'being on the right track.' come in, as well as the argument that realism 
gives the best account for the success of some actual scientific theo­
ries. This is relevant for the historical objections to my version of 
scientific realism, that will be discussed in the next chapter. At the 
present, conceptual, level, however, I am still free to rest my case on 
'ideal' situations (Van Fraassen's conceptual support for constructive
empiricism, if anything, is even less historically adequate, in that it
143fails to provide more than a few token historical cases). I will now 
try to establish historical adequacy for the version of scientific 
realism that I have developed in this chapter.
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CHAPTER IV 
REALISM AND THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE
So far, though historical examples have been interspersed to 
document the use of the virtues I've delineated, I have concentrated on 
conceptual rather than historical objections to scientific realism. As 
indicated at the beginning of the last chapter, however, there are also 
historical objections to scientific realism that must be dealt with.
These too can be divided into conceptual historical objections, stressing 
the alleged inability of the realist to interpret scientific progress in 
terms of a theory's closer approximation to the truth, and historical 
problems which have to do with interpreting actual historical cases of 
theory choice from the perspective of constitutive considerations, much 
less from the perspective of a realist interpretation. Often these two 
strategies are combined, arguing simultaneously that a realist approach 
is unintelligible, and that cases of actual theory choice do not fit 
into any reasonable realist framework. Still, it would be advisable to 
initially separate these considerations when responding to historical 
objections to realism. Consequently, this chapter will also be divided 
into three sections. The first will attempt to elucidate and respond to 
conceptual historical objections (that a realist approach is general
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unsatisfactory), while the second and third will attempt to establish 
that at least some important historical examples are capable of being 
explicated by the realist approach I have presented. In the process, I 
will further explicate the notions of 'being on the right track' and 
'benign chauvinism' introduced in the first chapter, and the comparative, 
diachronic version of realism that I have presented in chapters one and 
three.
The Problem of Scientific Progress and 'Truthlikenesg'
One of the results obtained in chapter two was to establish that 
some of the more familiar attacks on scientific progress are at least 
partially the result of muddling the notions of the meaning and the de­
notation (or less formally, the reference) of scientific terms. It was 
there shown that Kuhn's and Feyerabend's arguments for the 'change in 
physical reference' of central theoretical terms engendered by changes 
in overall theory are unfounded or inconsistent, given any of the three 
current approaches to denotation. It should be clear from the last chap­
ter that my diachronic approach to scientific realism depends upon some 
theories getting 'better' throughout their historical development, and 
that some of these theories receive enough evidential support via the 
three virtues to warrant rational belief. Consequently, while the last 
part of chapter two argued against basing realist claims on theories of 
denotation, they are nonetheless necessary conditions for diachronic 
realism.
Conceptual historical anti-realism, however, is not limited to 
this muddling of meaning and denotation. There are much more general 
attacks on realism and even on the primacy of constitutive components
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in cases of theory choice, which also create problems for scientific 
realism. Briefly, if evidential support for theoretical claims cannot 
be separated from 'external', aesthetic and philosophical considerations 
in actual historical cases, then realism via scientific virtues, even if 
conceptually adequate, becomes historically sterile. If philosophy of 
science is to be about science, then philosophical arguments concerning 
science should have a bearing on real cases. It is the purpose of the 
present section to counteract historical objections that claim a realist 
approach cannot in principle adequately handle historical cases.
The main aspect of traditional scientific realist positions in­
volves the alleged cumulative nature of scientific progress, which for a 
realist (in a variety of ways), is usually interpreted as a successful 
theory's closer and closer approximation to the truth. We have already 
dealt with some of the more familiar historical attacks on this general 
notion which are concerned with the concepts of the meaning and denota­
tion (or more often and vaguely, reference) of theoretical terms, but 
there are a variety of other arguments against this general notion of 
cumulative progress, involving particular features that various realists 
have felt to be desirable.^ Some of these include the notions of 'ap­
proximate truth', the retention of the explanatory successes of older 
theories by newer theories, the existence of 'crucial experiments', and 
the explanation of the success of a theory via its approximation to 
truth. Above and beyond these there are, of course, attacks on the 
meaning-invariance of scientific virtues (i.e., claims that methodolog­
ical considerations change so drastically that one can only delineate 
virtues within given research traditions), and more general arguments
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against the ability to distinguish methodological virtues from other 
non-methodological decision criteria. This section will discuss repre­
sentative arguments against all of these traditional realist desiderata, 
sometimes providing counterarguments, and sometimes arguing that the 
traditional desiderata are indeed reprehensible given the type of realism 
I'm advocating.
The general arguments concerning the ability to delineate vir­
tues have already been partially addressed in the last chapter, and will 
be further supported in the next section. There is historical support 
for believing that, whatever other factors may be involved, some consid­
erations weigh more heavily than others in theory choice, and that these 
have been fairly consistently employed throughout much of the history of 
science. Newton's laws, for example, were indeed controversial and for 
reasons that transcend normal methodological considerations. Perhaps, 
even, their eventual victory led to something like the acceptance of new 
perspectives concerning what were to count as legitimate theoretical 
concerns. Still, I maintain, the most important consideration was, and 
remains, their ability to determinately cover a wide range of data in a 
relatively modest manner— i.e., methodological considerations. The 
acceptance of new theories or research traditions may well lead to new 
methodological perspectives, but architechtonic and explicative compo­
nents are never transformed without empirical and methodological success, 
and this success, while not univocal, is at least relatively constant.
Consider, for example, Laudan's claim that empirical problems 
are context-dependent, that is, they are empirical because a certain 
generation of scientists treats them as though they were objective
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problems about the world. It was once an important empirical problem 
for geologists, for example, to explain how the earth could take shape
3
within six to eight thousand years. This problem was of course (from 
our perspective) never solved, but rather dissolved when approaches were 
accepted that allowed for millions of years of development. Still, while 
we might deny empirical status to such a problem, are there any inherent 
differences between accepting it as an empirical problem given the prev­
alent contemporary theories, and our acceptance of determining the legit­
imacy or illegitimacy of Bell's Inequality regarding the behavior of 
photons in the singlet state? Once the theoretical/observational dis­
tinction is surrendered, are there any non-trivial (e.g., unlike 'this 
paper is white') examples of 'empirical data' that do not depend on the 
state of current theories? In other words, are there 'phenomena to be 
saved'?
Laudan, of course, maintains that there are empirical problems
for a theory to account for, but it seems that, for him, these are just
what scientists who adopt the relevant theory postulate as empirical
4
problems for that theory. At least, for Laudan, methodological consid­
erations do not so much justify a theory as they are themselves justified 
by the adherence to a theory.^ If either of these claims is accepted, 
the 'success' of a theory, and, at least partially, the phenomena it 
saves, are determined by the theory itself. This result threatens not 
only scientific realism, but also claims concerning the objective status 
of scientific confirmation, and the relevance of empirical evidence for 
a given theory. That is, even its degree of confirmation may not be di­
rectly relevant to the theory's ability to 'solve' empirical problems.
209
As Laudan claims:
I shall claim that: a theory may solve a problem as long as it
entails even an approximate statement of the problem; in determining 
if a theory solves a problem, it is irrelevant whether the theory is 
true or false, well or poorly confirmed; what counts as a solution 
to a problem at one time will not necessarily be regarded as such at 
all times.6
What exactly is it to 'solve' a problem if this does not mean that a 
well-confirmed theory handles it, or that this theory provides a true 
account of it? As far as I can tell, this is never explicitly spelled 
out by Laudan.^ Still, there seems to be something both important and 
challenging about the above claims, especially since near-variants are 
advanced by several other historians.
Thomas Kuhn, for example, while in many respects more extreme 
than Laudan, seems to be in basic agreement with him when he argues that 
the (especially initial) results of measurements conducted to allegedly 
'test' a theory are almost never in "unequivocal agreement" with the
g
quantitative commitments of the theory. Galileo, for example, in re­
porting his inclined plane experiments, gives no actual numbers, but 
claims that "in such experiments, repeated a full 100 times, we always 
found that the spaces traversed were to each other as the squares of the
Q
times." In fact, however, according to Kuhn, "groups of the best in 
France announced their total failure to get comparable r e s u l t s . S i m ­
ilarly, early 19th-century chemists did not have precise enough methods 
and instruments to unambiguously confirm Dalton's law of multiple pro­
portions. Proust, for example, got a weight ratio for oxygen of 1.47:1 
when analyzing copper oxides, as opposed to Dalton's prediction of 
2:1.11
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As a result chemical texts can now state that quantitative 
analysis confirms Dalton's atomism and forget that, historically, 
the relevant analytic techniques are based upon the very theory 
they are said to confirm. Before Dalton's theory was announced, 
measurement did not give the same results. There are self- 
fulfilling prophecies in the physical as well as in the social 
sciences.
In other words, there is, historically, an interplay between theory and 
experiment, both conditioning and helping to frame the other, rather 
than the unambiguous support of a theory by experimental evidence 
claimed by empiricist methodologists. Furthermore, a theory accepted 
as 'successful' helps to establish the methodology appropriate to it­
self, rather than being judged successful because of methodological 
considerations somehow independent of it.
A similar claim can be made concerning the case of Galileo.
Although he was at least partially persuaded by his new telescopic
'facts' to champion the Copernican astronomical theory, this was cer-
13tainly not his only reason, nor was it clearly his main reason. This
'saving of the phenomena' was not the reason he gave, for example, for
favoring Copernicus' system in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief
14World Systems; Ptolemaic and Copernican. since both theories, 
strictly speaking, were refuted by careful observations. Instead he 
praises Copernicus (and Aristarchus before him) for trusting their rea­
son instead of their senses.
There is no limit to my astonishment when I reflect that 
Aristarchus and Copernicus were able to make reason so conquer 
sense that, in defiance of the latter, the former became mistress 
of their belief. . . . Were it not for the existence of a superior 
and better sense than natural and common sense to join forces with 
reason, I much question whether I, too, should not have been much 
more recalcitrant toward the Copernican system than I have been 
since a clearer light than usual has illuminated me.^^
And, a few pages later, he again praises Copernicus for favoring reason.
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"We may see that with reason as his guide he resolutely continued to 
affirm what sensible experience seemed to c o n t r a d i c t . O f  course, it 
would be irresponsible to conclude from these and similar passages 
either that Galileo never conducted experiments, or that he did not try 
to test his theories by experiment. Still, they seem to provide more 
historical support for the claims of those like Kuhn that the theoretical 
concepts accepted by scientists act partially as legislative concepts, 
or regulative ideals— i.e., that they partially determine what is 
observed.
Such challenges, of course, threaten the very notions of objec­
tive theory tests and context-independent notions of 'relevant' evidence. 
Fortunately, such positions are not forced upon us even if we abandon the 
theoretical/observational distinction. To maintain that theories can be 
objectively tested, and that certain experimental results are relevant to 
a theory's confirmation while others are not, one need only establish 
that it ^  possible to test parts of a theory (contra holism), and that 
the theory-evidence relation is not viciously circular. Clark Glymour 
has long maintained that the theoretical/observational distinction is 
not necessary for the objective testing of theoretical commitments, as 
long as the criteria used for the test are independent of the part of the 
theory being tested, whether these are theoretical or observational. In 
short, one can use other parts of the same theory to test the particular 
part of the theory in question.Even if initial measurement results 
do not unambiguously support a given theory, the eventual convergence of 
these results, as well as a variety of different theoretical commitments 
being satisfied within the theory, can be established as context-
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independent evidence for the theory.
What justifies this claim for context-independent evidence? For 
Glymour, the evidence in such instances can turn out incompatible with 
the theory (the tests do not comprise 'self-fulfilling prophecies'). 
Furthermore, we have already established in chapter two that there are a 
variety of ways in which we can meaningfully claim that some later 
theories are 'about' the same entities as earlier ones, which also 
counters the extreme context-dependent claims made by some proponents of 
the incommensurability of succeeding theories. Finally, the previous 
chapter has provided at least some historical evidence that there is 
more agreement about methodological factors in cases of theory choice 
than these proponents of incommensurability indicate. This last re­
sponse seems to me to constitute the real crux of this issue, and will 
be further supported in the next two sections. In any event, nothing 
presented thus far compels us to abandon the hope for the preponderance 
of objective, methodological factors in cases of theory choice, nor the 
hope that some of these factors can support diachronic realism.
The second traditional methodological desiderata that has in­
creasingly come under attack concerns the possibility of conducting a 
'crucial experiment' to empirically decide between conflicting theo-
ID
ries. Historical cases that have often been thought to count as such
crucial experiments include Lavoisier's measuring the weight of a sealed
19
container before and after calcination (oxidation) took place, and
Foucault's experiments showing that light traveled faster in air than in 
20water. Empiricists themselves have come to be sceptical concerning 
the existence of such crucial experiments. On purely methodological
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grounds, it has come to be believed that the failure of a given theory 
to agree with the results of a single experiment is not sufficient rea­
son to single out that the theory is to blame for this failure. After 
all, the measurements might be in error, some known or unknown factor 
may have interfered with the results, the experimental apparatus used 
to conduct the experiment may have been inadequate, it may be possible 
to add 'friendly amendments' to the theory so that it would agree with 
the results, etc. Such considerations have led many empiricists to be­
come disillusioned with the idea that a single experiment can confirm
or disconfirm particular parts of a theory, and led them, rather, to
21adopt more holistic approaches to theory confirmation. Without opting 
for the resurrection of the 'crucial experiment' concept, I think that 
the arguments for the possibility of objective tests of a theory pro­
vided above show that the holism option is not mandatory.
Non-empiricist attacks on crucial experiments are much more 
varied than those just listed. It is quite common historically, for 
example, for proponents of the theory 'refuted' by the alleged crucial 
experiment to fail to be swayed (examples: Priestley and Nollet dis­
cussed in the last chapter). For some historians, this failure to sur­
render to the success of a new theory is based on allegiance to the con­
ceptual scheme of the older theory ('paradigm'), preventing them from
22recognizing the phenomena that the new theory could explain. In other
words, the persuasiveness of the experimental support for the new theory
cannot be made logically compelling to those who do not accept the basic
23framework of the new theory. In fact, it is claimed that proponents
of the older theory often 'die out' without followers, rather than
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recognize (for purely methodological reasons) the greater success of the 
24
new theory.
There is something to this historical objection to crucial ex­
periments. As I've previously argued, there are many considerations 
operating in cases of theory choice, not all of them methodological (con­
stitutive). It is not surprising, therefore, that there would be cases 
of individuals holding on to their research tradition in the face of what 
we can retrospectively call more successful theories. Furthermore, the 
diachronic model I've been developing must certainly allow for methodo­
logical disagreement at certain stages in the development of a given 
theory (at least concerning whether a theory can be claimed to have the 
relevant scientific virtues, and to what degree). It seems to me that 
both methodological and non-methodological considerations play a role in 
the kinds of cases cited in the last paragraph. At least some anti- 
atomists, for example, were convinced by Perrin's experiments concerning
Brownian motion, and others may well have been, had they lived to wit-
25
ness those experiments. It is also arguable that, given Dumas' orig­
inal benevolence toward the atomic theory, his experimental results 
would have supported the theory had he made the appropriate distinction 
between 'atoms' and 'molecules' (i.e., he may have been persuaded by 
Cannizzaro's treatment had it occurred earlier). After his initial 
failure, however, and given his increasing allegiance to a more posi­
tivist position, he may not have been swayed by Cannizzaro's success-
27ful use of this distinction in 1858. Architechtonic and explicative 
components, in other words, ^  play a role in theory choice, and no 
doubt can lead individual scientists to maintain their scepticism in the
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face of highly 'virtuous' competitors. Still, this is not surprising 
given the diachronic model I've developed, and certainly does not lead 
to the incommensurability positions mentioned above. I have already 
argued that there ^  overwhelming convergence of opinion on the part of 
a majority of scientists after the development of a successful theory, 
and the next two sections will provide further support for the view that 
this convergence is primarily due to methodological (constitutive) con­
siderations.
This interpretation concerning the primacy of methodological
considerations in cases of theory choice has also been attacked in a
more subtle (and, I think, more reasonable and persuasive) manner by 
28
Stephen Toulmin. Considering the case of Lavoisier's 'crucial expe­
riment' on the red calx of mercury against the phlogiston theory,
Toulmin argues that Priestley's refusal to accept the new theory was not 
due to his pride, or to the incommensurability of the two theories, but 
to his own experimental results which seemed to contradict Lavoisier's 
position.
Is it likely that such a man as Priestley, whose distinguished 
contributions to chemistry nobody can deny, could ever have been 
blind to the force of a crucial experiment in this field, if a gen­
uinely crucial experiment were possible?
In point of fact, Priestley was well aware of what Lavoisier 
had been doing, and saw clearly what the implications of this work 
might be. Writing in 1783 about the new oxygen theory he says:
"The arguments in favour of this opinion, especially those which 
are drawn from the experiment of Mr. Lavoisier made on mercury, are 
so specious that I own I was myself much inclined to adopt them.
Why then was Priestley reluctant to accept these results?
His own experiments on minium (lead oxide, PhyO^) had convinced 
him that one could 'see' the imbibing of phlogiston in the calx (in the 
form of hydrogen), even more clearly than Lavoisier's experiment allegedly
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showed the contrary. In a letter to Benjamin Franklin, dated June 24, 
1782, Priestley reveals the gist of his experiment.
. . .  my experiments are certainly inconsistent with Mr. 
Lavoisier's supposition, of there being no such thing as phlogiston, 
and that it is the addition of air, and not the loss of anything 
that converts a metal into a calx. In their usual state calxes of 
metals do contain air, but that may be expelled by heat; and after 
this I reduce them to a perfect metalic state by nothing but inflam­
mable air [hydrogen], which they imbibe ^  toto, without any decom­
position. I lately reduced 101 ounce measures of this air to two 
by calx of lead, and that small remainder was still inflammable.
Remember that for the phlogiston theorists calcination consisted in the
loss of phlogiston from a metal, and the heating of the resulting calx
(with, for example, carbon) reproduced the metal by reintroducing phlo- 
32
giston. Lavoisier's experiment reputedly demonstrated not only that
something was added to the metal during calcination (oxidation), but the
diminishing of the volume of air in the sealed container corresponded to
33the weight gain of the calx (hence, oxidation/calcination). Priestley's 
experiment on lead oxide, therefore, attacked Lavoisier's results on two 
fronts. Not only does he provide a different account of the presence of 
'air' in the calx, but he also seems to provide a clear case where phlo­
giston is necessary for the reconstitution of the metal (on the then not
34uncommon identification of phlogiston with inflammable air-hydrogen).
What are we to make of Priestley's 'crucial experiment'? Well,
35as Toulmin points out, there are at least two important questions here.
The first is, roughly, what kind of chemical account do w  give that 
would explain Priestley's result? Since the experiment was conducted in 
a bell jar of hydrogen enclosed over water, heating the lead oxide re­
leased oxygen which could then combine with the hydrogen to form water. 
Consequently, oxygen was given off in the reconstitution of the metal.
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rather than hydrogen being imbibed by the lead oxide as Priestley sup- 
36
posed. The second question is, again roughly, what kind of criteria
do we employ if we so interpret Priestley's experiment in Lavoisier's
favor? If Lavoisier's experiment is taken as 'crucial', we seem to be
committed to the view that ^  the time the experimental data were open
37to only one interpretation, i.e., that Priestley's interpretation of 
his own experiment must be explained away, rather than appreciated as 
strong methodological support for phlogiston theory, given the state of 
chemistry at that time. Certainly Toulmin, in agreement with the dia­
chronic model I've developed, agrees that eventually the available evi­
dence converged to favor Lavoisier's theory. At the time in question, 
however, this was not the case. Consequently, though Kuhn's interpre­
tation is extreme, there are good reasons for not taking Lavoisier's 
experiment as 'crucial', at least if the case in interpreted 
synchronically.
The details of the case, therefore, do not support an incommen­
surability argument, i.e., that the experiments on both sides were so 
theory laden that the two sides could not communicate with one another. 
Priestley agrees with Lavoisier, for example, on the kinds of virtues a 
theory needs to have in order to be successful— for example, modesty.
And did the facts correspond on this theory [Lavoisier's], it 
would certainly be preferable to that of Stahl [phlogiston theory], 
as being more simple; there being one principle less to take into 
our account in explaining the changes of bodies.38
Furthermore, his refusal to take weight in the chemical reaction involved
in calcination as the physical magnitude of prime importance is not, as
many interpreters suppose, inherently less scientific (or even less quan­
go
titative) than Lavoisier's approach. In general, besides the empirical
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results of his own experiment on lead oxide, his general position con­
cerning his reluctance to accept the new theory seems methodologically 
sound. "If a former theory will sufficiently account for all the facts, 
there is no occasion to have recourse to a new one, attended with no 
peculiar advantage.Considered at the time of his experiment, then, 
there is no evidence of a 'shift of world views' inherent in his re­
fusal to accept Lavoisier's fledgling theory. The disagreement with the 
anti-phlogiston theorists concerns whether the virtues are present to a 
greater degree in the new theory, not which virtues are relevant nor 
what these virtues 'mean'.
Nothing that Toulmin says in this article leads me to believe 
that he would disagree with the above analysis. His attack on the pos­
sibility of crucial experiments is limited to a synchronic view of these 
experiments— considered at the time they were performed, not with respect 
to the future development of the relevant theories. I am in full agree­
ment with his summary of the consequences of Lavoisier's and Priestley's 
experiments, and, in fact, see his interpretation as in full accord with 
the objectivity of methodological considerations that I am defending.
We must acknowledge that Priestley's interpretation of his ex­
periment is at least consistent. Whatever grounds we have for pre­
ferring our own, Lavoisierian explanations (and I would not dream 
of disputing the fact that they are vastly preferable to 
Priestley's) the original mercury experiment is by no means the 
crucial or the uniquely-vivid one it at first seemed. . . . The 
same compelling impression of seeing a chemical formula verified 
before one's eyes, which was so happily suggestive to Lavoisier, 
was equally misleading to Priestley.41
Therefore, from my perspective, there are no such things as single, cru­
cial experiments if synchronically interpreted, but for reasons following 
from the above analysis, not because there is nothing objective or agreed
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upon by competing 'paradigms'. Insofar then as particular earlier 
empiricist (and/or realist) interpretations of scientific methodology 
were committed to such experiments, they were misguided. The absence of 
such experiments (or any synchronically interpreted methodological com­
ponents for that matter), however, does no damage to the diachronic 
realist position I am defending.
The remaining traditional realist desiderata attacked by con­
ceptual historical anti-realism (the retention, and often 'explanation' 
of the success of former theories by later ones, and notions of 'approx­
imate truth') are often lumped together both by realists and anti-realists. 
Consequently, it will be appropriate to deal with them as a group. While 
there is a history of conceptual historical objections to these desid­
erata, the most important and current objections occur in various works 
by Larry Laudan. Laudan's arguments will therefore receive the most 
attention in what follows.
One of the ways in which earlier philosophers of science have 
tried to handle the retention of explanatory success in cases of theory 
change is via various forms of 'reduction' of the older theories into 
the newer, often involving the formal derivation of the former (or parts 
of it) by the l a t t e r . S u c h  a view has long been attacked by concep­
tual historians.Laudan’s attack on this particular version of this 
view (what he calls the 'extreme version of the cumulative postulate'
(CP)) is both logical and historical. He first formulates this extreme 
model of (CP) as follows: "Tg is progressive with respect to T^, if and
only if Tg entails all the true consequences of Tj^ , plus some additional 
true consequences."^^ His logical objection to this position is simply
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that the class of true consequences of any two universal theories can­
not be ennumerated, scuttling any attempt to directly compare the theo-
45ries with respect to their true consequences. His historical objec­
tion to this version of (CP) is equally simple.
Sadly, none of the major cases of theory change in the history of 
science seems to satisfy the stringent conditions of entailment be­
tween theories required to decide whether absolute cumulativity has 
occurred. Copernican astronomy does not entail Ptolemaic astronomy; 
Newton's mechanics does not entail the mechanics of Galileo, Kepler, 
or Descartes; the special theory of relativity does not entail the 
Lorentz-modified aether theory; Darwin's theory does not entail 
Lamarck's; . . .46
Certainly Laudan is right in claiming that none of the above theories 
entailed their predecessors in this sense. There is possibly another 
sense of a theory entailing the measurement results of its predecessor, 
which may rescue part of the intuition behind this version of (CP) (at 
least for quantitative theories, like Newton's mechanics being a 'limit­
ing case' for Einstein's). Since Einstein's equation for the kinetic
mc^energy of a material point is '----5— ', while the classical equation
is 'm "2 it follows from Einstein's equation that, for objects with 
relatively small velocities with respect to the speed of light, the ex­
perimental results of the classical theory will not be measurably dif-
47ferent from those predicted by the newer theory. This, however, does 
not rescue this version of (CP) form all of Laudan's objections, nor 
will it apply to the less quantified theories he mentions in the above 
quote. In any event I have no wish to rescue a view that I find sus­
pect for independent reasons, and which is totally irrelevant for the 
type of realism I'm defending.
A weaker version of the (CP) view surrenders the idea of the
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entailment of the former theory by the latter, and instead insists that: 
"Tg is progressive with respect to if and only if all the facts thus 
far explained . . .  by can be explained . . . by Tg, and Tg can also 
be shown to explain some fact . . . not explained by This is
certainly intuitively more plausible than the extreme version of (CP) 
and doesn't share its logical flaws, but it too is overly strict to fit 
many important historical cases. Laudan discusses four important exam­
ples where phenomena were explained by an earlier theory, which the
49theory that replaced it couldn't even formulate. The result, as far 
as Laudan is concerned, is that no version of (CP) is adequate to deal 
with the actual history of science. There is no reason to ennumerate 
all possible versions of (CP) to establish this point, because no cumu­
lative view can cope with the historical fact (for Laudan) that most 
cases of theory change involve gains and losses of phenomena explained. 
Hence, if scientific progress depends on the cumulation of explained 
phenomena (as is certainly assumed by all previous proponents of (CP) 
views), then science does not progress. Laudan instead opts for the 
view that scientific progress must be articulated in a non-cumulative 
manner, involving the number and importance of 'problems solved', rather 
than data explained, or progress toward truth, etc.^^ Here Laudan and I 
partially part company, but I need to clarify Laudan's further attacks 
on the 'retention of success' desideratum before I try to establish a 
new version of cumulative progress.
Laudan's further attacks on this desideratum, and especially 
the view that realist interpretations of theories explain the success of 
some theories, is found most succinctly and persuasively in his recent
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52article "A Confutation of Convergent Realism." The main stalking- 
horse in this article is labeled 'Convergent Epistemological Realism'
(CER) by Laudan, and contains elements of the (CP) views already dis­
cussed, as well as new features particularly important for most rea­
lists. It will be worthwhile to begin this discussion by presenting 
Laudan's depiction of (CER), summarized by him in five theses.
Rl) Scientific theories (at least in the 'mature' sciences) 
are typically approximately true and more recent theories are closer 
to the truth than older theories in the same domain;
R2) The observational and theoretical terms within the theo­
ries of a mature science genuinely refer (roughly, there are sub­
stances in the world that correspond to the ontologies presumed by 
our best theories);
R3) Successive theories in any mature science will be such 
that they 'preserve' the theoretical relations and the apparent 
referents of earlier theories (i.e., earlier theories will be 
'limiting cases' of later theories);
R4) Acceptable new theories do and should explain why their 
predecessors were successful in so far as they were successful.
To these semantic, methodological and epistemic theses is con­
joined an important metaphilosophical claim about how realism is to 
be evaluated and assessed. Specifically, it is maintained that:
R5) Theses R1-R4 entail that ('mature') scientific theories 
should be successful; indeed, these theses constitute the best, if 
not the only, explanation for the success of science. The empir­
ical success of science (in the sense of giving detailed explana­
tions and accurate predictions) accordingly provides striking 
empirical confirmation for realism.^3
R3 has already been discussed in the preceding paragraphs, and at least 
until a new approach to cumulative progress is provided, I think Laudan 
is right in rejecting it. Some versions of the remaining four are im­
portant for my version of scientific realism, as well as most current 
realist positions. Consequently, Laudan's attacks on them need to be 
considered in some detail.
Hilary Putnam is one of the most prominent supporters of Rl, R2, 
R4, and R5. He claims, for example, that:
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The typical realist argument against Idealism is that it makes 
the success of science a miracle. . . . and the modern positivist 
has to leave it without explanation (the realist charges) that 
'electron calculi' and 'space-time calculi' and 'DM calculi' cor­
rectly predict observable phenomena if, in reality, there are no 
electrons. . . .  If there are such things, then a natural explana­
tion of the success of thes^ theories is that they are partially 
true accounts of how they behave. And a natural account of the way 
in which scientific theories succeed each other . . .  is that a 
partially correct/partially incorrect account of a theoretical ob­
ject . . .  is replaced by a better account of the same object or
objects.54
Following Boyd, and further demarcating the (CER) view that Laudan is 
attacking, he claims that realism, as an empirical, explanatory hypoth­
esis concerning the success of some scientific theories, has two main 
principles.
1. Terms in a mature science typically refer.
2. The laws of a theory belonging to a mature science are typi­
cally approximately true.55
Given Putnam's succinct account of practically all of the theses of
(CER), he can be taken as one of the main targets for Laudan's
criticisms.
As far as the referential status of terms in a mature theory is
concerned, it is the conjunction of this with the claim that realism
'explains' success, that Laudan attacks. He distinguishes four claims 
necessary to make this conjunction work, at least two of which he finds 
objectionable; that a theory whose central terms refer will be success­
ful, and that a successful theory's central terras will refer.First, 
does the success of scientific theories depend in any way on their 
central terms being referential? Laudan claims that this is not gene­
rally the case, on any reasonable account of 'refer', or 'successful'. 
There is, for example, no aether, so theories that postulated an aether 
as a central theoretical term could not have achieved referential success
224
for this term on any reasonable current theory of denotation or refer­
ence.^^ Still, aether theories comprise some of the more successful 
theories of the 19th century (e.g., Maxwell's theory). Similarly, there 
is no phlogiston, no electrical fluid, no caloric, etc., and yet each of 
these were central terms in highly successful theories (relative, of 
course, to certain stages In the development of the relevant sciences). 
Nor does It help to adopt a causal view of denotation (CT), both for 
reasons presented at the end of chapter II, and because It Is not clear 
that 'aether', 'phlogiston', or 'caloric' pick out anything (I.e., the 
problem Is not just that what the theories said about these alleged 
entitles was not quite right). It seems then, that either such theories
were not really successful (a disastrous move historically) or their
58success did not depend on the reference of their central terms.
What of the claim that theories whose central terms refer are 
(thereby) successful? Laudan claims that this too Is not generally the 
case. Most of us, I think, would want to claim that the term 'atom', 
for example, refers. Still, there are many stages In the development of 
the atomic theory when the theories using the term 'atom' were not the 
most successful account of the relevant phenomena at the time. To note 
just a few examples, the ancient atomic theories were by and large 
clearly Inferior to Aristotle's account. Dalton's theory was not clearly 
the most successful chemical theory through all of the 19th century, and 
even Cannizzaro's amended atomic theory and the kinetic theory of gases 
were not, at all stages, clearly more successful than phenomenological 
thermodynamics. Similarly, assuming that the key terms of wave theories 
of light had reference (although on some readings of 'photons', I
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suppose, corpuscular theories could also be said to have referred), they
still remained inferior to Newton's corpuscular theory until at least 
59the 1820's. In any event, there seem to be important historical cases
of theories whose central concepts we would now (probably) claim referred,
that were nonetheless not thereby more successful theories than their
opponents whose central terms did not refer.
If reference and success are not always connected, what becomes
of the realist claim that the success of a theory is best explained by
its (at least 'approximate') truth? This claim, if anything, is the
central tenet of (CER) positions. Furthermore, reference and truth are
connected for most realists, and, consequently, even non-(CER) accounts
of realism would also seem to be in jeopardy if the above objections
hold. As Laudan claims:
It might be said (and Putnam does say this much) that we can 
explain why a theory is successful by assuming that the theory is 
true or approximately true. Since a theory can only be true or 
nearly true (in any sense of those terms open to the realist) if 
its terms genuinely refer, it might be argued that reference gets 
into the act willy-nilly when we explain a theory's success in 
terms of its truth (like) status.60
Rather than helping the realist, however, this linking of reference and 
truth leads, for Laudan, to even greater conceptual historical muddles. 
First, and perhaps least important, there do not seem to be any seman­
tically or epistemically adequate formulations of 'approximate truth'. 
Intuitively, if not formally, there may be some hope for establishing 
such a notion for quantitative theories, where 'approximate truth' might 
well be unpacked in terms of measurable parameters (for example, perhaps 
Newton's theory makes approximately true predictions for medium sized 
objects moving slowly with respect to the speed of light). It is not at
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all clear, however, what kind of notion of 'approximate truth' will
handle cases like electrical fluid, caloric, or phlogiston. It does
seem to be an embarrassment for (CER) accounts that the crucial concept
62of approximate truth has remained an intuitive, promissory note.
Still, this objection need not be considered devastating, since some 
philosophers hope to formulate more adequate accounts of this concept.
The second sort of objection to 'approximate truth', however, 
is devastating. The connection between notions of 'truth' and 'ref­
erence' is, again, the main source of the problem. Laudan certainly 
seems to be correct when he claims that, however 'approximate truth' may 
come to be understood, "a realist would never want to say that a theory
was approximately true if its central theoretical terms failed to 
63refer." Given this, examples of successful, non-referring theories
seem to hamstring (CER) accounts. As Laudan claims, there seems to be
"a plethora of theories which were both successful and non-referential"
64in the history of science. Besides the examples already listed, crys­
talline sphere theories in astronomy, humoral theories in medicine, 
catastrophist geological theories, vital force theories of physiology, 
and theories of circular inertia could also be mentioned, and these 
would by no means exhaust the list.^^ Such theories 'had their day' in 
terms of being successful (on any reasonable account of scientific suc­
cess), and yet had central theoretical terms that failed to refer (on 
any reasonable account of reference). Consequently, they could not be 
considered 'truthlike', if this is interpreted as being either true, or 
approximately true (both being tied to notions of reference). Generally,
In the absence of an argument that greater correspondence at 
the level of unobservable claims is more likely than not to reveal
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itself in greater accuracy at the experimental level, one is obliged 
to say that the realists' hunch that increasing deep-structure fi­
delity must manifest itself pragmatically in the form of heightened 
experimental accuracy has yet to be made cogent.&&
Laudan, then, argues (successfully, I think) that the success of a theory
does not entail either the referential status of the theory's central
theoretical terms, or the theory's 'truthlikeness', and vice versa.
Hence, (CER) forms of realism not only fail to explain the success of
(some) scientific theories, they are not even cogent.
What about the form of realism that I have been developing?
Some of Laudan's objections to (CER) accounts are tangental to diachronic 
realism. It is not important to this form of realism, for example, that 
all successful theories be referential, true, or truthlike, as long as 
the level of virtues achieved by non-truthlike theories does not rival 
that achieved by theories I would claim we should believe. Nor do I 
deny the rationality or (relative) success of phlogiston theory, for 
example, at particular stages in the development of chemistry. I ^  deny 
that the level of virtues achieved by this theory is comparable to that 
(eventually) achieved by oxidation theory, which I would also argue we 
should believe. Oxidation theory, in other words, became modest, gen­
eral, and determinate enough to warrant rational belief, though it did 
not always warrant this belief. Similar claims could (and will) be 
given for atomic theory, etc. Although my intuitive defense of dia­
chronic realism via these three virtues does not allow for a completely 
clear demarcation of truthlike and non-truthlike theories, I will argue 
that it can establish this demarcation for some important cases, and 
may well prove useful for others. Only part of this promissory note 
will be made good in this work, but that, alone, does not present a
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conceptual or historical problem.
I have, however, in the previous chapter, promised to defend 
the intuition that certain levels of success achieved by some theories
are best explained by a (diachronic) realist account. Laudan has pro­
vided several reasons to suspect any realist explanation of scientific 
success, and he succeeds in debunking (CER) versions of this. Part of 
the problem with (CER) accounts is that they are interpreted synchroni­
cally. This problem, at least, is not shared by my version, but other 
problems listed by Laudan concern the very notions of 'approximate 
truth' and 'reference' that seem to be the cornerstones of any realist 
explanation of the success of scientific theories. Consequently, I 
must show that the notion of 'approximate truth' needs to be replaced by 
another notion in view of Laudan's objections, and that this replacement 
is not ad hoc (i.e., not merely engendered by Laudan's objections). 
Luckily, I think that the reformulations I am about to suggest for 
realist explanations of scientific success follow naturally enough from 
diachronic realism as I've presented it, so that they are not merely ad
hoc. Furthermore, I think that they provide the most promising approach
to supporting the central realist claim that the remarkable success of 
at least some scientific theories is best accounted for by their 'truth­
likeness' (a notion which, not surprisingly, will also need to be re­
formulated) . These arguments will therefore conclude my conceptual de­
fense of diachronic realism, and the following section will attempt to 
show that it can be easily applied to two important historical cases.
First, a perspective is necessary for evaluating past theories 
in terms of whether or not they achieved a sufficient level of the three
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virtues to warrant rational belief. This perspective must tread a fine 
line between two unacceptable extremes. On the one hand, one must be 
careful about 'going native', and trying to evaluate the virtues of 
theories completely from the perspective dominant at the time. Trying 
to go native (besides being difficult, if not impossible) can quickly 
lead to the epistemic quandary of alternative or competing conceptual 
schemes. Realism, after all, is committed to some theories being well 
enough confirmed to warrant belief in these theories' truth. While what 
would warrant rational belief may change historically (though many of 
the examples I've already used should make even this assertion question­
able), truth, of course, does not. Aristotle, for example, was undoubt­
edly justified, given the evidence available to him, in asserting the 
truth of many of his cosmological beliefs. Rationality notwithstanding, 
however, the earth is not stationary at the center of the universe, and 
such assertions must now be considered to be false. Like historical 
knowledge claims, considerations pertaining to historical realism must 
be decided from our perspective. If this represents a degree of cultural 
chauvinism, it is also a necessary bulwark against serious epistemic 
mischief.
On the other hand, pushing this chauvinism too far (if it is 
chauvinism), would result in a shamelessly 'whiggish' interpretation of 
historical cases (i.e., theories are 'good', 'rational', 'scientific', 
'successful', etc. only in so far as they foreshadowed our clearly 
'good', 'rational', 'successful', 'scientific' theories). As I stated 
earlier, if philosophy of science is to be about science, (completely) 
reinterpreting historical cases is as damaging in the content direction
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as going native is in the conceptual direction. In short, the chauvin­
ism necessary for epistemic reasons needs to be 'benign', in the sense 
that the historical data, if not our final epistemic judgments concerning 
this data, need to be as historically accurate as possible. We do not 
want to rewrite history, but we reserve the right to reevaluate the 
strength of the evidence then available for a theory in light of its 
subsequent development. Whether scientists were then warranted in be­
lieving the theory is a different question from whether we should be­
lieve it given current evidence. Benign chauvinism then, is the neces­
sary perspective to take in interpreting the success of historical theo­
ries. If we are to try to keep both our epistemic and our historical 
consciences unblemished, then it follows (as I've already argued) that 
nonmethodological considerations that may have played a role in histori­
cal cases of theory choice must be neither ignored on the one hand, nor 
overemphasized on the other. In short, my position that methodological 
considerations play the predominant role in such cases of theory choice 
needs to be supported with historical, as well as conceptual evidence. 
Furthermore, if our chauvinism is to remain benign, then as far as pos­
sible, this historical evidence must be gleaned from the cases them­
selves, rather than imported after the fact. I've already attempted to 
partially justify my claim for the predominance of methodological factors 
in the last chapter by showing the agreement in a variety of cases over 
which virtues were important. I will further defend this claim in the 
following two sections by considering two historical cases in some 
detail.
If benign chauvinism is the best epistemic attitude to adopt
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towards the success of historical scientific theories, a perspective is 
also needed to account for this success by means of diachronic realism 
without falling into the problems Laudan has established for (CER) 
views. Specifically, while it is a general realist intuition that the 
best explanation for the success of at least some theories is that they 
were somehow 'truthlike', none of the more common ways to unpack this 
'truthlikeness' seem to work. It seems, for example, that no notion of 
'truth' open to the realist can do without the central terms in a theory 
referring. Yet, as Laudan has argued, many past successful theories 
fail to meet this criterion. Apparently, then, no available notion of 
'truth' (or even 'approximate truth') can explain their success. If 
this common realist desideratum is to be realized, then, some new account 
of 'truthlikeness' will be necessary.
Such a new perspective is available, I think, and, in fact, 
more or less follows from the account of diachronic realism I've de­
veloped. Remember, for example, that it is not a commitment of dia­
chronic realism that all successful theories are true, or even that all 
successful theories warrant rational belief. Rather, some theories 
have achieved a sufficient level of virtues to warrant such belief, and 
cases of theory choice most often favor the theory that has achieved the 
highest level of these virtues, whether or not this level is sufficient, 
from the perspective of benign chauvinism, to warrant belief. What dia­
chronic realism needs to explain is how some past scientific theories 
have achieved rather high levels of these virtues while not being true.
In the early stages of a theory's development, of course, being success­
ful does not require a very high level of virtues, so that even though
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the 'better' theory at the time was better because of these virtues, the 
most appropriate epistemic attitude towards it would be something less 
than belief (for example, acceptance as empirically adequate, or as a 
fruitful model, etc.). Still, when a theory is as successful as Newton's 
or as Bohr's model of the atom, or even as Franklin's theory of electri­
city, it becomes necessary to explain this higher level of theoretical 
virtues. After all, if a theory can achieve a high level of these vir­
tues without being true or approximately true, realist arguments based 
on these virtues seem bankrupt (why should our confidence be high con­
cerning 20th-century atomism, if past highly successful theories were 
false?).
From the perspective of diachronic realism, an account of the 
high level of virtues attained by some past theories should be developed 
along the following lines. First, a sufficient level of virtues should 
warrant belief in a particular theory at a given time with respect to 
the available evidence, competitors, etc. Hence, like past knowledge 
claims, a diachronic realist should be prepared to assign the status of 
'warranting belief at the time' to some (not all) past theories, even 
though current evidence leads us to no longer assent to them. Given 
benign chauvinism, such a decision on our part is independent of whether 
these theories were actually believed at the time. This can be made 
clearer if we leave aside belief temporarily, and restrict our attention 
to a theory's being 'better' at the time. From the perspective of dia­
chronic realism, this judgment of a theory's being better is also decided 
by means of the virtues. Consequently, as I've argued, Copernicus' 
theory was more modest, more general, and more determinate than Ptolemy's
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at the time it was proposed, and was, therefore, an objectively better 
theory. This judgment is not affected by the fact that most contempo­
raries did not share this judgment and had legitimate reasons for not 
believing that the earth moves. Constitutive components are not the 
only components involved in theory choice, but if my arguments in the 
last chapter are sound, they are the most important epistemic components.
More importantly, diachronic realism should try to account for 
the high level of virtues attained by some past theories in terms of 
their 'truthlikeness'. This need not mean, however, that these theories 
were true, or approximately true, or that their central theoretical 
terms successfully referred. Rather, their truthlikeness can be estab­
lished by reference to current theories, that we have reason to believe 
are true. A past theory with a high level of virtues can be said to be 
truthlike if the reason it attained such a high level of virtues (re­
gardless of the referential status or approximate truth of its central 
terms) is because it 'tapped into' central components of later, more 
accurate theories whose central terms ^  have referential status, and 
are true or approximately true. 'Tapped into' is, of course, a vague 
notion. This is partially because there are a number of different ways 
in which a former theory can achieve truthlikeness with respect to later 
theories. Sometimes they can be said to be truthlike, for example, be­
cause their theoretical accounts, while not true, can be easily amended 
to agree with later accounts (i.e., they are readily 'translatable' into 
true or approximately true theoretical accounts). Sometimes we can 
claim that a past theory achieved truthlikeness because, though not 
translatable into true theoretical accounts, it succeeded in connecting
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phenomena that are connected. It is largely because of the connection 
it made between various forms of combustion, for example, that phlogis­
ton theory was as successful as it was. Sometimes a past theory can be 
said to have achieved truthlikeness because it directly led to true 
accounts, not merely in the sense that later theories developed from it, 
but in the sense that its theoretical account was struggling with con­
cepts that later were reformulated by true accounts. While there are 
no electrical fluids, for example, Franklin's strange, inconsistent 
treatment of them transcended the mechanical models predominant in the 
18th century, and directly foreshadowed the notion of an electrical 
field. In all of these cases, it was because the past theories got 
something right (or nearly right) that they were as successful as they 
were. When this success reaches a certain high level, the theory can 
be said to have been on the right track. I am proposing, in other 
words, that the 'truthlikeness' of at least some successful theories is 
not so much due to their particular theoretical accounts, as it is due 
to the research tradition began or continued by them being directly re­
lated to a later theory that can be claimed to have sufficient virtues 
to warrant rational belief. If this account is to prove promising, it 
at least needs to be shown that such a perspective enables us to sepa­
rate some theories that were on the right track, from other (successful) 
theories that were not, with respect to the virtues I've delineated.
Thus I want to argue that the remarkable success of early 20th- 
century atomism gives us reason to believe that there are atoms. While 
the quantum theory renders all of the early models of atoms wrong, this 
does not affect (what I take to be) the fact that there are sub-
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microscopic entities that combine in certain ways with other sub- 
microscopic entities to account for the chemical phenomena they were 
originally postulated to explain. Whether or not their construction 
consists of particles or probabilistic wave packets, does not affect 
the evidence for the existence of a relatively stable unit that is the 
smallest amount of a substance that combines with units of other sub­
stances. If this is right, then Dalton's atomic theory was on the right 
track, not because atoms are very much like he claimed, but because the 
tradition of chemical atomism directly resulted in the highly successful 
atomic theories of the early 20th century. Put another way, it is be­
cause (and in so far as ) Dalton's theory shares important aspects of 
these more adequate theories that it successfully accounted for the law 
of multiple proportions by weight, the law of constant composition for 
chemical compounds, the law of the conservation of mass, etc. Simi­
larly, it is because static electricity actually behaves in a manner 
closer to Franklin's postulation than to Nollet's that Franklin's theory 
gave such a better account of the Leyden Jar, etc. As was stated ear­
lier, one of the major problems in spelling out (CER) accounts is mis­
placing the 'truthlikeness' of past successful theories. The realist 
intuition that being related to truth explains (certain levels of) 
success, can be rescued from Laudan's attacks, I maintain, by shifting 
the 'bearers' of truthlikeness to theories that can be argued to be 
true (or, on some yet to be specified account of the term, 'approximately 
true') via the concepts of 'benign chauvinism' and 'being on the right 
track'.
An enterprise such as this would, of course, be historically
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doomed if success were categorically connected to being on the right 
track, or theory choice was confined to constitutive components like 
the virtues I've listed. As for the latter. I've consistently main­
tained that diachronic realism is not committed to constitutive compo­
nents being the sole factors involved in theory choice, but only to 
their playing a dominant epistemic role. The historical cases I've 
already presented and will subsequently present should at least par­
tially justify this claim. The former claim has also been repeatedly 
denied by my account. Theories are successful. I've argued, in so far 
as they satisfy scientific virtues, but not all levels of success via 
virtues warrant rational belief. Hence, phlogiston theory can be suc­
cessful without being on the right track, and Franklin's theory can be 
on the right track without warranting belief; and being successful, be­
ing on the right track, and warranting rational belief are all decided 
by relative levels of the virtues I've delineated. That is, being 
modest, general, and determinate is what makes a theory successful and, 
given my arguments in the previous chapter, a theory is not likely to 
achieve all of these virtues unless it is at least partially right about 
something. Hence, achieving the virtues is best explained by a theory's 
being truthlike (right about something), and having a high level of the 
virtues warrants rational belief in the theory, or at least the theory's 
being on the right track. Furthermore, I will maintain that such an 
account is not ^  hoc (tacked onto diachronic realism in order to save 
it from Laudan's objections), but that it is the type of account that 
one would expect given my earlier arguments. Warranted belief is not 
the correct epistemic attitude toward all theories at all times, but the
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most important epistemic considerations (belief, acceptance, or what­
ever) are all based on the scientific virtues. Benign chauvinism and 
being on the right track reflect the notions that I've argued for 
throughout this work.
Given the view I've maintained, one should not expect that 
levels of virtues can at this stage be quantified, formalized, or to­
tally demarcated. The entire approach to diachronic realism that I've 
been maintaining remains at the intuitive level, on the assumption (again) 
that general convergence of intuitions must precede more detailed anal­
ysis. Still, as I noted above, for the present account to be shown to 
be even on the right track, means of at least roughly distinguishing 
levels of virtues must be provided. At this point, a brief account 
using historical examples must suffice. Consider, for example, three 
cases that I believe intuitively represent three different levels of 
virtues: phlogiston theory, which was successful but not on the right
track; Franklin's electrical theory, which was on the right track but 
did not achieve a sufficient level of virtues to warrant belief; and 
early 20th-century atomism, which achieved a sufficient level of virtues 
to warrant rational belief.
What does it mean to claim that phlogiston theory was 'success­
ful', given that it was neither on the right track nor is there such a 
thing as phlogiston? William Whewell accounted for the success and im­
portance of the phlogiston theory in the following way.
The phlogiston theory was deposed and succeeded by the theory 
of oxygen. But this circumstance must not lead us to overlook the 
really sound and permanent part of the opinions which the founders 
of the phlogiston theory taught. They brought together, as pro­
cesses of the same kind, a number of changes which at first appeared
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to have nothing in common; as acidification, combustion, respira­
tion. Now this classification is true, and its importance remains 
undiminished, whatever are the explanations which we adopt of the 
processes themselves. . . .^ ^
In other words, the phlogiston theory was sufficiently general to be 
the most successful theory of calcination and combustion yet proposed.
It linked diverse phenomena that have few obvious connections and did 
so in a relatively modest manner. Furthermore, while the theory was 
wrong, the phenomena it connected really are connected, and the successor 
theory continued to connect them. Still, the basic postulate of some­
thing being lost during combustion and calcination was wrong enough to 
prevent this theory from developing much further. The problems involved 
in trying to rescue the theory by means of negative weight or identify­
ing phlogiston with hydrogen, for example, while not inherently irra­
tional or unscientific, became sufficient to render the theory non­
progressive (although, labeling such moves as ad hoc at the time, would 
be an example of unbenign chauvinism). Hence, in spite of its initial 
admirable success (in terms of the virtues), phlogiston theory was not 
on the right track, since it ultimately cannot be translated into later 
theories that we are warranted in believing, nor did it directly lead to 
true theoretical accounts. Unlike Franklin's theory, phlogiston theory 
was not struggling with new concepts that were later to be reformulated 
by better accounts, but instead remained committed to a (nonexistent) 
substance being released by combustion. Lavoisier's oxygen theory, on 
the other hand, while at the time not obviously superior, did directly 
lead to truer accounts (again, despite the non-existence of caloric, 
etc.) and so was on the right track.
Franklin's theory of electricity was also successful in the
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same sense as phlogiston theory (it was more general, for example, than 
its competitors). Unlike phlogiston theory, however, it was also on the 
right track because some of its crucial concepts did directly lead to 
current views (as will be shown in the next section). Still, even at 
the time, it did not warrant rational belief in electrical fluid, and 
especially in electrical atmospheres, because of the serious anomaly of 
accounting for the mutual repulsion of two negatively charged bodies. 
This is not to claim that a theory cannot be rationally believed .just 
because there are some recalcitrant phenomena, since this may well be 
true of any theory. Rather, in this case, the phenomena in question had 
been previously explained, and, even though the Leyden Jar phenomena 
transcended this data, both in generality and in eventual importance, it 
remained important phenomena for electrical theory. Since it had been 
explained, and was still considered to be important, its recalcitrance 
bothered Franklin,and from our perspective, it should have. Hence, 
while successful and on the right track, Franklin's theory encountered 
sufficient difficulties to render its level of virtues insufficient to 
warrant belief.
Finally, by about 1911, most scientists were convinced of the 
existence of atoms. The doubts of the 1830's and 40's due primarily to 
still insufficient chemical formulae and the failure to distinguish be­
tween atoms and molecules, were largely nullified by the work of 
Cannizzarro and Mendeleev as well as by the initial success of the 
kinetic theory of gases. The remaining doubts were handled in the 
early 20th century by the recognition that atoms had internal struc­
tures, and experimentally by the work of Jean Perrin.Regardless of
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the problems later confronting the early models of the structured atom 
at the sub-atomic level, I do not believe that these problems create 
serious reasons for doubting the existence of atoms, however structured. 
Unlike both of the earlier examples, the level of virtues achieved by 
the atomic theory at this time rendered it not only successful and on 
the right track, but also sufficient to warrant rational belief. Con­
sequently, the analysis via virtues that I have been developing is cap­
able of demarcating different epistemic attitudes appropriate towards 
some important historical theories, in spite of the fact that this de­
marcation is still intuitive. Phlogiston theory was successful because 
of its level of virtues (and truthlikeness), but not on the right track; 
Franklin's theory was on the right track but did not warrant rational 
belief; and early 20th-century atomism warranted rational belief in 
atoms.
If the above account seems intuitively sound, then diachronic 
realism can account for the realist intuition that the 'truthlikeness' 
of some theories explains their level of success without falling prey 
to Laudan's objections to (CER) accounts. This account can be clarified 
a bit more by comparing my treatment of 'truthlikeness' with a recent 
defense of (CER) views against Laudan's a t t a c k . I  argued above that 
one of the problems Laudan finds with the notion of 'approximate truth' 
is that it is too imprecise, lacking both a semantics and an epistemology. 
At the time I argued that this was a problem, but also claimed that it 
was not devastating, given the possibility that some adequate treatment 
of approximate truth may be forthcoming. Hardin and Rosenberg also 
claim that from Laudan's attack on the lack of precision of 'approximate
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truth', it does not follow that (CER) intuitions are not correct.
This conclusion does not follow; it is like saying the asser­
tion that we lack, or, for a long time, did lack an adequate anal­
ysis of the central terms in the claim that there are other minds, 
implies that the claim that there are other minds was or is unin­
telligible. The non sequitur does not minimize the importance of 
the problems in expounding realism that Laudan puts before us, but 
it does put them in perspective. Like the thesis of other minds, 
scientific realism is intuitively plausible and widely embraced, 
but is very difficult to state perspicuously.7%
So far, then, my account is in agreement with Hardin's and Rosenberg's. 
They begin to differ when they each consider Laudan's insistence that 
the realist must associate truth and approximate truth with the refer­
ence of the central terms in a theory.
I, of course, agreed with Laudan, and saved the 'truthlikeness' 
of some past theories by shifting considerations of truthlikeness to 
theories that ^  warrant rational belief (benign chauvinism and being 
on the right track). Hardin and Rosenberg, instead, deny that reference 
is necessary for truth or at least, approximate truth. There need not, 
for example, be anything like a gene for Mendel's theory to be regarded 
as 'approximately true'.
Mendelian genetics is still represented as an approximately 
true theory, even though its central theoretical terms can, on this 
account, plausibly be said not to refer. The causal role Mendel 
accorded to genes is parceled out to other entities. In brief, 
this is done by showing that the diverse units of genetic func­
tions— of mutation, of replication, of expression— work together 
often enough to give a false impression of unity and to yield an 
approximately true set of predictions about the distribution and 
transmission of paradigmatically heritable properties, which Mendel 
mistakenly took to be phenotypes. The units of function, the 
'muton', 'recon', 'cistron' do not add up to the gene.73
I would agree with all of this except with attributing approximate truth
to Mendel's theory. Mendel's theory was, on my account, on the right
track, and therefore truthlike. Still, I don't think it follows, or is
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even plausible, that his admittedly non-referring theory was approxi­
mately true. An "approximately true set of predictions," after all, 
does not constitute the approximate truth of a theory.
I think this case is particularly striking because Hardin and 
Rosenberg, in another passage, come very close to interpreting 'approx­
imate truth' as 'being on the right track'.
Mendel's 1866 theory, embodying its laws of segregation and 
assortment, clearly constitutes the first in a sequence of succes­
sive theories which are held by life scientists to constitute a 
series converging on the truth. Mendel's theory is often credited 
with approximate truth and still taught because of its simplicity, 
and the ease with which it can be complicated in the direction of 
presumably more accurate and more complete genetic theories, theo­
ries more nearly approximate to the truth. Yet it may plausibly 
be reported by a realist that there is nothing like genes, or 
phenotypes, as Mendel or his Immediate successors construed them.'
I would again hardily agree with this line of reasoning except the part 
attributing approximate truth to Mendel's theory. Newer theories, if 
sufficiently virtuous to warrant rational belief, may be construed as 
true or approximately true, but this, I think, entails that their cen­
tral terms ^  refer (or at least partially (?) r e f e r ) . I n  other words, 
like Laudan and most philosophers working on semantics, I balk at calling 
anything true or approximately true whose key terms aren't referential. 
'Truthlikeness', on the other hand, in the sense of being right about 
something, or eventually converging in a theory that ^  true, is quite 
different in that it (on ray reading) shifts truth bearers without giving 
up the explanatory role truth is held to play concerning some successful 
theories. Consequently, I share many of Hardin's and Rosenberg's in­
tuitions, but feel that a new perspective is necessary to specify what 
is 'truthlike' in earlier, highly successful but false, theories. I 
claim that a promising way to begin constructing a new perspective is
243
in terms of diachronic realism, benign chauvinism, and being on the 
right track. Virtually any level of success with respect to the scien­
tific virtues I've delineated requires that the theory in question be 
right about something. When the level of success becomes high the 
theory can be said to be on the right track. Truthlikeness, then, ex­
plains the success of past theories, and some theories become success­
ful enough to eventually converge in a theory that is true or approxi­
mately true. These latter can be said to be on the right track. Still, 
since their central terms do not refer, or their theoretical accounts 
are not correct, they should not themselves be claimed to be true or 
even approximately true.
So far in this chapter I have attempted to defend diachronic 
realism against some important conceptual-historical objections. I have 
argued that some of these objections do not affect diachronic realism 
(even if they hold for other realist accounts), and that others can be 
answered from my perspective. If I have been successful in this, I 
would now claim that diachronic realism is neither logically nor his­
torically bankrupt (it is neither historically implausible, nor refut­
able without consulting the historical record). I have also attempted 
to cash a promissory note I issued in the last chapter concerning dia­
chronic realism’s ability to account for the realist intuition that 
theoretical success is best explained by a theory's relation to truth.
To accomplish this, I have tried to answer Laudan's objections to (CER) 
views by introducing the notions of 'benign chauvinism' and 'being on 
the right track' to account for a theory's 'truthlikeness' even though 
it cannot be said to be true or approximately true. It is now time to
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consider whether such a position can provide a satisfactory account of 
some important historical cases.
Historical Cases; Atomic Theory
It is often remarked that Dalton's atomic theory, following 
upon Lavoisier's work, helped to establish chemistry as a quantitative 
physical science. As with most such generalizations, there is both an 
element of truth, and an oversimplification contained in this assertion. 
Although it is often claimed, for example, that Lavoisier's 'chemical 
revolution' was a victory of quantitative chemistry over chemical 'phi­
losophy' (measurements, as opposed to vague chemical 'principles', etc.), 
the background of quantitative chemistry extends at least back to the 
pneumatic chemists (including the phlogiston theorists) that Lavoisier 
supplanted. As was argued earlier, Priestley's work, for example, was 
also concerned with measurements and experimental verification, to the 
extent that ^  the time it would not be appropriate to consider 
Lavoisier's experiment on the red calx of mercury 'crucial'. Further­
more, many of the techniques and apparatus' used to isolate 'factitious' 
gases were in existence prior to Lavoisier's work, and, consequently, 
gases with distinct properties had already been isolated. What true 
in the above claim is that, in Dalton's theory, a particularly fruitful 
perspective was introduced that did rapidly lead to increased quantifi­
cation and accuracy.
For one thing, though the mechanical corpuscular philosophy 
had been prevalent since the 17th century 'scientific revolution', a 
chemically fruitful conception of these corpuscles had not been estab­
lished by the beginnings of the 19th century.Consider, for example.
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Newton's claim concerning the existence of particles in "Query 31" of 
his Optics.
It seems probable to me, that God, in the Beginning form'd 
Matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles, of 
such Sizes and Figures, and with such other Properties and in such 
Proportion to Space, as most conduced to the End for which He'd 
form'd them; and that these primitive Particles being Solids, are 
incomparably harder than any porous Bodies compounded of them; . . . 
And therefore, that Nature may be lasting, the Changes of corporeal 
Things are to be placed only in the various Separations and new 
Associations and Motions of these permanent Particles; compound 
Bodies being apt to break, not in the midst of solid Particles, but 
where those Particles laid together, and only touch in a few 
Points.77
What was lacking in this account and in its immediate successors as far 
as a chemist was concerned, was a way to tie in such physical explana­
tions to actual chemical experience. Neither chemistry nor physics were
78yet advanced enough to establish such a union. What is the nature of 
this union?
Dalton, like many other innovators in the history of science, 
came to chemistry with principles gleaned from work in another disci­
pline, in his case, meteorology. He had long been concerned with the 
composition of the atmosphere, especially with respect to the nature of 
the combination of the four main gases which constituted it. The pro­
portion of these gases in the atmosphere was more or less constant, 
whether the sample was taken from mountain tops, valleys, etc. Why did 
the four gases, whose relative weights by volume were different, not 
instead form layers, with the heaviest on the bottom and the lightest 
on top? The fact that they did not could be explained, according to 
Dalton, by assuming that each gas was composed of indivisible particles 
that were neither attracted nor repulsed by particles of the other gases. 
If this were the case, these unlike particles could be thoroughly mixed
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in the atmosphere, so that each gas could retain its own density 
(whether 'mixed' or not). Consequently, since the densities of the 
various gases remained independent of their mixture, adding up to the 
total density of atmospheric air, the different densities of the var­
ious gases would not result in the layers that might otherwise be ex­
pected. Hence, Dalton proposed the 'law of partual pressures' in 1801,
79which provided the conceptual background for his atomic theory.
At the same time, an eight year controversy was brewing between
Berthollet and Proust over whether the proportion by weight of combining
chemical substances was constant, or whether the composition of a given
80compound could vary. Berthollet favored the hypothesis of varying
composition, and supported this by results he had gained by studying
various chemical solutions, alloys, glasses, and metallic oxides, as
81well as numerous (incorrect) analyses reported by others. Especially
since some of the metals he studied formed several oxides (e.g., lead
forms oxides that range in color from gray through shades of yellow, to
red), he felt that "the change in composition was continuous rather 
82than intermittent." Proust, on the other hand, believed that the 
composition of chemical compounds was constant, and between 1802-1808 
exchanged amiable correspondence with Berthollet in the Journal de 
Physique. Given his deft experiments conducted in his excellent lab 
in Madrid, Proust was gradually able to show that Berthollet's results 
were sometimes due to confusing mixtures with actual chemical compounds 
and otherwise due to faulty apparatus and incomplete analyses. He 
showed, for example, that there were two oxides of tin, each with a 
fixed proportion of tin and oxygen. Berthollet's results favoring
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intermediate percentages were again, based on his analysis of impure
83
mixtures. Eventually, due primarily to Proust's work, the 'law of 
constant composition' was accepted by most chemists. As is often the 
case, a measure of serendipity entered into this exchange, since at 
this level of the development of quantitative chemistry, had they anal­
yzed different compounds (berthollides) the results would have supported 
84
Berthollet.
What Proust's results did was to help establish generality for 
Dalton's fledgling chemical atomic theory. At this point, the hypoth­
esis of chemical change being due to the 'reshuffling' of indivisible 
atomic particles provided a modest account of Dalton's own law of par­
tial pressures, Lavoissier's law of the conservation of mass (not dis­
covered, but employed by Lavoisier), and the newly established constant 
composition by weight of chemical compounds. Furthermore, unlike the 
earlier corpuscular philosophy, and especially unlike ancient specula­
tive atomism, there was reason to hope for determinateness regarding 
Dalton's theory, since weight had been singled out in all of the above 
laws as a 'crucial quantity'. Consequently, when Dalton shifted his 
attention to chemical composition in general, his fledgling theory was 
already modest, general, and (potentially) determinate enough to warrant 
some confidence in its eventual success (not, of course, virtuous enough 
to yet warrant belief).
Given this brief background, Dalton's 'discovery' of the law of 
multiple proportions involved the mixture of experimental fact and theo­
retical insight that we have come to expect in important episodes in the 
history of science. He already was in possession of a promising
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(virtuous) theory, so that his experimental results, clumsy as they 
were,®^ were already organized, and consequently 'fit' into his theo­
retical expectations. As was claimed in the last section, the numbers 
did not (and never do) speak for themselves. Still, the combination of 
data covered renders 'changes in world view' interpretations too ex­
treme to adequately interpret the historical data. While someone with­
out the organizational power of the appropriate theory would not neces­
sarily see such a fit, the confidence that Dalton and others had at this 
point in his theory was still more methodological (via the virtues) than 
metaphysical. The absence of single, synchronic, crucial experiments 
does not, as shown above, jeopardize the hope for the primacy of con­
stitutive components in theory choice.
Part of Dalton's experimental work that led to the law of mul­
tiple proportions (sometimes 'multiple ratios') was stated as follows.
If 100 measures of common air be put to 36 of pure nitrous gas 
. . . , after a few minutes the whole will be reduced to 79 or 80 
measures, and exhibit no signs of either oxygenous or nitrous gas.
If 100 measures of common air be admitted to 72 of nitrous gas . . . 
there will, as before, be found 79 or 80 measures of pure azotic gas 
(nitrogen) for a residium. If, in the last experiment, less than 72 
measures of nitrous gas be used, there will be a residium containing 
oxygenous gas; if more, then some residiary nitrous gas will be 
found. These facts clearly point out the theory of the process: 
the elements of oxygen may combine with a certain proportion of 
nitrous gas, or with twice that portion, but with no intermediate 
quantity. In the former case nitric acid is the result, in the lat­
ter nitrous acid; but as both these may be formed at the same time, 
one part of the oxygen going to one of nitrous gas, and another to 
two, the quantity of nitrous gas absorbed should be variable; from 
36 to 72%, for common a i r . 87
Similarly, he found that in carburretted hydrogen obtained from stagnant
water, 4.3 measures of carbon combined with 2 of hydrogen, while in
olefiant gas (ethylene), 4.3 measures of carbon combined with 1 of hy- 
88drogen. As Freund points out, "Obviously, the numbers expected by
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89theory, and not the experimental results, are given." The law of
multiple proportions was further publicized in 1807 by its inclusion,
along with Dalton's atomic theory, in Thomas Thomson's System of Chem- 
90istry. Together with the three regularities already mentioned, this 
law increased the generality and experimental power of Dalton's theory, 
and became fairly widely disseminated. All of this took place at a 
time when most chemists were increasingly concentrating on the quanti­
tative aspects of chemical phenomena. Hence, the initial success (for 
methodological reasons) of Dalton's theory, at least as a promissory 
note.
Dalton's original atomic theory, presented in his New System
of Chemical Philosophy (1808-1810), contained the following postulates.
Chemical elements were made up of small, indivisible atoms, which were
alike in terms of their mass and properties for the same element, but
different from those of other elements. Chemical combinations between
two or more elements are formed by the atoms of these elements joining
into a firm union with one another in definite proportions by weight.
These 'combinations' of atoms were also called 'atoms' by Dalton,
91leading to fifty years of confusion within atomic theory. In order
to determine the relative weights of constituent atoms in a compound
atom, since these clearly could not be directly measured, Dalton rea- 
92soned as follows. Suppose, for example, the chemical compound in 
question is a binary one, composed of elements A and B, whose atoms 
weigh a and b respectively. If one individual (compound) atom of AB is 
formed by the combination of m atoms of A with n atoms of B, then the 
actual weights of the two elements combining with one another in one
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compound atom will be ma of A and nb of B. The crucial quantities to 
be determined then, are the ratios a:b and m:n. Since the ratios of 
quantities which form one atom of the compound will be the same as those 
ratios which form any number of compound atoms, they can be determined 
by the experimentally ascertained ratio in which A and B are present in 
AB (call this experimental ratio 'p:q'). It follows then that the ac­
tual relative weights of the constituent atoms of the compound can be 
expressed by the equation 'ma:nb=p:q'.
Unfortunately, since m:n and a;b are unknown, this equation 
cannot be solved as it stands. One can measure the relative proportion 
by weight of a large number of atoms of A combining with a large number 
of atoms of B to give the compound AB. This, however, will not provide 
the actual relative weights of the constituent atoms without some value 
for the number of atoms of each chemical element that enter into the 
combination. Analogously, if one wished to determine the relative 
weights of individual uniform concrete and asphalt tiles contained in a 
stretch of road, it is not sufficient to determine the total proportion 
of the weight of each. Without knowing how many tiles are asphalt and 
how many are concrete, the relative weights of the individual tiles are 
ind et ermina t e.
To return to the chemical problem if one had values for the 
number of individual atoms of each element combining (represented by 
accurate chemical formulae), and a value for the total proportion by 
weight (given experimentally), one could then determine the relative 
weight of individual atoms of the two elements. Or, if one had values 
for the relative weights of individual atoms of the two elements, and a
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value for their total proportion by weight, one could determine the 
accurate chemical formula for the compound. Since one has neither the 
weight of individual atoms, nor the number of atoms of each element com­
bining, one cannot proceed to make the atomic hypothesis more determi-
93nate without some added assumptions. Since the determinateness of
these quantities was of prime importance for the atomic hypothesis, this
became the fundamental problem confronting both proponents and opponents
94of 19th century atomism. As will be shown, this agreement concerning 
the importance of the determinateness of these quantities within atomic 
theory by both atomists and anti-atomists, is yet another reason to re­
gard constitutive components as primary in cases of theory choice, and 
to discount the 'alternate world views', non-cumulative, 'gestalt 
switch' claims of Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others.
Given the indeterminateness of some of the crucial quantities 
implied by the atomic theory and the impossibility of directly deter­
mining either the individual weights of constituent atoms or correct 
chemical formulae, two options were open to proponents of the theory.
One option would have been to make assumptions concerning the number of 
atoms of each element contained in equal volumes of the gas in question. 
This was soon proposed by Avogadro and Ampère, but, as we shall see, was 
rejected by Dalton because of some of the assumptions in his original 
theory. The other option was to make assumptions regarding the relevant 
chemical formulae for these compounds. This was the option adopted by 
Dalton and most other chemists until the I860's. Dalton attempted to 
make the chemical formulae more determinate by using what he called the 
'Rule of Greatest Simplicity' (RGS). This rule is explained by Dalton
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in the following manner.
If there are two bodies, A and B, which are disposed to com­
bine, the following is the order in which the combinations may take 
place, beginning with the most simple, namely:
1 atom of A and 1 atom of B = 1 atom of C, binary.
1 atom of A and 2 atoms of B = 1 atom of D, ternary.
2 atoms of A and 1 atom of B = 1 atom of E, ternary.
1 atom of A and 3 atoms of B = 1 atom of F, quaternary.
3 atoms of A and 1 atom of B = 1 atom of G, quaternary, etc.
The following general rules may be adopted as guides in all our 
investigations respecting chemical synthesis.
First, When only one combination of two bodies can be obtained, 
it must be presumed to be a binary one, unless some cause appear to 
the contrary.
Second, When two combinations are observed, they must be pre­
sumed to be a binary and a ternary.
Third, When three combinations are obtained, we may expect one 
to be a binary, and the other two ternary. ( e t c . ) 9 5
In other words, if only one chemical compound is known having hydrogen 
and oxygen as constituents, assume that the chemical formula is 
(so that one constituent atom of oxygen combines with one constituent 
atom of hydrogen to form one compound atom of water, binary, etc.), and 
since the total proportion by weight of the two elements is 7:1 (one of 
the values used) in favor of oxygen, the relative weight of single oxy­
gen and hydrogen atoms is also 7:1. Similarly, if carbon and hydrogen 
form at least two compounds, assume that one is binary ('CH', olefiant
gas) and the other ternary ('CHg', carburretted hydrogen), and determine
97the relative weights of carbon and hydrogen atoms accordingly, etc.
While such a procedure indeed results in definite relative 
weights of individual constituent atoms, it certainly does not render 
these weights determinate. As Freund claims:
The arbitrariness of these rules is self evident. Why, if we 
know one compound only, should this be the binary one? Another may 
be discovered any day, and why should nature be so complacent, in 
the quite accidental sequence of discovery, as to always put us into 
the way of the binary compound first? Why any of these rules? No
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attempt is made to place them in connection with observed facts, 
and criteria are lacking for testing the validity of any one of 
them. Moreover they are not only arbitrary, but also insufficient 
and vague. What for instance is to constitute 'a cause to the 
contrary'
Hence, there were few methodological reasons for adopting (RGS), and 
the 'pseudo-determinateness' gained for the crucial quantities of the 
atomic theory seemed to many chemists at the time (as it does now) quite 
arbitrary. Before these quantities could really be made determinate, a 
convergence of measuring techniques would be necessary, and assumptions 
concerning correct chemical formulae and the relative weights of indi­
vidual atoms needed to be bolstered by independent (usually using the 
99bootstrap strategy) techniques. This was to take at least several 
more decades of quantitative and theoretical work in chemistry, incor­
porating results from apparently diverse and unrelated fields of chemi­
cal study. Still, even at the time, while not being virtuous enough to 
warrant belief (from our perspective), Dalton's theory was quite success­
ful in accounting for the original data he was concerned with. Further­
more, the crucial quantities postulated by his theory remained the 
fundamental problems in chemical theory throughout the 19th century, for 
both opponents and proponents of the atomic theory.
Independent studies conducted at the same time on the propor­
tion by volume of elements entering into chemical compounds could have 
added further generality (and determinateness) to Dalton's atomic theory. 
In fact, this potential support was ambiguously interpreted by many 
chemists, and Dalton himself refused to accept the experimental results 
on which it was based. These studies were conducted primarily by Joseph 
Louis Gay-Lussac, and were published in the Mémoires de la Société
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d'Arcveil, II, (1809). Together with Humboldt, he attempted to devise 
an accurate means of measuring the oxygen content of the atmosphere, and 
then generalized this technique for other gaseous s u b s t a n c e s . T h e  
technique used involved passing a spark through mixed gases in a eudi­
ometer and measuring the resulting shrinkage of the air. Gay-Lussac 
found that the combining ratios by volume of hydrogen and oxygen, for 
example, were very close to 2:1. Similarly, experiments on other gases 
indicated (within the limit of then acceptable experimental error^^^) a 
constant proportion of combination by volumes of elemental gases entering 
into chemical compounds. These results could have supported Dalton's 
theory, both because the atomic hypothesis could have provided a modest 
explanation of these results, and because such a technique would have 
helped to determine atomic formulae (at least for gaseous substances), 
but Dalton never accepted them.
There are several reasons why Dalton could not bring himself 
to accept Gay-Lussac's results, all stemming from assumptions within his 
own theory. For one thing, his earliest formulation of the atomic hy­
pothesis to account for the 'mixing' of the components of the atmosphere 
led him to conclude that the atoms of different substances had different 
diameters, each atom surrounded by a specific amount of caloric, and
each being in contact with its neighbors (hence the 'mixing', much like
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shaking a bag of differently sized marbles). Consequently, the 
seemingly natural assumption that equal volumes of gases contain equal 
numbers of atoms, which would have included Gay-Lussac's law of combining 
volumes within the range of data covered by atomic theory, seemed impos­
sible to Dalton. Furthermore, how, on the assumption that atoms are
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indivisible (together with the failure to distinguish individual atoms 
of an elementary substance and stable molecules composed of these 
atoms), is it possible for two atoms of hydrogen to combine with one of 
oxygen to produce two compound atoms of water (as would be necessary if 
Gay-Lussac's ratios were interpreted atomistically)?
It is evident the number of ultimate particles or molecules in 
a given weight or volume of one gas is not the same as in another; 
for, if equal measures of azotic and oxygenous gases were mixed, 
and could be instantly united chemically, they would form nearly 
two measures of nitrous gas, having the same weight as the two 
original measures; but the number of ultimate particles could at 
most be one half of that before the u n i o n . 1^3
Using Dalton's symbolism, and Gay-Lussac's measured proportions, the 
combination of oxygen and hydrogen to form water would look like this:
' ® ® 0 o' ('2H+0 2H0'); a flat contradiction if each of the sym­
bols represents a single atom, and atoms are indivisible. Finally, and 
most ludicrously (given Dalton the theorist and sloppy experimenter, and
Gay-Lussac the careful experimenter and reluctant theorist), he ques-
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tioned Gay-Lussac's experimental results themselves.
The only way that the early atomic theory could account for 
Gay-Lussac's results was by postulating that equal volumes of gases con­
tain equal numbers of atoms. Given the above objections to such a view 
from the perspective of Dalton's theory, this option did not seem open 
to atomic theorists. Of course, these objections are of unequal impor­
tance. Dalton's law of partial pressures, for example, does not entail 
the static, 'mixed bag of marbles' view that he adopted to account for 
the mixing of gases in the atmosphere. Hence, one of his main reasons 
for rejecting equal numbers of atoms in equal volumes of gases was not 
only wrong, it was not independently supported. Asserting distances
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between individual atoms and molecules, and attractive and repulsive 
forces between them (instead of the purely mechanical 'pushing' analogy 
via envelopes of caloric), would have made the equal volumes-equal num­
ber of atoms view more acceptable from Dalton's perspective. As will 
be seen again later, non-mathematical, strictly mechanical perspectives 
often inhibited the development of more determinate theories. Simi­
larly, Dalton's rejection of Gay-Lussac's measurements was eventually 
bound to backfire, given Gay-Lussac's care and Dalton's sloppiness.
Hence, the increasing evidence for accepting Gay-Lussac's results hurt 
Dalton's theory instead of helping it, since the controversy itself made 
other chemists somewhat leary.
Finally, the objection that Gay-Lussac's law entailed splitting 
atoms, while seemingly conclusive, rested on the contemporary ambiguity 
in the use of the term 'atom'. If a distinction had been consistently 
made between the smallest unit of an element that can enter into chemi­
cal combination with other elements (atom), and the smallest stable unit 
of this element found in isolation (molecule), Gay-Lussac's results 
could easily have been covered by the atomic theory, without sacrificing 
the indivisibility of atoms. Such a distinction was made in 1811 by 
Avogadro in the Journal de Physique, and although a few chemists used it 
from time to time in the interim (e.g., Dumas), it received little at­
tention until forty years later. Avogadro's original paper distin­
guished between three types of molecules, 'molecule integrants' standing 
for molecules in general, 'molecule constituante' referring to indivi­
dual molecules of elementary gases, and 'molecule elementaire' referring 
to individual atoms of e l e m e n t s . I n  other words, the smallest
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naturally occurring units of elements might themselves be composed of 
more than one atom of the element. So that the contradiction implied 
in ' © + 0 ->■ ® o' ( ' 2H+0 2H0') could be handled by assuming that oxy­
gen (' 0 ') and hydrogen ('® ') naturally occurred as diatomic molecules 
of two atoms— ' © 0  + 8 ‘*’© 0 O  ' ('ZHg+Og -*■ 2H20').^^^
Had this addendum to Dalton's theory been acceptable to Dalton 
and other chemists, it would have, of course, extended the generality 
of the atomic theory. As Avogadro claimed :
It will have been in general remarked on reading this Memoir 
that there are many points of agreement between our special results 
and those of Dalton . . . This agreement is an argument in favor of 
our hypothesis which is at bottom merely Dalton's system furnished 
with a new means of precision from the connection we have found be­
tween it and the general fact established by M. G a y -L u ssa c .1^7
It was, however, not accepted, partly because it seemed at the time ad 
hoc, arbitrary, with little independent experimental support to recom­
mend it. Also, it seemed tangental to the main problem then accepted 
by atomic chemists, means for determining relative atomic weights, in­
stead of relative molecular weights. Furthermore, since the number of 
gaseous and gasifiable substances was then relatively small, Avogadro's 
hypothesis a^ the time had a rather limited applicability, insufficient
to sway chemists who were impressed by, or suspicious of, Dalton's 
108theory. Finally, since Dalton's (RGS) was arbitrary, many chemists 
developed their own methods of determining workable chemical formulae, 
the mere proliferation of which worried other chemists and directed at­
tention away from Avogadro's potentially fruitful approach. In short, 
many of the reasons for rejecting Avogadro's hypothesis (not all) sound 
like architechtonic and explicative reasons (the problems it addressed 
seemed at the time tangental to 'paradigmatic' problems, a general
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distrust of chemical hypotheses not firmly supported by experiments, 
etc.). Still, this is an oversimplification. There were also what 
appeared at the time to be good methodological (constitutive) reasons 
for pursuing alternative approaches.
Central among these reasons is a problem that wasn’t adequately 
handled until the atom itself was taken to be structured. How could 
like atoms attract one another and form stable chemical bonds? Such a 
view would, for one thing, undermine Dalton's explanation of the law of 
partial pressures and the observed 'mixed' composition of atmospheric 
air. Worse, after 1811 an increasing number of chemists began to use 
recent work in electrochemistry, and it was generally accepted by elec­
tricians and chemists that like charges repel one another. Consequently, 
if atoms are the smallest chemical units, and if they could be (reason­
ably) taken to be the bearers of 'plus' and 'minus' charges, then two
or more atoms of the same element should certainly not unite into a 
109stable bond. This is one of the reasons, for example, that Berzelius 
took what would otherwise look like such a strange view concerning Gay- 
Lussac's law. He rejected Avogadro largely because of his 'dualistic 
theory', involving many of the electrical problems mentioned above.
On the other hand, he partly accepted Gay-Lussac's law as a way of 
helping to derive chemical formulae, holding that equal volumes of 
elemental gases contained equal numbers of atoms, but not that equal 
volumes of compound gases did.^^^ He also thought that chemical com­
pounds exhibiting similar properties should also have similar chemical
112
formulae ('isomerism').
What resulted was several different estimations of tables of
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atomic weights, so that instead of converging, potentially independent 
ways of determining atomic weights pulled chemists in different direc­
tions. Berzelius, for example, utilized something like Dalton's (RGS), 
chemical intuition, a primitive formulation of isomerism, and a modi­
fied version of Gay-Lussac's law of constant composition by volume to 
help determine chemical formulae. Due to the relative paucity of expe­
rimental results available at the time, and some tension between these 
and other methods, Berzelius constructed different tables in 1814, 1818,
and 1826. Furthermore, Thomson, Dalton, and Berzelius, using different
113methods, obtained different chemical formulae for many substances.
The formula for water, for example, was characterized as 'HO' 
(using modern symbolism, introduced by Berzelius) by Dalton and Thomson, 
and 'HgO' by Berzelius, Davy and W o l l a s t o n . T h i s  and other discrep­
ancies (all concerning the determinateness of the relevant crucial quan­
tities), led many chemists to lose confidence in the fruitfulness of 
the atomic theory, so that, by 1813-1815, Berthollet, Bostock and 
Wollaston retreated to what they took to be the theory-neutral empirical 
concept— 'chemical equivalents'standing for the fact that a certain 
quantity of one substance 'neutralized' the same weight of another. 
Consequently, while some of the early criticisms of the atomic theory 
(including the disaffections of some previous atomists) may have been 
due to general philosophical perspectives like favoring phenomenological 
descriptions over 'hypotheses', straightforward methodological problems 
regarding the crucial quantities in atomic theory both fueled this in- 
ductivist tendency where it was already present, and provided indepen­
dent reasons for having second thoughts about the fruitfulness of the
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theory. Also, as I’ve already repeatedly stressed, the ensuing dis­
agreements were not primarily concerned with which virtues were rele­
vant in accepting or rejecting atomic theory, nor over what these vir­
tues mean, but rather over whether or not the theory achieved a suffi­
cient level of these to justify faith that it would eventually overcome 
these problems (whether or not the ’promissory note’ of making the quan­
tities determinate would be cashable).
In 1826, J. B. A. Dumas, in an attempt to use a new procedure 
that he hoped would render chemical formulae and relative atomic weights 
more determinate, instead obtained results that not only made this new 
procedure seem questionable, but greatly extended the growing scepticism 
regarding the atomic t h e o r y . D u m a s  developed a procedure for deter­
mining the vapor densities of solid and liquid (at normal temperatures 
and pressures) substances. His basic procedure was to heat the sub­
stance in a glass bulb within a bath of water, for example, to a high 
enough temperature to vaporize it. When the substance vaporized, the 
neck of the glass bulb was sealed off with a torch, so that its temper­
ature and pressure could be measured. When the bulb was cooled, the 
vaporized substance would condense and could be weighed, while the 
volume of the bulb was measurable in terms of the quantity of water it 
could hold.^^^ This procedure should have greatly extended the deter­
minateness of the crucial quantities we’ve been discussing, since only 
a few substances known at the time occurred naturally in the gaseous 
state. Furthermore, Dumas, at that time, favored atomism and was one 
of the few chemists who accepted Avogadro’s hypothesis (which he attri­
buted to Ampère). Using the idea that equal volumes of a gaseous
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substance contained equal number of atoms, his procedure of measuring 
vapor densities should have provided yet another method for determining 
relative atomic weights, and for substances previously inaccessible.
His anomalous results, therefore, not only further weakened chemists' 
confidence in Avogadro's hypothesis, but, more generally, led to even 
more disaffection with the atomic theory.
The main problem was not Dumas' new procedure, but, once again, 
(in spite of his appreciation of Avogadro/Ampère), an ambiguous treat­
ment of atoms and molecules. The vapor density method is valid for de­
termining molecular weights of elements, but not directly for their 
atomic weights. Consequently, the atomic weights and chemical formulae 
suggested by Dumas' work (revised and extended by Mitscherlich) were 
often in direct conflict with those established by Berzelius' via chem­
ical analogy. His value for sulphur, for example, was three times that 
allotted to it by Berzelius, while his value for mercury was one half
that of Berzelius, and his value for phosphorus (and Mitscherlich's for
118arsenic) was twice that of Berzelius, etc. As Freund points out, 
such apparently anomalous results could hardly fail to add fuel to anti- 
atomist sentiments.
Hence a gallant attempt to rescue Avogadro's hypothesis was 
unsuccessful, and indeed led to contradictions calculated to bring 
discredit on the course advocated; and it is no wonder that con­
sidering the complex and involved nature of Berzelius' arguments 
in choosing the values for atomic weights, and the failure of 
Dumas' attempt 'to replace the arbitrary data by definite concep­
tions', the desire to do without any such hypothetical quantities 
should in many quarters have been s t r o n g .
So far then, Dalton's atomic theory, while undoubtedly initially suc­
cessful (virtuous), was also failing over a period of time to make its 
crucial quantities more determinate, and to exploit the increased
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generality it would have enjoyed had it been formulated in such a way 
as to be compatible with Gay-Lussac's, Avogadro's, and Dumas' results. 
While it would still be rational to accept it, given its initial suc­
cess (and, it was still the most modest way to explain the law of mul­
tiple proportions, etc.), it was also rational, given the above appar­
ently anomalous results, to suspend belief. In other words, compatable 
with diachronic realism, there was a rather lengthy period in the early- 
mid 19th century when Dalton's theory, while on the right track, was not 
(given all the available evidence), virtuous enough to subdue anti­
realist objections.
What was needed was a classification of the concepts of 'atom' 
and 'molecule', and theoretical-empirical advances in several branches 
of chemistry (e.g., organic chemistry), to render the crucial quantities 
of relative atomic weights and chemical formulae more determinate. Be­
sides the apparently anomalous results already discussed, other appar­
ently disparate data such as electro-chemical results, crystallography, 
etc., eventually converged within a reformulation of atomic theory. In 
the 1840's and 50's, for example, Gerhardt and Laurent helped consoli­
date chemical formulae within organic chemistry, by concentrating more 
accurately on chemical analogy, and obtained results compatible with
many of the above methods, and also used a clearer distinction between
120atoms and molecules. Another approach that could have been used to 
make the relevant quantities more determinate was (especially Faraday's) 
work in electrolysis. Though Faraday himself preferred 'equivalents' to 
the 'hypothesis' of atoms, his electrolysis experiments potentially pro­
vided yet another independent method for determining the proportion by
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weight of elements separated from compounds by electrical means (and, 
hence, chemical formulae).
A very valuable use of electro-chemical equivalents will be to 
decide, in cases of doubt, what is the true chemical equivalent or 
definite proportional, or atomic number of a body; for I have such 
conviction that the power which governs electro decomposition and 
ordinary chemical attractions is the same; and such confidence in 
the overruling influence of those natural laws which render the 
former definite, as to feel no hesitation in believing that the 
latter must submit to them a l s o . 121
Faraday, however, failed to pursue this any further, and Berzelius
122failed to extend it because of his distrust of Faraday's laws. While 
Faraday's laws and empirical results eventually proved to be useful for 
chemistry, the theory of the electrical combination of chemical elements 
had to await the structured atom of 20th century physics.
Within chemistry, most of the above anomalies were satisfac­
torily handled in 1858, with the publication of Cannizzarro's "Sketch
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of a Course of Chemical Philosophy." Though widely distributed after 
the Karlsruhe Congress of 1860, the importance of this work was not 
appreciated by many chemists for some time. By now, the anti-atomist- 
anti-hypothesis sentiment was strong enough to keep many chemists from 
recognizing what might have earlier been seen to have solved most of 
the anomalies plagueing the atomic theory since at least 1815. Using 
both the progress made in several branches of chemistry since Dumas' 
Leçons, and (finally) a clear distinction between atoms and molecules, 
Cannizzarro was in a good position to bring the previous anomalies into 
a unified perspective.
I believe that the progress of science made in these last years 
has confirmed the hypothesis of Avogadro, of Ampère, and of Dumas on 
the similar constitution of substances in the gaseous state; that is, 
that equal volumes of these substances, whether simple or compound.
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contain an equal number of molecules: not however an equal number
of atoms, since the molecules of the different substances, or those 
of the same substance in its different states, may contain a dif­
ferent number of atoms, whether of the same or of diverse n a t u r e .^^4
Returning to Dumas' and later chemists' work on vapor densities, 
Cannizzaro argues that the molecular weights of substances are propor­
tional to their density in the gaseous state. Taking half of a molecule 
of hydrogen as unity, and referring the densities of other gaseous sub­
stances to a molecule of hydrogen (=2), he obtained a set of molecular 
weights consistent with chemical facts.
By comparing the data gained by using this assumption, relative 
atomic weights of a substance can be calculated by comparing the propor­
tional molecular weights of "all or the greater part of the molecules in
125which it is contained, and their composition." The weight of one vol­
ume of hydrochloric acid, for example, is 36.5 (taking 1/2 volume of 
hydrogen as unity), consisting of a weight of 35.5 of Chlorine, and 1 of 
hydrogen. One volume of water weighs 18, consisting of a weight of 16 
for oxygen, and 2 for hydrogen. One volume of ammonia has a weight of
17, consisting of a weight of 14 for nitrogen, and 3 for hydrogen,
126etc. From these results, consisting of many more chemical compounds
than were available in the 30's, Cannizzaro reasoned that "the different
quantities of the same element contained in different molecules are all
whole multiples of one and the same quantity, which always being entire,
127
has the right to be called an atom." Consequently, a hydrogen mole­
cule can be said to consist of two hydrogen atoms, hydrochloric acid 
contains one hydrogen atom, water contains two, ammonia three, etc.
Also, for Cannizzaro, this indirect determination of atomic weights from 
molecular weights is not hypothetical. Since, if anyone were to compare
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the composition of equal volumes of substances in the gaseous state, "he
will not be able to escape the following law: the various quantities of
the same element contained in equal volumes either of the free element
or of its compounds are all whole multiples of one and the same quan- 
128tity." Furthermore, this assumption can be independently tested by 
multiplying the atomic weights calculated as above by the specific heats 
of the substances involved (the amount of heat required to raise the 
temperature of the substance one degree). The resulting product turns 
out to be very nearly a constant (if the atomic weight value is cor- 
rect).12*
Finally, an indirect method is also available for determining 
the relative atomic weights of substances whose vapor densities cannot 
be determined. The constitution of the bromides, chlorides, and iodides 
of potassium, sodium, and silver, for example, could not be determined 
directly, because the vapor densities of these compounds was not known. 
However, by analogy with the protochloride of mercury (HgCl), and of 
copper (CuCl), and the specific heats of these free metals, one can as­
sume that one atom of sodium, etc., combines with one atom of the rele-
130
vant halogen in these compounds as well. Combining results using 
vapor densities, specific heats, and chemical analogy, then, Cannizzaro 
was able to make a wide range of chemical formulae and relative atomic 
weights determinable, on a revised version of Dalton's atomic theory 
linked (finally) with Avogadro's hypothesis.
Cannizzaro succeeded, then, in establishing procedures for 
determining relative atomic weights that was no longer arbitrary— i.e., 
for some chemical compounds it was now possible to check the results of
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one method against those of others and obtain consistent results. Com­
putations based on molecular weights taking 1/2 hydrogen molecule as 
unity, for example, could sometimes be independently checked using spe­
cific heat values, etc. Consequently, most of the previous anomalies 
concerning different atomic weight tables could now be resolved. Had 
this occurred earlier, it may certainly have quelled many of the anti-
atomist objections concerning the determinateness of the crucial quan-
131titles assumed by the atomic theory. At the time, however, the
atomic-molecular theory of gases was being extended into the physical
study of heat and energy by the development of the kinetic theory of
gases. On the one hand, this extension greatly enhanced the generality
of the atomic theory, and many physicists and chemists saw this as good
132
evidence for the molecular (if not the atomic) theory of gases. On
the other hand, this extension of range also led to new empirical and
conceptual problems. What, for example, happened to the heat energy
absorbed by the molecules? If this absorbed energy was completely
handled by the translation of the molecule, how could these molecules be
133'halved', as Cannizzaro claimed? Also, later spectroscopic studies
indicated the necessity for a complex, structured atom, as opposed to
the indivisible ultimate particles that had been assumed by all atomists 
134since antiquity. There were attempts to handle these objections with
135vibratory atoms, etc., but these problems as well as the problem of 
the electrical bonding of atoms could not be fully handled until the 
structured atom. Furthermore, phenomenological thermodynamics was soon 
to offer a serious competitor to the molecular theory of heat, which also 
led to new anti-atomist objections.
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By the early 20th century, all of these objections could fi­
nally be met by an atomic theory that had given up the notion of indi­
visible atoms. Furthermore, the determinateness of the crucial quanti­
ties was established by the actual measurement of the actual (as opposed
to relative) mass of atoms and their constituents, as well as Perrin's
2.36experimental work on Brownian motion. As I claimed earlier, at this 
point, the atomic theory became modest, general, and determinate enough 
to warrant rational belief, in spite of the subsequent problems involving 
the nature of sub-atomic entities. I have also tried to show in the 
above account, that all of the meanderings of the atomic theory through­
out the 19th century were primarily due to constitutive components in­
volving the determinateness of the crucial quantities involved. It was 
primarily the proliferation and interpretations of experimental results
that led chemists and physicists to their realist or anti-realist views 
137concerning atoms. If this is so, not only do extreme non-cumulative
interpretations fail, but so do synchronic interpretations of realist/
anti-realist debates. What evidence was or would be relevant was not
138very controversial throughout this period. Whether the atomic theory 
had at various stages of its development sufficiently satisfied these 
evidential demands was controversial, at least until the early 20th 
century. This is exactly what should be expected if my treatment of 
diachronic realism is correct, and if my realist arguments for the sci­
entific virtues were convincing, I can now claim that by the early 20th 
century, atomic theory was virtuous enough to warrant rational belief. 
Hence, Dalton's atomic theory, while not itself sufficiently virtuous to 
warrant belief, (from our perspective), was on the right track in that
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the success it did enjoy was due to the parts of Dalton's account that 
match or nearly match those of 20th century atomism.
The development of the atomic theory has received a great deal 
of attention by both historians and philosophers of science. Further­
more, Gardner has interpreted this development in a similar manner to 
diachronic realism, and Glyraour has interpreted it in a manner which 
agrees with my contention that there was pronounced agreement concerning 
relevant evidence on the part of both proponents and opponents of the 
atomic theory, and that it progressively became better tested. The main 
innovations in my treatment of this case involve stressing methodological 
factors more than Gardner, and realist factors more than Glymour (dia- 
chronically interpreted), as well as my interpretation of Dalton's theory 
being on the right track. Atomic theory, however, is, in Putnam's and 
Laudan's terminology, a 'mature' theory, whose central theoretical terms 
may be said to have referred (via the causal theory of denotation), and 
which, therefore, may be open to a revised (CER) account. Consequently, 
while diachronic realism can be supported by the case of atomic theory, 
an older, less quantified theory might provide a better elucidation of 
being on the right track, and demonstrate how my interpretation of the 
'success' of some past theories can be best explained by diachronic re­
alism, and is more general and more adequate than any (CER) account.
Franklin's theory of static electricity provides a case that 
does not seem accessible to a notion of approximate truth (since it was 
not only non-quant itat ive, but many of its central theoretical terms 
failed to refer, unlike 'atom'). Still, it was, on any reasonable ac­
count of the term, 'successful' enough to provide a good test case for
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my claim that some levels of success are best explainable by the 'truth- 
likeness’ of the theory, in terms of being on the right track. Conse­
quently, I will now provide a brief account of the formulation and de­
velopment of Franklin's theory as the final historical evidence for my 
version of diachronic realism.
Historical Cases: Franklin's Theory
of Static Electricity
Franklin began his investigations of electricity in the mid 18th
century as (is often the case) somewhat of an outsider, having become
acquainted with only some of the previous European discoveries, and very
139little of the predominant contemporary electrical theories. Hence, 
the researches of the Philadelphia electricians contained some inadver­
tent repetitions of previous experiments, but with a new theoretical 
framework which contained the germ of a fresh approach that was to prove 
very fruitful for the subsequent development of electrical science. The 
most prevalent theories of electricity at the time were in England, 
those of Watson and Wilson, and in France, that of Nollet. All were var­
ious forms of 'effluvial' theories of electricity, and all, as will be 
shown, encountered serious difficulties with the discovery of the Leyden 
Jar. It is quite possible that Franklin's superior theory of the phenom­
ena of the Leyden Jar was to a certain extent due to the fresh theoreti­
cal start the Philadelphia electricians were forced to make. Before 
describing Franklin's new approach, it will be worthwhile to briefly 
review the effluvial theories that were his chief competitors.
After the very general effluvial explanations of electrical phe-
140nomena towards the end of the 17th century, the first important
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further developments were the experiments of Francis Hauksbee at the 
beginning of the 18th century. He was the first electrician, for exam­
ple, to clearly recognize electrical repulsion as a genuine electrical
141phenomenon, and to support this with fairly well designed experiments.
By a more careful observation of the motions of small pieces of leaf
brass in the proximity of a rubbed tube of glass, he noticed that:
Sometimes the Bodies Attracted would adhere to the Tube, and 
there remained quiet. Sometimes would be thrown violently from it 
to good Distances: Sometimes in their Motions towards, and some­
times even touching it, they would suddenly be Repell’d back to a 
distance of 4 or 5 Inches, repeating the same several times with 
great Velocity in a very surprising m a n n e r . 1 ^ 2
The violence of the bodies thrown off indicated that this phenomenon was
not simply a case of their falling, but rather illustrated a real repul-
143sive force that increased their velocity.
Further experiments led to what would prove to be an even more 
important discovery, concerning what we would now call the direction of 
the electric field around an electrified glass globe. In one experi­
ment, a wire hoop with loose threads attached to it was held over a glass 
cylinder or sphere so that the threads hung about an inch from the glass. 
When the glass was electrified, the threads all pointed radially in­
wards towards the g l a s s . H o w e v e r ,  if one's finger (or another ob­
ject) was interposed between the glass and the threads, the threads lose 
this characteristic, but return to their original radial extension when 
the object is removed. Apparently, the 'effluvia' could not penetrate 
solid objects. If the threads were attached in the center of a hollow 
glass hemisphere, the threads again arranged themselves radially if the 
glass was rubbed. Again, when a finger was brought near, the threads 
lost this characteristic, "despite the fact that there was now a layer
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of glass between finger and thread.Apparently, then, the effluvia 
could penetrate at least one solid object— glass. Further experiments 
seemed to indicate that glass was unique in this regard (even a thin 
piece of paper, or muslin, for example, would prevent the passage of the 
effluvia).
Despite the apparent transparency of glass, however, the fact 
that interposing material objects interrupted the effluvial flow pro­
vided one of Hauksbee's reasons for asserting the physical reality of 
the effluvia. Why else, for example, would it be interrupted by the 
interposition of a barrier? Furthermore, it could be felt upon one's
face if a rubbed tube was held near, or seen and heard when a glass tube
146were rubbed in the dark. Finally, the effluvia seemed to move in 
straight lines towards the glass, on both the hoop-thread experiment and 
the brass leaves experiment. This was to pose a problem for the earlier, 
general effluvial theories that viewed the effluvia as emanating because 
of friction exerted by rubbing. Boyle, for example, likened it to the 
emanation of smell produced by rubbing a stick of sulfur. At first 
Hauksbee too used such an account to explain the transparency of glass 
to the effluvia.
The Effluvia which are provok'd from the glass seem to be, and 
are nothing else but part of the same Body exerted from it by rub­
bing; therefore (I think) can be no Impediment to the Motion of its 
own Effluvia, . . .14?
Then, however, he discovered that rubbed sealing wax could also influence 
threads or pieces of leaf brass through glass. How then could the efflu­
via of sealing wax penetrate glass? Only, on this analogy, if the parts 
of sealing wax and glass are "much alike."
Within two years, however, Hauksbee seems to have changed his mind
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about the nature of effluvia. Now instead of the 'stiff body' analogy 
utilized so far, he takes the effluvia to be more like a 'subtle fluid'. 
Still, however, some type of matter is emitted from the glass because of 
the rubbing, which remains the crux of the effluvium t h e o r y . T h e  
fluid image seems to have originated because of Hauksbee's view that air 
was necessary for electrical effects, and that the electrical effluvia 
(and the heat of the friction caused by rubbing) caused changes in the 
density of the air around and inside the glass tubes, which needed to be 
equalized.
If the Electrical Matter be emitted in Physical Lines, every 
where diverging from the Center of that Circle in which the Attri­
tion is made . . . towards the Circumference of the same Circle; 
then by the Rarefaction of the Medium contiguous to the Glass, and 
the necessary Pressure of the more remote and dense Medium, into 
the Plane of that same Circle, with directions contrary to those in 
which the Effluvia are emitted : by this means (I say) the Threads 
may be regularly directed to the Center of that Circle, in whose 
Plane the Hoop to which they are fix'd is plac'd.1^9
That is, while electrical matter moves out of the tube, air moves in, 
accounting for the hoop-thread experiment, and small bodies being car­
ried by the air towards a rubbed tube. This account handled a fair 
amount of the electrical phenomena known at the time, and its relative 
success may account for Hauksbee's not specifying how he handled Boyle's 
results that electrical effects could be created in a vacuum. Still, 
Hauksbee's experiments and theoretical accounts were the most general 
thus far, and were not really expanded upon or challenged for 20 years, 
until the work of Stephen Gray and Charles-Francois De Cisternal Dufay. 
Even then and later, the effluvial theories which preceded Franklin all 
shared aspects of Hauksbee's account, and the direct mechanical action 
of the effluvia, the transparency of glass to the effluvia, and the idea
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that the density of the surrounding medium accounted for electrical ef­
fects, remained cornerstones of the Effluvial theories.
Gray's experiments are noted chiefly because their results drew 
attention to electrical conduction, or the transmission of 'electrick 
vertue' through bodies— most of which we would now ascribe to electro­
static induction.Prior to this, most effluviasts were convinced 
that the emanated effluvia must return to the parent body (e.g., the 
rubbed glass), and some used this as an explanation of attraction.
After all, if the effluvia did not return, there should eventually be a 
marked diminishing of the mass of the parent body^^^ (interestingly, 
Franklin used similar reasoning to discount Newton's corpuscular theory 
of light— the sun's mass should therefore diminish, etc.). Gray's expe­
riments, on the other hand, showed that the effluvia need not return, by 
demonstrating that it could pass from one body to another, sometimes by
contact, and sometimes by merely bringing a rubbed object close to
152another body (if it was a 'conductor'). His experiments led to the
view that all bodies were either conductors or nonconductors, though he
neither expressed this as a general law, nor used the terminology of 
conductor and nonconductor. He like Gay-Lussac, was much more of an 
experimenter than a theorist, and retained the vague notion of the trans­
mission of the effluvia. In one striking experiment that attracted much 
attention, a small child was suspended by silk threads above (insulated) 
containers of small objects and then a rubbed glass tube was made to ap­
proach the child. The small objects were thereby made to dance back and 
forth between the child's face and hands and the containers, a spectacu­
lar instance of communication already demonstrated in a milder way with
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153rubbed glass, cork and a feather, as well as with other objects. He 
also showed (following Boyle, and against Hauksbee) that the attractive 
virtue was communicated in vacuo, as well as by the air. The results of 
his experiments were to prove increasingly troublesome for the effluvia 
approach. The communicated effluvia, for example, could be conducted 
through threads and (with difficulty) through air, but not at all through 
silk, glass, or resin, while the earlier experiments seemed to indicate 
that the effluvia could penetrate glass but not muslin, etc. Though 
this discrepancy did not yet cause mischief, such phenomena were even­
tually to prove embarrassing for the effluvia theory.
Dufay's work on electricity began by verifying and expanding 
Gray's work on conduction. More importantly, Dufay's experiments led 
him to propose that there were two electricities, 'vitreous' and 'res­
inous' (later corresponding more or less to 'plus' and 'minus' electri­
fication), the first exemplified by rubbed glass, the second by rubbed 
amber, though these did not correspond, for Dufay, to two distinct sub- 
stances^^^ (though later it would sometimes be interpreted in this way). 
Dufay also made the important discovery that bodies with different 
'electricities' attracted one another, while like bodies repelled each 
other. Though also primarily an experimenter in the manner of Gray,
Dufay did allow himself some tentative opinions as to the cause(s) of 
electrical phenomena. He apparently believed that bodies emanate elec­
trical matter when approached by, for example, a rubbed glass tube, and 
that this electrical matter is retained around the body by envelopes or 
'atmospheres', though he did not speculate concerning the nature of 
these atmospheres. Also, he made some use of electrical tourbillons or
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'vortices', without specifying their nature or their precise role in 
producing electrical e f f e c t s . S t i l l , this last (Cartesian) element 
of his effluvial theory was to be picked up in more detail by one of 
Franklin's chief competitors— Nollet.
Hence, while many discoveries were made twenty years after 
Hauksbee's work, electrical theory was still quite rudimentary. Those 
that ventured to speculate at all continued to believe that there were 
many irregularities or 'caprices' contained in the subject. Consequently, 
while sharing the general effluvium research tradition of Boyle, Newton 
and Hauksbee (and in a sense, Descartes), none of these briefly articu­
lated 'mini-theories' could account for all electrical phenomena, though 
each could claim superiority for their account of some phenomena.
Kuhn would call the state of electrical science prior to the 1740's a
'pre-paradigm' stage. In the terminology I've developed, there was so
far an insufficient level of scientific virtues attained by any of these
theories to establish any of them as a really successful theory, or at
least to help choose between minimally successful theories. As we've 
seen, these theories, in so far as they were articulated at all, were 
not precise enough to lead to any clear cut commitments (determinate­
ness) , nor was any formulation general enough to adequately cover all of 
the data being discovered. Hence, at this stage of electrical theory, 
allegiance to effluvia, electrical particles, or whatever, was primarily 
philosophical, based on an allegiance to earlier corpuscular philosophy, 
and Newton's speculations in the "Queries" of his Optics. Methodologi­
cal reasons for faith in a particular approach were as yet too few in 
number, and the theories themselves were too vague to allow the
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constitutive components I've argued are predominant in cases of theory 
choice to come fully into play. This was to happen later, as the var­
ious approaches became articulated enough to obtain clear commitments 
that could be verified or falsified by experiment, and by the level of 
virtues obtained by the theories.
One other factor that needs to be discussed before Franklin's 
chief competitors, is the (relative) popularization of electrical phe­
nomena, caused primarily by the experiments of German electricians, some 
of whose experiments were communicated to Franklin. Bose, for example, 
immediately prior to the 1740's developed a more sophisticated electri­
cal machine for producing electrical effects. Consisting of a bicycle- 
type apparatus which could whirl a glass globe or cylinder at great 
speed for a considerable length of time, and a 'prime conductor' (a 
metal rod suspended by silk, insulating, threads), which could be elec­
trified by the whirling glass much more effectively and powerfully than 
in the older rubbing techniques. With such a machine, Gray's and 
Dufay's experiments could be conducted more quickly, easily, and with 
much more powerful effects, in a more consistent m a n n e r . H e  also
conducted his own experiments, some of which were little more than
158
'party tricks' in the genre of the 'whoopy cushion', but which did
succeed in popularizing (De gustibus non disputandum est) electricity.
Also, one of his particular tricks was a near-predecessor to the Leyden
Jar. Knowing that water could draw sparks from an electrified object,
he conducted an experiment to see if the converse were also true, and
159
succeeded in drawing sparks from an electrified glass of water. Had 
he held the glass while he tried to draw a spark from the prime
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conductor, . . . Again, however, the level of available theory was 
quite low, and was directed by, in Heilbron's terms, "rough, amateurish, 
superficially plausible systems.Consequently, it was not at a 
higher level than the theories discussed in the previous paragraph.
In France, Jean Antoine Nollet, an assistant of Dufay in 1731 
or 1732, developed the first more determinate electrical theory, after 
hearing of Bose's experiments in 1745, and himself constructed a "great 
wheel, fully equipped with globes." Equipped with this means of pro­
ducing more powerful and consistent electrical effects, Nollet soon in­
vented some two dozen new demonstrations, and a new theory to go along 
with them.^^^ First, Nollet affirmed the existence of 'electrical at­
mospheres' surrounding electrified bodies, and maintained that all
bodies contained electrical matter, which can be expelled from them when
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their parts are sufficiently agitated. The expelled electrical mat­
ter takes the form of an 'effluent stream', issuing from certain 'pores' 
of the electrified body in divergent jets, which can be made visible, 
for Nollet, by spreading fine dust on the prime conductor and watching
some of it leap up from the conductor at various points like "so many 
163water jets." Some of the dust, however, remained on the conductor, 
which for Nollet, illustrated the existence of a second 'affluent flow' 
back to the co n d uctor.These 'effluent' and 'affluent' streams of 
electrical matter, together with respectively different 'pores' in the 
body, were the cornerstones of Nollet's s y s t e m , a n d  were articulated 
in such a way as to make his system vastly superior to the one's already 
discussed.
A problem for all previous theories, for example, was that
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objects seemed to first be attracted by an electrified body, then, after 
contact with it, were repulsed (ACR). By varying (besides the direction 
of the two streams) the velocities and spatial arrangements of the 
streams (currents), Nollet was able to provide a plausible explanation 
for (ACR) phenomena.
Consider an electrified body of cylindrical shape surrounded 
by small objects E F G immersed in a moderate flow, well removed 
from the strong divergent effluent currents; nothing impedes the 
’attraction', the drift of these mites towards the excited elec­
tric. When the small body touches or nears the electric, it is 
stimulated to emit its own effluent jets, to which Nollet assignes 
properties similar to those of Hauksbee's stiff effluvia; the 
charging of the small object proceeds like the unfolding of the 
tentacles of an octopus, giving purchase to effluent spurts that 
'repel' or drive it away
Why does a suspended leaf fly to a finger presented to it? Well, since 
the electrical matter 'flows' less readily through air than through (non- 
resinous) denser bodies, the interposed finger decreases the density (so 
to speak) of the affluent flow of the leaf on the side of the finger, and 
hence the increased affluent flow on the far side pushes it towards the 
finger, while the effluent flow issuing from the leaf readily permeated 
the finger (and hence is not repelled from it). This attraction does 
not take place if a wax rod (resinous) replaces the finger, because, be­
ing more resistant to the electrical flow, the consequent added repulsion 
between the leaf and the rod caused by the leaf's effluent flow on the 
side of the finger neutralizes the increased affluent flow on the far 
side (brought about, again, by the interposed object increasing the den­
sity on the other side).^^^ Hauksbee's important hoop-thread experiment 
can be explained in a similar way, again on the assumption that glass is 
transparent to electrical matter (common to all effluviasts).
Nollet's system could apparently handle virtually all of the
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electrical phenomena discovered up to that time (all thought associated 
with (ACR)). Furthermore, its more precise formulation of the nature 
of electrical phenomena (unlike Dufay’s), rendered it more determinate 
(e.g., glass must be penetrable, there must be both effluent and af­
fluent streams of the electrical matter, resinous bodies block the flow 
while non-resinous bodies do not impede it, etc., any of which if shown 
wrong, topples Nollet's system, while Dufay’s vague speculations seem to 
have no particular commitments that could not be amended if the need 
arose). Nollet was also an able experimenter, who traveled throughout 
Europe demonstrating his theory to almost everyone’s satisfaction.
Given this, and the results of his visible demonstration of the streams 
by putting fine dust on the prime conductor, there was good reason (at 
last) to have a certain amount of faith in an electrical theory, given 
the level of available evidence. Before the Leyden Jar, and Franklin’s 
clear formulation of an alternative theory, Nollet’s theory was the 
first that was virtuous enough to be taken as a standard. Thus, again, 
the convergence of opinion regarding the ’success’ of Nollet’s system 
was due to its ’virtuousness’, and between 1745-1752, it enjoyed the 
widest assent yet received by any electrical theory.
William Watson began his systematic study of electricity in 
1745. One of his experiments, which was later adequately explained by 
Franklin, consisted in having two persons stand on wax cakes (insulating 
them), and electrifying one of them. If this electrified person (A), 
touches the other (B), he loses ’almost all of his electricity’, and B 
receives it in one sensible ’snap’. If this is repeated a number of 
times, the ’snapping’ progressively diminishes until it becomes
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insensible when B is 'impregnated with electricity'Another of his 
experiments brought him close to the problem of the penetrability of 
glass by the electric matter. Placing some books atop an inverted wine 
glass containing some leaf brass, he brought a rubbed tube above the 
glass. Eventually, the brass leaves responded to the motion of the 
tube, but not, for Watson, until 'the electricity has fully impregnated 
the books'. Then, after the glass first hinders the flow (so that the 
books can become 'impregnated'), the electric matter eventually per­
meates the glass and the brass leaves respond. Watson, therefore, 
claimed that glass was 'semitransparent' to the electric matter (why?—
he does not say), and that the effluvial flow must attain a certain
170strength before it could penetrate the glass. Once again, these 
types of explanations would later have trouble with accounting for how 
a charged Leyden Jar could retain its charge.
In 1746, Watson presented a 'Sequel' to the Royal Society, 
which supplied his account of the electrical fire, or effluvia. Based 
on the surprise he experienced when an insulated operator failed to pro­
vide more electricity (on the assumption that the electricity originated 
in the rubbed glass, less should 'escape' through the operator if she 
were insulated), he, and others familiar with this effect, began to con­
jecture that the electricity emanated not from the rubbed glass tube, 
but from the operator, and, ultimately, from the ground she stood on, so 
that the tube acted as a kind of 'pump'.^^^ Consequently, Watson came 
to see most electrical phenomena as cases of the electric aether trying 
to restore its equilibrium (similar to Franklin), but in taking the 
'fluid' analogy too literally, he identified this in terms of the
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differing densities of the electrical matter brought about by electrical 
experiments, parallelling Nollet.
The equilibrating aether flow is the agent of attraction and 
repulsion. To save the phenomena, Watson must make the current of 
effluvia run initially in a direction opposite to that demanded by 
the theory. It is to flow towards electrified objects, towards ob­
jects already clothed with atmospheres, from the naked conductors 
about them: 'The blast of electrical aether constantly sets in from
the nearest unexcited non-electrical towards those excited, carries 
with it whatever light objects be in its course'. That is attrac­
tion. On approaching an excited object the light bodies encounter 
the equilibrating aether blast the original theory promised, and are 
repelled.172
On the other hand, like all English electricians, Watson interpreted 
electrical phenomena as the conduction of electrical matter, or a change 
of electrical state, rather than the French model, which interprets elec­
trical phenomena as the propagation of a state, or the stimulation of a 
173flow of effluvia. Hence, despite his density interpretation and ten­
dency towards Nollet's theory, Watson was even closer to Franklin's 
account.
Benjamin Wilson was Watson's chief competitor for the title of 
'chief electrician' in England. Using electrical machines (like Bose's) 
rather than a simple rubbed glass tube, he quickly noticed that in the 
phenomena of sparks passing between a grounded metal plate and a contin­
ually electrified one, the sparks appeared to originate from both plates,
174rather than only from the one which possessed a surplus of effluvia.
From this he inferred that excited and unelectrified bodies differed in 
degree rather than kind (consistent with Watson's 'equilibrium' view), 
but when conducted the experiment of insulating the operator, he ex-
175
pected a diminishing rather than an enhancement of the electrification. 
Wilson postulated that the electrical matter was Newton's gravitational-
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optical aether (from the "Queries" to the Optics), mixed with luminous 
and sulphurous particles. Hence:
The (electrical) machine works by 'vibrating' the aether natu­
rally in or around the hand or cushion; the vibration projects elec­
trical matter onto the glass, which, being an electric substance and 
highly 'elastic' besides, drives it onto the prime conductor, the 
closest object more apt to receive it. The process can continue if 
a reservoir of electrical matter, like the ground, replenishes the 
particles lost by the rubber.
Consequently, if the operator is insulated, little or no electrification 
can occur. Of course, identifying the aether of electricity with gravi­
tational aether seemed absurd on the face of it. Gravitational attrac­
tion, after all, depends on the mass of the attracting objects, while 
electrical phenomena do not, and there seems nothing comparable in gravi­
tational theory to the vitreous and resinous duality. Still, this theory 
too had its (brief) day, but was soon (with the others so far mentioned) 
to experience the 'shock' of the Leyden Jar.
In 1746, Pieter van Musschenbroek, reported a phenomenon to 
Reamur that had been accidentally discovered by Andreas Canaeus, a law­
yer trying to reproduce some of Musschenbroek's experiments, and then 
investigated by h i m s e l f . I f  a wire is linked to a prime conductor of 
an electrical machine and a glass of water, if a person holds the glass 
of water and tries to draw a spark from the machine, she will receive a
violent shock, but only if the same person holds the glass and approaches 
178the machine. How was it possible to put such a fantastic charge into 
a glass of water only if the experimenter held the glass and drew the 
spark? There were now frank reports of puzzlement on all sides, the 
most important probably coming from Nollet. He admitted that the natu­
ral explanation of the large shock received would be to assume that the
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glass somehow retained and built up a charge. On the other hand, like 
all effluviasts, the penetrability of the glass to the electric matter 
played a crucial role in his explanation of many other electrical phe­
nomena. Still, repeated experiments affirmed the paradoxical results 
so that Nollet was forced to treat the jar as an anomaly, not explainable 
by contemporary electrical theory. As Heilbron reports:
The feebleness, imprecision, and incompleteness of the theories 
of Nollet, Winkler and Watson, their failure to explain or even to 
mention characteristic features of the condenser (Leyden Jar), re­
quire no comment. They offered no guidance or stimulation. . . .  A 
new approach was n e e d e d . 1^9
This new approach was to come, from (of all places!) the colony of
Pennsylvania, and the electrical theory of Benjamin Franklin.
In one of his first communications concerning electricity,
Franklin took up the 'men on cake wax' experiment of Watson, with a few
additions of his own, as well as an explanation of the effects, involving
180his new terminology of 'plus' and 'minus' electrification. Again, two 
persons (A and B) are standing on wax, one (A) rubbing the tube and the
other (B) drawing the charge. As long as they do not touch one another,
they will both seem electrified to a third person (C), who is not insu­
lated (i.e., C will exchange a spark with either A or B). If they touch 
one another during the rubbing of the tube, however, they will not appear 
electrified to C. On the other hand, if A and B touch one another after 
the tube is rubbed, there will be a stronger spark between them than be­
tween either of them and C. After this 'discharge', neither of them will
appear electrified to C. Like the English Electricians, this experiment
181
suggested to Franklin that the rubbed glass acts as a 'pump', but
182
unlike them, his interpretation is much more detailed.
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Franklin supposes that there is one 'electrical fire' (later 
called by him 'electrical matter', and then 'electrical fluid'), of 
which all three persons in the above experiment have their equal share.
A (who rubs the glass) communicates some of his share to the glass, and 
since he is insulated by the wax, this cannot be replenished from the 
ground. B (who received the charge) accumulates an extra amount of 
electrical fire, and because he is also insulated, must retain this sur­
plus. Both appear electrified to C, who, standing on the ground, re­
tains his normal share and, hence, communicates some of this to A (whose 
share is deficient), and takes some from B (who has a surplus). The 
spark is greater if A and B approach one another after the glass is 
rubbed because there is more of a difference between A and B than be­
tween either of them and C. If A and B approach while the glass is be­
ing rubbed, on the other hand, the electrical fire merely circulates, 
and the equality is not destroyed, hence, no spark results.
Hence have arisen some new terms among us: we say B, (and
bodies like circumstanced) is electrised positively; A negatively.
Or rather, B is electrised plus; A minus. . . .  To electrise plus 
or minus, no more needs to be known than this, that the parts of
the tube or sphere that are rubbed, do, on the instant of the fric­
tion, attract the electrical fire, and therefore take it from the 
thing rubbing: the same parts immediately, as the friction upon
them ceases, are disposed to give the fire they have received, to 
any body that has less.^®^
Hence, a la the English electricians, the electrical matter can be com­
municated, and loss of equilibrium of this matter results in electrical 
phenomena (at least charging and discharging). Even here, however, 
Franklin takes exception to Watson's interpretation of the direction of 
this communication.^®^ Also, the terminology of 'plus' and 'minus' al­
ready anticipates Franklin's insistence on the conservation of electrical
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charge, crucial to Franklin's theory, and an experimental law that still 
stands.
This concept also provided the 'new approach' necessary for 
understanding the Leyden Jar. Three months after the above letter to 
Collinson, Franklin wrote him another, in which he specifically discusses 
"M. Musschenbroek's wonderful bottle." As the glass is charged by the 
wire leading to the prime conductor it retains this surplus, since glass 
is impermeable to the electrical fire. Since, because of the conserva­
tion law, a surplus of electrical fire in one place requires a surfeit 
in another, the outer coating of the glass gives off equal quantities of 
electrical fire to that being added to the inside via the prime conduc­
tor, through the man holding it and into the ground. The glass can 
therefore accumulate a great difference between 'plus' and 'minus' elec­
trical fire on its inside and outside, until the latter has no more 
electrical fire to communicate. Equilibrium can only be reached (as with 
the experiment with the three persons standing on wax above) if the inner 
and outer coatings can communicate with one another (via the person 
holding the glass and drawing a spark from the wire). Hence, the violent 
shock if the same person holds the glass and tries to draw the spark. 
Also, a spark can only be drawn out of the top, if one can also enter the
outer coating, so that if the glass is placed on an insulator there will
be no spark. Hence, Franklin's concepts of plus and minus electrifica­
tions and the conservation of electric charge, together with the assump­
tion that glass is impenetrable to the electric matter, allows Franklin 
to modestly account for a phenomenon that baffled the leading electri­
cians in Europe. He also produced eleven elegant experiments to support
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this view.^^^
Some historians would argue that it was because Franklin early 
concentrated upon Leyden Jar phenomena, while Nollet and others concen­
trated on (ACR) phenomena, that Franklin's theory constituted a new ap­
proach (note: there is no mention of attraction or repulsion in the
above accounts by Franklin). To a certain extent, this is probably true, 
particularly together with the fact that, being relatively isolated in 
the new world, Franklin was only partially aware of previous theories 
when he began his electrical investigations. It is going too far, how­
ever, to further claim that this resulted in the incommensurability of 
the two approaches, and that Franklin and (for example) Nollet didn't 
even agree on what constituted a successful electrical theory. While 
some non-methodological considerations no doubt played a role in the 
subsequent theoretical arguments, it has already been argued (in the 
last chapter) that Nollet also appealed to experimental facts, and many 
of the later arguments between proponents of Nollet's and Franklin's 
theories revolved around data that their individual theories could best 
explain ((ACR) phenomena for Nollet, Leyden Jar phenomena, and, par­
tially, induction phenomena for Franklin). As will be seen, Franklin 
eventually ran into trouble with (ACR) phenomena, particularly the mu­
tual repulsion of two negatively charged bodies. Hence, the debates 
were primarily over which theory explained the most, and the most im­
portant facts, not over what it means to explain experimental facts, 
nor over the importance of experimental verification. Eventually, I 
want to argue, it was the greater variety of phenomena exhibited by the 
Leyden Jar, and so, explained by Franklin, and the increased determinate-
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ness engendered by his experiments, that led many electricians to side
with him, and not conflicting 'world views'. As Priestley points out:
"Dr. Franklin's new theory of charging the Leyden Jar led him to observe
a greater number of facts, relating both to charging and discharging it,
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than other philosophers had attended to." In other words, from my 
perspective, it was the virtues that I have been arguing for that played 
the dominant role in this case of theory choice, as I've argued they 
have for others.
So far then, Franklin has provided a very modest, general, and 
(as we shall see) relatively determinate account of the Leyden Jar.
Still, 'plus' and 'minus' electrification, the conservation of charge, 
and the impenetrability of glass, however suggestive and nicely docu­
mented, are closer to empirical laws than to a theoretical account of 
189electricity. After more experiments, especially on Leyden Jar phe­
nomena, Franklin first articulated his theory of electricity in a formal
190
paper, addressed to Peter Collinson, July 29, 1750. It will be use­
ful at first to borrow a succinct statement of the general outline of 
this theory from Heilbron, and then discuss the explanations it provides 
of a wide range of electrical phenomena.
The phenomena of electricity, he says, depends upon the inter­
actions of two types of matter, the common and the electrical. Ele­
ments of the former attract, those of the latter repel one another; 
while between a particle of the common, and one of the electrical 
matter a strong attraction obtains. Because of these forces, and 
the great subtlety of electrical fire, neutral matter is a 'kind of 
sponge' crammed with as much of the fire as it can hold. Between 
two neutral bodies there is no net electrical interaction. For 
'electrical signs' to appear— attractions, repulsions, sparks, 
shocks— electrical matter must be accumulated. The accumulation, 
or excess beyond the amount required to saturate a body, 'lies with­
out upon the surface, and forms what we call an electrical atmo­
sphere'. We know that, in general bodies contain nearly their just
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quantities of electrical matter, for a small increment usually con­
fers an atmosphere; and we know that, since bodies with atmospheres 
repel one another, common matter does not normally contain more of 
the electric matter than it can a b s o r b . ^^l
Franklin reports some nice experiments to support his postulation of
atmospheres, and some which seem, to him, to render them visible, using
smoke, etc. (much like Nollet's demonstration of his effluent jets using
192fine dust on the prime conductor). He also speculates concerning the 
ease with which pointed objects more easily receive and transmit electric 
sparks than blunted objects (as he did in his first paper), though he 
later came to be less sure of this.
Most important, perhaps, are his detailed account of the impene­
trability of glass to explain the Leyden Jar and his explanation of older 
experiments (like the inverted wine glass experiment, and Hauksbee's hoop-
threads on the inside of a glass cylinder) that seem to indicate that
193glass ie penetrable.
We cannot by any means we are yet acquainted with force the 
electric fluid through glass. I know it is commonly thought that 
it easily pervades glass, and the experiment of a feather suspended 
by a thread,in a bottle hermetically sealed, yet moved by bringing 
a rubbed tube near the outside of the bottle is alleged to prove it. 
But, if the electrical fluid can easily permeate glass, how does the 
vial become charged (as we term it) when we hold it in our hands?
Would not the fire thrown in by the wire, pass through to our hands, 
and then escape into the floor?^^^
In fact, for Franklin, if there is a crack in the glass, the bottle will
not charge, which certainly seems to further support his view. Also, an
experiment that Franklin feels might convince a "slight observer" that
glass was penetrable, on closer examination proves the contrary. If a
Leyden Jar is placed on a glass stand beneath the prime conductor, and a
bullet is suspended by a chain from the prime conductor to within 1/4
inch over the wire of the bottle, and one places her knuckle on the glass
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stand 1/4 inch from the jar, a spark will fly from the bullet to the
wire as the globe is turned, and another spark will be seen (and felt)
at the same instant passing to the knuckle. Does this not demonstrate
that the same electrical fluid that enters the wire, passes through the
glass of the jar and onto the knuckle? No!, according to Franklin, since
the jar will be charged by this procedure, which would be impossible if
it were the same spark that entered and left the jar (i.e., the total
electrical fluid contained in the jar would be the same as before the
turning of the globe if the same spark entered and left, or for that
matter, if glass permitted the electrical fluid to pass through).
Rather, for Franklin, this experiment provides an elegant support for
his account of the jar; that for every surplus charge forced into the
inside, an equal quantity will be discharged by the outside. If this
195
were not the case, there is no way the jar could charge.
One of the most fruitful parts of Franklin’s theory, and the 
most troublesome given his model for it, is his near anticipation of 
electrostatic induction. Franklin's postulation of 'electrical atmo­
spheres', as in most of the previous effluvial theories, was an attempt 
to provide a mechanical (non action at a distance) account of (ACR).^^^ 
Unlike earlier theorists, however, he did not take his fluid analogy so 
literally as to think that these atmospheres 'mixed', or that there was 
an actual transfer of electrical fluid in electrical phenomena. Rather, 
the atmospheres reacted to each other in a static way. As Heilbron 
claims :
Somehow an atmosphere causes its host and neighboring neutral 
bodies to come together, and two atmospheres, without mixing, force 
their (positively) charged possessors to move apart. Whether the
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atmospheres rotate, gyrate, pulsate, or vegetate does not appear; 
compared to earlier models they seem lifeless, even vegetal.19?
Besides the lack of articulation concerning atmospheres, his brief ac­
count of them seemed contradictory; the 'air' both being transparent to
them, and, sometimes, the mechanism which retained them around the
198bodies they surrounded. Furthermore, of course, such a model could
provide no explanation of the repulsion between two negatively charged 
199bodies. Still, his confusing, static atmospheres were a strength as
well as a weakness of his theory. Not being able to surrender mechanical 
models (and not being mathematically sophisticated enough to investigate 
action at a distance alternatives— reminiscent of the 'bag of marbles' 
account of atoms in Dalton's model for his law of partial pressures), he 
was also, due to the cornerstones of his new approach, unable to fully 
embrace the literal mechanical views of the effluviasts. Consequently, 
what he said was confused by his impotent atmosphere model, but what he 
almost said in several places comes very close to action at a distance, 
which would be successfully used by mathematical electricians in the near 
future.200
Consider, for example, Watson's intermediate position between
Franklin and Nollet. He shared, again, the English conception of the
imbalance of electrical equilibrium, and Nollet's Cartesian concept of
varying densities of the electrical matter, the surrounding air, etc.
Though Watson at first thought his position similar to Franklin's, his
literal mechanical-dynamical view of bodies moving in response to two
streams of fluid was in fact closer to Nollet than to Franklin's ambig-
201uous account of 'atmospheres', (although his equilibrium view was, as 
was claimed earlier, more like Franklin's). While his followers cannot
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be blamed for their misinterpretation of Franklin's troublesome model,
202which also provided grounds for Nollet's counterattack, his dis­
claimers concerning their interpretations of his system demonstrate 
that he was in principle, if not in fact, theoretically beyond the me­
chanical constraints of earlier theorists, and this struggling with new 
concepts is one of the reasons his theory was on the right track.
John Canton's experiments on what we would call electrostatic
203induction provide a good example for showing Franklin's theoretical 
acumen, hampered as it was by his atmosphere model. If two cork balls, 
for example, are suspended from the ceiling by 8-9 inch linen threads 
so that they hang in contact with one another, and a rubbed glass tube 
is made to approach them, the balls will separate when the tube is three 
to four feet away, and will separate farther as the tube is brought 
nearer. If the balls are suspended by dry silk threads, however, the 
tube must be brought within 18 inches before they repel one another, and 
they will continue to repel one another after the tube is withdrawn! In 
the first instance, according to Canton, since the balls are not insu­
lated (due to the linen threads), they are not electrified (since the 
surplus electricity passes through the threads to the ceiling), but the 
atmosphere of the approaching tube causes them to "attract" and "con­
dense" the electrical fluid about them, and separate because of the re-
204pulsion of the electrical particles. Since they are insulated in the 
second experiment (due to the silk threads), the tube must approach 
nearer because a denser (!) part of the atmosphere of the tube is neces­
sary for them to repel one another. The dynamics involved here in 
Canton's account can be made clearer by considering another one of his
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 ^ 205experiments.
If a tin tube 4-5 feet in length and two inches in diameter is 
hung from the ceiling by silk threads, and cork balls are suspended from 
one end of it by linen threads, and the tin tube is electrified by 
bringing an excited glass tube near the opposite end from the cork balls, 
the balls will diverge from one another to hang one and a half inches 
apart. As the glass tube approaches closer, they will lose their repel­
ling power and converge, if still closer they will again repel one 
another and to the same distance as before. As the glass tube is with­
drawn, they will reverse this process. If the tin tube is electrified 
instead by the approach of a rubbed wax tube (negatively charged), the 
balls will behave in a similar manner. On the other hand, if the tin 
tube is electrified by glass and approached by wax (or vice versa), 
their repulsion will be increased. Why? For Canton, the glass tube 
electrifies the tin tube positively, adding to the electric matter it 
contained, so the balls will attain a surplus of electric matter through 
the linen threads and will repel each other. But as the glass approaches 
closer, emitting electric fluid, the discharge of it from the balls will 
be diminished, a part of it will be driven back and they will converge. 
And :
If the tube be held at such a distance from the balls, that the 
excess of the density of the fluid round about them, above the com­
mon quantity in air, be equal to the excess of the density of that 
within them, above the common quantity contained in cork; their re­
pulsion will be quite destroyed.20?
If the tube is brought closer, however, the fluid without will again be
more dense than that within the balls; they will attract it, and recede
from one another again. The increased distance of the repulsion if the
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tin tube is electrified positively and approached by a negatively 
charged rod (or vice versa), is due to the increased difference in den­
sity between the balls and the fluid surrounding them. This is, of 
course, a hodge podge, consisting of parts of Franklin's static atmo­
spheres, older density views of effluvia, and new facts dictated by 
these experiments. Still, his experiments were elegant and suggestive, 
despite the crudity of his explanations.
Franklin's response to Canton's work shows his ability to clar­
ify experimental results, and give a good indication of his non-
208mechanical tendencies. He begins his account with a restatement of 
his distinction between (what we would call) inductive effects, and 
those involving actual transference of electrical matter, again, by 
denying that atmospheres 'mix' (i.e., his static/dynamic, density ac­
count) .
Electric atmospheres, that flow round non electric bodies, be­
ing brought near each other, do not readily mix and unite into one 
atmosphere, but remain separate, and repel each o t h e r .209
Furthermore, atmospheres not only repel one another, but also the elec­
tric matter contained in the substance of a body, "and without joining
or mixing with it, force it to other parts of the body that contained 
210it." This is, of course, to implicitly accept action at a distance, 
and was to later be utilized by more mathematically inclined electri­
cians, until it was used quite fruitfully by Coulomb in the first really
211adequate mathematical account of static electricity. That Franklin's 
account came close to later action at a distance treatments was noted by 
Priestley, who first provides Franklin's response to Canton and praises 
it for its simplicity (modesty), and then goes on to argue that the
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phenomena could also be accounted for by action at a distance models,
introducing the subsequent work of Wilcke and Aepinas, and the eventual
212overthrow of the entire 'atmosphere' approach.
In summary, Franklin's theory, though at times an odd mixture 
of old and new concepts, provided the first adequate explanation of the 
multi-varied experimental phenomena engendered by the Leyden Jar, and 
suggested (while still hamstrung by an inadequate model), fruitful ap­
proaches to electrostatic induction that were to destroy mechanical ex­
planations of static electricity until the field theories of Faraday and 
Maxwell in the 19th century. Furthermore, his terminology of 'plus' and 
'minus' electrification remains a useful device to this day, and his 
utilization of the law of the conservation of electric charge remains an 
undisputed physical law. There are indeed no 'atmospheres' and no 'elec­
trical fluid', but Franklin's struggle with these inadequate mechanical 
concepts is much to his credit, since unlike his contemporaries and pre­
decessors, he was never willing to sacrifice experimental demonstrations 
to contemporary mechanical models. While not true or approximately true, 
therefore, Franklin's approach was on the right track as can be illus­
trated by the easy translation of the salient elements of Franklin's 
theory into the later concept of fields of force, and the electron 
theory of the 20th century.
We have been able to measure the masses associated with given 
charges of electricity in gases at low pressures, and it has been 
found that the mass associated with a positive charge is immensely 
greater than that associated with a negative one. This difference 
is what we should expect on Franklin's one-fluid theory, if that 
theory were modified by making the electric fluid correspond to 
negative instead of positive electricity, while we have no reason 
to anticipate so great a difference on the two-fluid theory. We 
shall, I am sure, be struck between the similarity between some of
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the views that we are led to take by the result of the most recent
researches with those enumerated by Franklin in the very infancy of
the subject.213
Hence, on my account, we can talk about the 'truthlikeness' of Franklin's 
theory, in terms of his nearness to views that are more nearly correct 
(from our perspective— benign chauvinism). Also, I will try to further 
justify this claim by showing that the increased success of Franklin's 
theory at the time it was developed was because of this truthlikeness. 
That is, his theory succeeded where his competitors did not because of 
its anticipation of part of the correct account of electrostatics.
Franklin's use of the law of the conservation of charge, for 
example, was one of the main reasons his theory provided a better account 
of the Leyden Jar than earlier effluvial approaches, and this law an 
empirical law. Consequently, while his terminology and models often di­
verge from our treatment, in so far as he remained faithful to this law, 
one would expect his theory to work. Furthermore, while 'atmospheres' 
did not (and could not) provide a correct account of many electrical phe­
nomena, especially electrostatic induction, his confused, static, inter­
pretation of these did not lead him into the same mechanical pitfalls 
experienced by his competitors. It was his allegiance to the conserva­
tion of charge, and his 'plus' and 'minus' terminology (as well as 
'charge' and 'discharge') that confused his contemporaries, and sepa­
rated his theory from the sterile 'density' interpretations of Watson, 
Wilson, and Canton. In other words, from my perspective, while there 
were previous 'successful' theories of electricity, Franklin's achieved 
a greater level of the virtues, and proved fruitful for later electrical 
work because he had tapped into notions that are either correct, or
296
directly led to notions that were correct. His theory was thereby on 
the right track, and the level of virtues it achieved it achieved ^  so 
far as it was on the right track (i.e., it was 'truthlike', though not 
true or approximately true, given the non-denotative status of many of 
its central theoretical terms).
Also, while there were problems with his account of (ACR) phe­
nomena (and hence Nollet and others were not automatically 'stuck in a 
competing paradigm' or 'stubborn' in their refusal to accept his ap­
proach) , his Leyden Jar experiments and explanations were considerably 
more virtuous than his competitors' accounts. Furthermore, since Leyden 
Jar phenomena eventually proved to encompass more data than traditional 
(ACR) data, and eventually proved more fruitful for action at a distance 
models, and electrostatic induction, his theory was more virtuous given 
the entire range of data. Hence, even the later competing 'two-fluid' 
theory remained closer to Franklin than to (for example) Nollet's views, 
which quietly died out. In other words, while there were some good rea­
sons for rejecting Franklin's account, and even more good reasons (e.g., 
the equivocal treatment of 'atmospheres') for reserving judgment, 
Franklin's theory proved to be more virtuous (even at the time), and 
hence the gradual converging of opinion concerning (at least) Franklin­
like approaches, over older effluvial accounts. Franklin's theory never 
achieved a level of virtues to warrant rational belief, but it was still 
an impressively successful theory. On my account of diachronic realism 
and truthlikeness, the relative success of all of the above early elec­
trical theories was due to their being right about something. Franklin's 
theory, however, because it directly led to more adequate accounts, and
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because of the relative ease with which it can be 'translated' into cur­
rent accounts, was also on the right track. Hence it was more 'truth­
like' and consequently more virtuous than its competitors because it 
comes closer to later true accounts. I think that my explanation of the 
success of Franklin's theory succeeds (while (CER) accounts fail) in 
fulfilling the realist desideratum that theoretical success is best ex­
plained by a realist account of (some) scientific theories. Conse­
quently, I think that this chapter provides reason to hope that dia­
chronic realism is historically adequate, as well as conceptually 
adequate.
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190"Opinions and Conjectures, Concerning the Properties and 
Effects of the electrical Matter, arising from Experiments and Observa­
tions made at Philadelphia, 1749, Paper to Peter Collinson," July 29, 
1750, in Benjamin Franklin's Experiments, pp. 213-36. See also, 
Heilbron, pp. 334-43, Franklin and Newton, pp. 467-78, Roderick W. Home, 
"Franklin’s Electrical Atmosphere's," British Journal for the History of 
Science, vol. 6, no. 22 (1972).
Heilbron, p. 335.
192"Opinions and Conjectures," pp. 215-18, the experiment render­
ing atmospheres ’visible’, p. 216.
^^^Ibid., pp. 227-36.
194
Ibid., p. 227» Emphasis in original.
195
Ibid., p. 228. See also, Franklin and Newton, pp. 473-76.
^^^Heilbron, p. 337.
^^ I^bid.
1Q8
Home, "Franklin’s Electrical Atmospheres," pp. 135-37. 
l^ *Ibid.
^^^For a brief account of how the non-mathematical electricians 
of Franklin’s day could not appreciate the bold step taken by Aepinas, 
see Roderick W. Home, "Aepinas and the British Electricians: The
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Dissemination of a Scientific Theory," Isis, vol. 63, no. 217 (1972).
201
Home, "Franklin’s Electrical Atmospheres," pp. 140-42.
202
Ibid., p. 145, Heilbron, pp. 352-62.
203
John Canton, "Electrical Experiments, with an Attempt to 
Account for their several Phenomena: Together with Some Observations
on the Positive and Negative electrical State of the Clouds," Dec. 6, 
1753, in Benjamin Franklin's Experiments, pp. 293-99. See also, 
Heilbron, pp. 373-76; Franklin and Newton, pp. 516-24; Home, "Franklin's 
Electrical Atmospheres," pp. 142-43; Priestley, vol. 1, pp. 386-93. The 
following account is a paraphrase of Canton.
Canton, "Electrical Experiments, with an Attempt to Account 
for their several Phenomena: Together with Some Observations on the
Positive and Negative electrical State of the Clouds," p. 294.
^°^Ibid., p. 295.
ZO^Ibid.
208"Electrical Experiments made in Pursuance of those made by 
M. Canton, dated Dec. 6, 1753," March 14, 1755, in Benjamin Franklin's
Experiments, pp. 302-306.
2 0 9
Ibid., p. 302. See also, Heilbron, pp. 376-77; Franklin and
Newton, pp. 526-28; Priestley, vol. 1, pp. 293-94.
210Benjamin Franklin's Experiments, p. 302.
211George Gamov, Biography of Physics (New York: Harper Torch-
books, 1961), pp. 128-30, Whittaker, pp. 57-60.
01 o
Priestley, vol. 1, pp. 293-303, Whittaker, pp. 48-53.
213J. J. Thomson, Electricity and Matter (New York: Charles
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Scribner's Sons, 1905), p. 6. See also, his later account of the atomic 
structure of electricity, and the easy translation he provides of 
Franklin's theory into his own, pp. 88-89.
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